HARVARD COLLEGE
LIBRARY
Sffi
GIFT OF THE
GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF
THE RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
(Based on testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa
and Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OE REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGEESS
FIRST SESSION
AUGUST 9, 22, AND 23, 1951
Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities
HARVARD C0LLE6E LIBRARY
DEPOSITEB BY THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
DtC 10 1951
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90929 WASHINGTON : 1951
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JOHN S. WOOD, Georgia, Chairman
FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania HAROLD H. VELDE, Illinois
MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York
CLYDE DOYLE, California DONALD L. JACKSON, California
JAMES B. FRAZIER, Jr., Tennessee CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan
Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., Counsel
Louis J. Russell, Senior Investigator
John W. Carrington, Clerk of Committee
Raphael I. Nixon, Director of Research
II
CONTENTS
Pace
August '•>. 1951, testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa 1134
Augusl 22, 1951, testimony of Maj. (leu. Charles Willoughby _ 11(51
August 23, 1951, testimony of —
Courtney E. Owens 11H5
Maj. Gen. Charles Andrew Willoughby 1198
in
HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD
SORGE SPY CASE
(Based on Testimony of Mitsnsada Yoshikawa and
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willonghby)
THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1951
United States House of Representatives,
Committee on Un-American Activities,
Washington, D. C.
PUBLIC HEARING
The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to call at
10 : 30 a. m. in room 220, Old House Office Building, Hon. Francis E.
Walter presiding.
Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter,
Clyde Doyle, Bernard W. Kearney, Donald L. Jackson, and Charles
E. Potter (appearance as noted in transcript).
Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Courtney
E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of research; John
W. Carrington, clerk ; and A. S. Poore, editor.
Mr. Walter. The committee will come to order. Is the interpreter
here, Mr. Kuroda ?
Mr. Kuroda. Yes.
Mr. Walter. Will you stand and raise your right hand, please.
Do you solemnly swear you will truly and accurately interpret into
the Japanese language the questions propounded by the committee,
and that you will make a true and accurate interpretation in the
English language of the replies made by the witness in the Japanese
language, so help you God \
Mr. Kuroda. I do.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, before swearing in the witness, may
I suggest that the } r oung lady there be sworn in as a monitor. Due to
the difficulties in translation of finding the exact equivalent in English
of the Japanese, it has been the general practice for a monitor to be
present also, to give her interpretation in the event of a difference.
Mr. Walter. I think she should be sworn as an interpreter.
Do you solemnly swear you will truly and accurately interpret into
the Japanese language the questions propounded in English by the
committee, and that you will make a true and accurate interpretation
in the English language of the answers made by the witness in the
Japanese language, so help j^ou God?
Mrs. Katsuyo L. Takesiiita. I do.
Mr. Walter. Will the witness please stand. [To Mr. Kuroda.]
Repeat this, please.
1133
1134 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
I swear that in answering all questions propounded to me in the
course of this hearing. I will state the truth according to my con-
science, adding nothing and concealing nothing.
Mr. Yoshikawa (through Mr. Kuroda). Yes.
TESTIMONY OF MITSTJSADA YOSHIKAWA
(Through the Interpreter, Andrew Y. Kuroda, Assisted by the
Monitor, Mrs. Katsuyo L. Takeshita)
Mr. Tavenner. Will you state your full name, please I
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yoshikawa, Mitsusada. 1
Mr. Tavenner. Your name is Yoshikawa, Mitsusada \
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa, you are at present in the United
States on a mission of the Japanese Government, I believe; is that
correct ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. You are a native of Japan?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. When and where were you born ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I was born in Tokyo on January 16, 1907.
Mr. Tavenner. What position do you now hold with the Japanese
Government ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I am the chief of the special investigation bureau
of the attorney general's office.
Mr. Tavenner. How long have you held that position ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. For about 3 years.
Mr. Tavenner. What other official positions have you held with the |
Japanese Government ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I was a prosecutor and also an official in the
Ministry of Justice. I was holding those offices concurrently.
Mr. Tavenner. I notice that the translation given was prosecutor.
Have you held the position of procurator under the Japanese
Government?
Mr. Yoshikaw t a. Yes. It is officially translated as procurator in-
stead of prosecutor.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, according to An Outline of the
Japanese Judiciary, by Masataro Miyake, published in Tokyo in 1935,
page 4, a procurator has the following function :
To conduct searches, institute prosecutions, and supervise the execution of
judgments in criminal cases and to act as representative of the public interest in
civil cases of public concern.
Mr. Walter. It sounds like duties of the nature of those of the
Attorney General and the head of the FBI.
Mr. Tavenner. The duties are even broader than that. Procurators
are attached to district and appeals courts in Japan, as well as to the
supreme court. The Library of Congress likens a procurator to a dis-
trict attorney in the United States, but having much more power than
a district attorney.
I would like to ask the witness if that is his understanding of the
duties of a procurator.
(Representative Charles E. Potter entered hearing room.)
1 In Japanese, it is customary to give last name first.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1135
Mr. Kuboda. He says that what is written here is right. However,
he is not quite sure what it means, having much more power than a
district attorney.
Mr. Tavenner. When you -were procurator, were you attached to
the criminal courts of Tokyo ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. For a certain period I was.
Mr. Tavenner. What was that period '.
Mi-. Yoshikawa. 1 don't remember exactly, but from around Sep-
tember 1938 for about 8 years.
Mr. Tavenner. During the period you were procurator, were you
assigned to the case of Richard Sorge in the performance of your
duties as a procurator?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you describe very briefly the nature of your
assignment to the case of Richard Sorge?
Mr. Yoshikawa. A group
Mr. Tavenner. Just a moment, please. May I suggest that from
this point on the interpreter interpret in shorter passages.
Mr. Yoshikawa. A group of procurators was organized to make
search and prosecute this case under Mr. Toneo Nakamura. Mr. Naka-
mura was chief of a division of the Tokyo district criminal court, the
prosecution bureau, and under Mr. Nakamura I was appointed as the
one primarily in charge of the prosecution. There were two persons
appointed, and I was one of the two, and I was in charge of the prose-
cution of this case, and I used several procurators and engaged in the
search.
Mr. Tavenner. When you speak of being engaged in search, do you
mean engaged in investigation of the case ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I personally conducted the investigation, and also
I appointed other procurators to help conduct this prosecution, and
also I ordered the police to help in the investigation.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you state, please, what led up to the arrest of
Richard Sorge?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I remember, I think it was around the spring of
1941, a woman called Tomo Kitabayashi came to Tokyo from America.
We received information that this woman Kitabayashi was doing
some spy activities.
We ordered police to proceed in investigation.
Kitabayashi went to Wakayama.
We couldn't get any evidence against her.
But in October of that year — that is, 1941 — T recall we received cer-
tain information, and therefore we arrested Kitabayashi.
Kitabayashi denied that she was a spy. However, she stated that a
person called Yotokti Miyagi. who came from America, was doing
some kind of spy activities.
Mr. Tavenner. May I interrupt you at that point. Was Yotoku
Miyagi an American citizen?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I am not sure, but I think lie was an American
citizen.
Mr. Tavenner. Proceed, please.
Mr. Yoshikawa. We arrested Mi vagi and investigated him. He
vehemently denied he was a spy. However, when w 7 e searched his
house we discovered an odd object.
It was an English document.
1136 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
It was a document conducted by the South Manchurian Railway
Co., and it was regarded as secret material to the Japanese Govern-
ment.
We thought it was strange that an artist had such kind of docu-
ment.
Mr. Tavenner. Miy agi was an artist ; is that correct %
Mr. Yoshikawa. He was an artist, and he had some reputation as
an artist in Tokyo. He painted American-style paintings.
Miyagi continued to deny that he was a spy. However, a certain
thing happened.
He was being investigated on the second floor of the Tsukiji police
station in Tokyo.
He attempted to commit suicide by jumping out of the window.
He wasn't injured, nor he died.
Police jumped after him and captured him.
After this incident, Miyagi began to state.
He began to state about a very important spy group ; he began to
state about the activities of a very important spy group.
Then he described the person who had closest connection with
Miyagi was Hidemi Ozaki, who was regarded as the brains of the
Konoye Cabinet.
Mr. Tavenner. Excuse me. I did not understand what he said
about Ozaki's connection with the Konoye Cabinet.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Premier Konoye had around him a group of
brain trusters or advisers, and they formed a society called Breakfast
Club, and Ozaki was one of the most brilliant advisers of Konoye.
As an illustration of his brilliancy, this can be stated : When the
Marco Polo incident occurred, Ozaki said that the incident would
become larger, extend larger. At that time people were confused
whether the incident would be localized or extended. However, the
development showed that Ozaki's prophecy was right, and his reputa-
tion increased.
(Representative Bernard W. Kearney left hearing room.)
Mr. Tavenner. Then I understand Ozaki was very close to Prince
Konoye, who occupied what position at that time ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. But what position did Prince Konoye hold at that
time in the Japanese Government ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. He was the Prime Minister at that time.
Mr. Tavenner. Now if you will proceed.
Mr. Kuroda. He asked if he may smoke.
Mr. Walter. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Yoshikawa. So we were very surprised when we found that
Ozaki was involved in this case. We were not sure we could proceed
in this case because of Ozaki's closeness to the Prime Minister. Then
we found that behind Ozaki there were several foreigners also.
Moreover, among those foreigners we found there was Richard
Sorge, who was the highest adviser to German Ambassador Ott,
although he didn't have any official position.
My colleague procurator, Tamazawa, investigated Miyagi.
I examined the content of the investigation.
And finally we arrested Ozaki.
I investigated Ozaki personally.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1137
I examined Ozaki at the Meguro police station, and he con fessed t he
same day.
He disclosed the name of Shigeru Mizuno. Therefore we arrested
Mizuno.
I began to examine Ozaki in detail.
We came to the conclusion we should arrest the foreigners, based
on the examination of Miyagi and Ozaki.
The Konoye Cabinet was pushed into a difficult position and finally
resigned.
It was before the forming of the Tojo Cabinet.
We were not particularly taking advantage of this situation, but
we arrested Sorge and Klansen and Vonkelitch.
I may correct my statement here. Tojo was scheduled to become the
head of the Cabinet, and it was known that Mr. Iwamura, who was
the Minister of Justice in the Konoye Cabinet, would stay in the new
Cabinet; therefore, we received the approval of Mr. Iwamura and
started arresting these people.
(Representative Clyde Doyle left hearing room.)
Mr. Tavenxek. With regard to the people who were arrested at that
time, I want to be certain we have their names listed correctly. You
spoke of Klausen. Is that Max Klausen, K-1-a-u-s-e-n?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavexxer. And the person referred to as Voukelitch was
Branko Voukelitch, B-r-a-n-k-o V-o-u-k-e-l-i-t-c-h.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Branko de Voukelitch, yes.
Mr. Tavenxer. You mentioned the name of Mizuno. Is that the
same person as S-h-i-g-e-r-u M-i-z-u-n-o.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavexxer. What is the first name of Ozaki ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. H-i-d-e-m-i.
Mr. Tavexxer. We have in the record of the Sorge trial the trans-
lation of Ozaki's first name as H-o-z-u-m-i.
Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't know, but we called him Hidemi.
Mr. Tavexxer. There was only one Ozaki involved in the Sorge
case?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavexner. Very well. Proceed, please.
Mr. Yoshikawa. We arrested Max Klausen, his wife, Anna Klausen,
and Voukelitch, and conducted a house search of these people.
What we wondered most was whether we could discover a radio
transmitter.
Fortunately, we could discover the radio transmitter, and we im-
pounded it. And also-we found coded messages and messages which
were to be coded, and also a code book, which was a German statistical
yearbook.
We were afraid that Sorge might shoot at us with a pistol. We put
Sorge's house under surveillance for several days. That morning a
person from the German Embassy visited Sorge. After that person
left we went in and arrested Sorge.
When he was arrested, Sorge insisted that he was a Nazi and held a
very high position as an adviser in the German Embassy.
Mr. Walter. About when was that?
Mr. Yoshikawa. In Tokyo.
Mr. Walter. When ? About what date ?
1138 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Yoshikawa. I think it was November 1941.
Mr. Walter. Did your investigation disclose that at that time both
Germany and Russia knew of plans to make the attack at Pearl
Harbor ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. It wasn't disclosed during the examination.
Mr. Walter. Was it subsequently learned, as a result of these ar-
rests and the investigation, that both Germany and Russia were
informed of the plans for the attack?
Mr. Yoshikawa. The Pearl Harbor attack did not come up.
I would like to mention about intelligence activities later.
Sorge was brought to the Toriisaka police station nearby.
After a physical examination, Sorge and Voukelitch were brought
to a Tokyo detention house.
The following day the procurator started to investigate.
Mr. Walter. May I interrupt at that point? Did the investigation
disclose that the Japanese forces contemplated attacks and that this
fact was known by the German and Russian Governments ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I am not sure exactly.
Since you asked me that question again, I will mention this. Sorge
informed Russia 2 months before Germany attacked Russia about the
German readiness of attacking. Sorge informed Russia that 150 divi-
sions of the German Army were massed at the border, and the German
high command was of the opinion that Petrograd, or Leningrad, would
fall within 2 months.
Mr. Tavenner. Proceed, please.
Mr. Yoshikawa. In connection with the investigation of Sorge,
Klausen, and Voukelitch, I personally investigated Sorge.
As I said, I was in charge of the investigation of Sorge, and Mr.
Hiroshi Iwo was in charge of Klausen. Another procurator was
appointed to investigate Voukelitch. When I started the investiga-
tion of Sorge he vehemently denied.
After one week, and I think it was Saturday evening, Sorge finally
confessed.
He wrote on a sheet of paper in German that "I have been an inter-
national Communist since 1925 and I am still," and then he confessed.
By that time Klausen and Voukelitch also confessed. This is the
process up to the prosecution.
If you have any questions.
Mr. Tavenner. Was there any coercion of any character used in
obtaining the confession?
Mr. Yoshikawa. No.
Klausen first confessed that he was a spy for the Red Army.
And Voukelitch confessed that he was a spy for the Comintern.
And so a very serious ensuing search took place.
We couldn't tell the nature of this spy group until Sorge confessed.
I told Sorge that Miyagi and Ozaki confessed and showed evidence.
While we were repeating this, he confessed himself.
I have an opinion why Richard Sorge confessed.
The first reason is this: He thought that his arrest was too late.
Sorge and his group had almost finished their spy activities and they
thought they were very successful. A few days before the arrest
Klausen and Voukelitch met at the house of Sorge and they were won-
dering why Ozaki failed to show up. They were talking that since
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1139
their activities were almost through they were going to get out of
Japan and by all means go to Germany to engage in spy activities
there.
Mr. Walter. Did he know of a radio message that wss sent in
October?
Mr. Kuroda. Mr. Chairman, when you said "he" you mean Mr.
Yoshikawa (
Mr. Walter. Yes.
Mr. Yoshikawa. 1 don't remember very exactly.
Mr. Walter. Does he know about this message as a result of his
invest igat ion :
The American-Japanese talks have entered upon their final stage. In Konoye's
opinion they will end successfully if Japan decreases her forces in China and
French Indochina and gives up her plan of building eight naval and air bases in
French Indochina. If America refuses to compromise by the middle of October,
Japan will attack America, the Malay countries, Singapore, and Sumatra. She
will not attack Borneo because it is within reach of Singapore and Manila.
However, there will be war only if the talks break down, and there is no doubt
that Japan is doing her best to bring them to a successful conclusion, even at the
expense of her German ally.
I think I had better show you the message and ask if you know
about this message [handing message to the witness and Mr. Kuroda].
Mr. Kuroda.. He says that he recalls about this message.
Mr. Walter. So that there is no doubt but that Russia knew in
advance of the plans on the part of Japan for aggression?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes; and also, Russia would probably welcome
a Japanese attack, instead of going north, going south.
Mr. Walter. Exactly.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Along that line, Sorge was doing certain political
maneuvering in addition to his spy activities.
Ozaki was also cooperating with Sorge.
Mr. Walter. In other words, spies paid by the Russian Government
were using whatever influence they had in order to promote Japanese
aggression against the United States and the British ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. To a certain extent.
(Representative Clyde Doyle returned to hearing room.)
Mr. Yoshikawa. In August of that year, 1,300,000 soldiers were
mobilized in Japan, and Sorge was very much interested in obtaining
the information to which direction, in which area, this number of
soldiers would be used.
Mr. Potter. In other words, he was anxious. I assume, to have the
troops go south rather than north toward the Manchurian border; is
that right?
Mr. Yoshikawa. He was very much anxious, and tried to get the
information.
Miyagi frequented the eating and drinking places in Tokyo and
tried to approach soldiers and tried to get information where they
were headed. Ozaki tried to get the information from the higher
echelon of the Government. However, the soldiers were wearing
summer clothes instead of winter, so they thought the soldiers were
headed toward the south instead of the north.
Mr. Potter. Did Sorge, posing as a German or Nazi, use his in-
fluence on various policy makers in Japan to carry out the Communist
wish to move the soldiers to the south as a threat to the British and
1140 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
the United States, rather than to the north, which might be a threat
to Russia ? Did he use his influence to formulate that policy ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I think Sorge didn't have much connection with
the high officials of the Japanese Government. What connection he
had was rather with the army general staff of Japan.
Before the Russian-German war started high military officers came
to Tokyo from Berlin.
And also an emissary of the German Admiral Canaries, who was
in charge of antiespionage activities, came to Tokyo.
When those people came from Germany to Japan they met, of
course, Ambassador Ott, and they also met Sorge.
And they went to the Japanese Army general staff, the Japanese
Army high officials, to see them with Sorge.
Ambassador Ott went to the Japanese Army general staff showing
the German plan of attacking Singapore, and told the Japanese that
if they followed that plan Singapore would fall very easily. At that
time Sorge was an assistant to the German Ambassador.
Mr. Tavenner. And that plan was prepared in the German Em-
bassy, was it not, by Von Kretchner, and at that time all the German
attaches were recalled for the purpose of that study?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I haven't heard about it.
Mr. Tavenner. The plan that was presented was a plan for over-
land attack, just as it did occur finally?
Mr. Yoshikawa. According to Sorge's confession, the Japanese staff
officers were not particularly eager to accept that plan right away.
Mr. Walter. May I interrupt at that point ? I would like to get
clear in my mind the connection between some of these individuals.
Sorge and Ozaki were very close, were they not ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Were more than close.
Mr. Walter. They were both Communist agents; both agents of
Russia; were they not?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Sorge started to use Ozaki as his assistant in
Shanghai. At that time Sorge received approval from Russia. In
Tokyo, too, when Ozaki was used in the spy ring in Japan, Sorge
received the approval from Russia, and Ozaki was the closest assistant
to Sorge. Ozaki was in a secret section of the Central Committee of
the Russian Communist Party.
Mr. Walter. And Ozaki was also at that time one of the leading
Communists out there and was the political adviser to Prince Konoye ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. At the time Gen. Eugene Ott, German Ambassador
to Japan, along with Richard Sorge, attempted to sell a plan of attack
on Singapore to the Japanese general staff, do you know whether
General Ott had taken that plan to Ribbentrop in Germany, where
discussions were held between Ribbentrop and Matsuoka, the Japanese
Foreign Minister?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I am not familiar with what you state. However,
Soi'ge sent important messages concerning Matsuoka.
Before Matsuoka went to Europe, Prince Konoye told Matsuoka
that it would be all right to conclude a commercial treaty with Russia,
however, don't do anything in Germany.
That message was sent by Sorge, therefore Stalin was waiting for
Matsuoka.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1141
What Matsuoka got from Stalin in the form of a treaty was actually
more than what Konoye was expecting, however.
That was the information which Sorge sent to Moscow in regard to
the trip of Matsuoka.
And so Matsuoka had only a hearty welcome in Germany and
not hing more.
So 1 heard.
Mr. Tavenner. The records of the conversations between Hitler
and Matsuoka and Oshiina were introduced in the trial of Tojo, were
they not ?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. I don't remember exactly.
Mr. Walter. Then, if 1 understand correctly, even after or at the
moment that Germany attacked Russia, Russia was concerned with
endeavoring to have the United States become involved in hostilities
wit h Japan \
Mr. Yosiiikawa. Yes. from the fact that German Ambassador Ott
showed plans of attacking Singapore even prior to the German attack
on Russia.
Mr. Walter. They probably were still concerned in endeavoring to
have us involved somewhere throughout the entire conspiracy?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. From these facts I could say that Sorge was pri-
marily interested in spy work and secondarily he w T as engaged in
political maneuvering, trying to divert Japanese attention to the
south instead of to the north.
Mr. Walter. In other words, he was acting in a dual capacity ?
Mi-. Yosiiikawa. He was telling the Japanese that the Russian
Army was strong, and also Siberia was rather barren, so Japan could
not get anything from Siberia, but in the south Japan could get im-
portant resources, and also it is easier to attack the south. That is
what he was trying to convince the Japanese people.
Mr. Potter. Y^ou stated that when the representatives of the Ger-
man Government visited Japan with this plan to move the Japanese
Army south, that there was some reluctance on the part of Japanese
military officials to accept that plan. Do you know what the official
position of the Japanese military was concerning wdiat they should
do with the troops? Did they envision sending their troops north?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. I haven't investigated the Japanese Army Gener-
al Stan 1 ', so I don't know.
Either right before or right after the war between Germany and
Russia started, a secret emissary came from Germany and, with Am-
bassador Ott. went to the Japanese General Staff to persuade the Jap-
anese Army to attack Russia.
The Japanese General "Staff replied that when the German Army
reached the Danube line, the Japanese Army might attack Russia.
Information like this centering around the German Embassy w 7 as
lost in fire.
Mr. Potter. Did the investigation you conducted bring out evidence
to determine whose idea it was to strike at Pearl Harbor? Was that
sponsored by Germany, or by the Communists, or was that the
Japanese Army's own policy?
Mr. Yoshikawa. That didn't come out in the investigation.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the relationship between General Ott
and Richard Sorge after the arrest of Richard Sorjre?
1142 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Yoshikawa. Ambassador Ott and Mrs. Ott were very surprised
and became very angry and put pressure on Tojo.
Ambassador Ott asked, through the Minister of Justice, to let the
Ambassador see Sorge.
We were very much embarrassed, because the investigation was
continuing at that time.
Fortunately, in 1 week Sorge confessed, and so after his confession
I told him that the Ambassador "is anxious to see you. Would you
like to see him?"
Sorge replied first that he would not like to see him.
Sorge told me that though their political opinions were different,
they were personally good friends, and so I told him, "If I were you,
I would see him. A Japanese in this kind of situation would see him
to say the last farewell." Sorge said, "Then I will see him."
So I told the Minister of Justice about that, and Ambassador Ott,
with Marchiter, Stahmer, and others, came to see Sorge.
After a brief interview, Sorge told Ott that this would be the last
time he would see him.
Ott was stunned and changed his countenance.
So we closed the interview and took Ott in another room. Ott said
that he would not do anything concerning this case any more, but
asked us to finish the investigation as quick as possible and let him
know about the results.
However, it appeared that the German Embassy tried to put pres-
sure upon us, using the Japanese left-wing people.
And so we made a copy of the first chapter of the investigation of
the Sorge case and sent it to the German Embassy through the
Minister of Justice.
Mr. Tavenner. May I ask a question at that point before you go
into a further discussion of that matter ?
Did information come to you, in the course of this investigation,
to indicate whether or not General Eugene Ott, the German Am-
bassador, knew of the Communist affiliation of Richard Sorge?
Mr. Yoshikawa. No. Ambassador Ott was completely deceived.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the result of General Ott being deceived
by Sorge, with regard to his relations with his own government?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I think if Ott had gone home he would have been
killed.
Mr. Tavenner. He was immediately replaced by Stahmer as Am-
bassador to Japan, was he not?
Mr. Yoshikawa. That is correct. And instead of going home,
Ott went to Peking and stayed in China.
This is not very reliable, but we heard, we had information, that
after the death of Ott, his wife went to Russia.
Mr. Waeter. Did Sorge at any time give you information concern-
ing the extent of Communist espionage in the United States?
Mr. Yoshikawa. lie did not,.
Sorge made comments on the American Communist Party.
Mr. Walter. What were his comments?
Mi-. Yoshikawa. The American Communist Party, according to
Sorge, his comment was that the American Communist Party had
many people of different racial backgrounds, with different lan-
guages — Italians, Germans, and Japanese — and one language could
not be used; but in the course of time it may become stronger.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1143
Mr. Tavenner. Prior to the time of obtaining the confession of
Sorge, did you show him, and use in obtaining his confession, the
Gorman Statistical Year book which had been used as a code in the
transmission of messages by Sorge?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I didn't show it personally, hut I told him that
Klauscn confessed the fact that the German Statistical Yearbook was
use I as the code book.
Mr. Walter. The committee will stand in recess until -2 o'clock.
(Thereupon, at L2:25 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. in. of the
same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
(The committee reconvened at 2: 10 p. m., Representatives Francis
E. Walter and Clyde Doyle being present, Mr. Walter presiding.)
TESTIMONY OF MITSUSADA YOSHIKAWA— Resumed
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa, at the time of adjournment T was
asking about the knowledge that Richard Sorge had of the code that
was used in the transmission of secret messages at the time of his
confession.
I now want to ask you whether he was also familial' with the exist-
ence of the radio equipment that had been used for that purpose prior
to giving his confession \
Mr. Kuroda. I didn't quite get the question.
Mr. Tavenner. 1 will break the question down.
Prior to Mr. Sorge giving his confession, was he told about the
seizure of the radio equipment, or was he shown the radio equipment
which had been seized \
Mr. Yoshikawa. Before the confession we didn't show any material
to him. Therefore, we didn't show the radio equipment which was
impounded.
May I continue?
There was an argument among the procurators because he didn't
confess, an argument that we should show the radio equipment to
him; but before we came to the point of showing the equipment, he
confessed.
Mr. Tavenxer. Had you advised him that you had seized and im-
pounded the radio equipment (
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. And that was before he made his confession?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you proceed now and tell the committee how
the confession was given?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I gave the committee an account about it before,
but I will speak to you a little further.
I told you before that they were almost finished their work in Japan,
and they had a sort of sense of relief after the successful completion
of their job.
Many people were arrested at the same time.
And those people confessed, one by one, before Sorge did.
Various evidences came up — radio equipment, code book, coded
messages, and so forth.
1144 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
As for the code book, it was foimd in a study of the house of
Klausen.
It consisted of three volumes.
I happened to pick them up and I found that there was a mark of
much use.
And the figures of general statistics were there.
I immediately figured that it was a source book for the code.
In order to make decoding difficult, they added the figures on that
page on the coded message.
So after we impounded the German Statistical Yearbook we asked
Klausen about it, and Klausen confessed it was the key book for the
code. He confessed it before Sorge did.
I told Sorge about those facts and he finally confessed.
We had no program at that time. We were wondering whether
Sorge was really a spy for Germany and using Communists in Japan
but actually spying for the Nazi regime in Germany. That was one
question.
The second question was whether Sorge was a double spy for both
Berlin and Moscow.
The third question was whether he was really a spy for Moscow,
pretending to be a Nazi.
Therefore, we examined Sorge without preconceived opinion.
We took a very cautious attitude.
There was another question. If he were a spy for Moscow, we
didn't know whether he was a spy for the fourth section, as Klausen
said, or whether he was a spy for the Comintern, as Voukelitch said.
Mr. Tavenner. When you speak of the fourth section, do you mean
the fourth section of the Red army ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. That was the intelligence section of the Red army ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Proceed.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Therefore, I never crossed him to get his
confession.
I asked his explanation as evidences came up.
So, finally, at the end of the first week, he confessed, but at that time
I was not expecting that he would confess.
About 4 o'clock my colleague, prosecutor Tamazawa, and a police-
men went to see if his health would stand any further investigation,
since that was Saturday.
Thus he finally confessed. Before he confessed he asked for a piece
of paper and pencil.
And, as I told you before, he wrote down in German that since 1925
he was an international Communist, and handed it to me.
And he took off his coat.
And he rose and cried: "I have never been defeated since 1 became
an international Communist. This is the first time that I was beaten."
he said.
Mr. Walter. At that time did he say that Ozaki was also an inter-
national Communist ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Sorge was quite exhausted at that time, and so
Mr. Tamazawa asked him whether he would continue investigation
the following day. Sorge wanted to be continued on Monday. So
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1 I 45
he didn'l say that Ozaki was also an international Communisl at that
time.
Sorge, generally speaking, admitted that Ozaki and Miyagi and
others were also international Communists.
And he consented that be would talk about it Monday.
(Representative Charles E. Potter entered hearing room.)
Mr. Yosmik.wya. On Monday, from 9 in the morning until '■'> in the
afternoon, the police conducted investigation under my supervision.
However, Sorge asked to be investigated personally by Mr.
Yoshikawa.
So from :) o'clock in the afternoon until night I conducted the
invest igat ion by mysel I.
And Sorge responded to my questions.
The police talked to me before the investigation, and alter the in-
vestigation they reported about the content of the investigation and
received direction from me.
When the policemen were conducting the investigation of Sorge,
Klausen, and Voukelitch, I went along and kept my eyes on the police-
men on their way of conducting the investigation.
Before starting the investigation I talked with Sorge about the
outline of the investigation.
I showed him the points I would cover in the investigation.
And Sorge also offered his wishes.
And when he offered any points, I adopted those points which were
helpful in the investigation.
My German and English are both broken. I speak broken in Ger-
man and English. It took time to conduct the investigation, but Sorge
didn't want to have an interpreter. I asked him why. and he said an
interpreter would make the story difficult.
So, whenever we came into difficulty in understanding, we used a
sheet of paper and Sorge wrote on the paper and explained.
When we decided about the outline of the investigation, he took a
piece of paper and. by means of the paper, he explained about those
points. When I read what he wrote on the paper I asked him ques-
tions when I didn't understand: then he made further explanation
on those points.
After several days. Sorge typed what we talked, in my presence.
He corrected misprints. I read what he typed by aid of a dictionary.
At times the typing was not neat and not sufficient, so I asked him
to retype. He offered to retype himself, since it was nor neat and not
sufficient. Thus the typed story increased.
Either March or April the investigation was completed.
On various important points I received special explanations from
him. There were some points where I could not get full explana-
tion. When the investigation was completed, Sorge took a sheet of
paper and typed that this investigation was conducted by Mr.
Yoshikawa. and signed his name.
Then an official interpreter was appointed. It was Professor Ikoma,
of the School of Foreign Languages. Mr. Ikoma came to the deten-
tion camp and confirmed that the story Sorge typed was actually
his.
90929 — 51 2
1146 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICIJARD SORGE SPY CASE
After taking oath, Mr. Ikoma translated it into Japanese. A copy
was made. And that copy, Professor Ikoma and I signed. And the
translation and the typed story were put into a document.
The criminal bureau of the Ministry of Justice prepared the trans-
lation of his story into pamphlet form. Sorge asked me to make my
own official document when he was talking about the activities center-
ing around the German Embassy. He didn't want to type his own
story when that story came.
After his typewritten story was completed and the translation was
completed, I asked Professor Ikoma to come and investigate Sorge
about that phase of his activities.
The official document of that investigation consists of about 38
volumes. At the end of each volume, Professor Ikoma translated it
into German and asked Sorge whether there was any disagreement
on it, and after he found it right he affixed his signature on each
volume. Then Professor Ikoma and I signed on each volume, and also
my secretary affixed his signature on it.
This is the official interrogation document based on law. Of the
contents, I told you about a couple points in the morning session.
Therefore, Sorge's story consists of two parts. One is his type-
written story and the other js this official interrogation document.
There is another interrogation document which was made by a
police officer, Ohashi. It took time for Ohashi to conduct his in-
vestigation. My recollection is that Ohashi's interrogation docu-
ment was completed around April or May.
Mr. Tavenner. Of what year ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. 1942. My official interrogation document was com-
pleted around June 1942.
The content of my official interrogation document contained infor-
mation about the process by which Sorge approached the German
Embassy. N
I am going to expand about that now. I don't remember exactly
the date, but Sorge came to Japan in 1934. At that time Ott was not
the Ambassador. I think he was a colonel attached to a regiment in
Nagoya.
At that time Sorge began to approach Ott.
Mr. Tavenner. Was not General Ott at that time military attache
to Japan?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't know about it, but maybe he was an
attache.
It was about the period of Von Kretehner that Sorge approached
the German Embassy. By his information and judgment he gained
the confidence of the staff of the German Embassy.
He gave General Ott political information. He joined the Nazi
Party too. Then Ott became the Ambassador. It presented a very
good chance for Sorge.
He frequented the Embassy, and though he did not have an official
position in the Embassy, he was one of the highest advisers of the
Ambassador. He also cooperated in the intelligence activities of the
Embassy.
While he was cooperating, he also drew information from them.
And, as T told you in the morning, there were many political diplo-
matic military personnel coming from Germany to Japan, and Sorge
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1147
got acquainted with those people. They were talking informally on
many important matters. Therefore, while in Japan, he could get
the information of Germany. Ott consulted with Sorge on very
important matters.
So the information Ambassador Ott could receive from the German
foreign office and from the .Japanese foreign office went to Sorge. Not
only the ( rerman foreign office, but diplomat ic circles in Japan.
Sorge got the military secrets within the German Embassy. There-
fore, the more the .Japanese military men approached the German
Embassy, the more information Sorge got out of them.
1 heard this story. This is contained in my official interrogation
document.
A Soviet General Rushikoff fled from the Soviet into Manchuria.
And he was rescued by the Kwantung Army of Japan.
Rushikoff gave the information of the military positions and mili-
tary forces of the Far Eastern Red Army and also Mongolia and
Siberia.
The Japanese general staff was delighted to have that kind of
informal ion.
Rushikoff was the leader of an anti-Stalin bloc in Siberia.
The .Japanese Army was so jubilant about it that they talked about
it to Ott. Ott was also glad and reported to Hitler about it. And
he sent a staff officer to Japan.
And after the Japanese examined Rushikoff, the staff officer from
Germany examined Rushikoff himself. And he made a very minute
report. That staff officer showed t hat report to Sorge.
Sorge asked him to leave that document with him for study, and
he took a picture of the document and sent the film to Moscow.
Later the so-called Nomonhan incident occurred. The Japanese
Army lost several divisions. By the mass artillery and tanks the
Japanese lost a heavy casualty.
Mr. Tavkxnkr. The casualty loss was reported at 45,000, was it
not I
Mr. Vosiiikawa. I do not remember. It was like putting Japan's
hand in a charcoal brazier.
Sorge also said that the anti-Stalin bloc in Siberia was also elim-
inated. The second document, which was the official interrogation
document, contained that kind of information.
Unfortunately, no copy was made of this document, and I am afraid
that the document was lost by fire.
Mr. Tavenner. Do von mean lost as a result of the bombing of
Tokyo?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Possibly.
This is the first time that I talk about this, 10 years after the inci-
dent. During that period. Ambassador Ott was very pleased with
Sorge and offered him a high position in the Embassy. Sorge de-
clined.
Because he declined, his reputation increased. However, he told
me that if he had become a member of the official staff he would
have been investigated about his past in detail, and he was afraid
of that. He told me about that.
Thus the official interrogation document was completed.
1148 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Tavenner. I hand you four pages in Japanese script and
ask you to identify those and state whether or not your name appears
in connection with it?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. This is my seal.
Mr. Tavenner. You are also pointing out, in addition to your sig-
nature, a seal placed beneath your signature?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. The seal also appears, half at the top of page 2
and half at the top of page 3, does it not ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
That is the way the Japanese official documents are made. They
prove that the documents are official by putting the signature on the
continuation pages.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words, that is a method of identification, by
placing what you call your "han" on the document?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. This document which has your signature and "han"
attached is an affidavit, I believe, which vou gave on February 19,
1949, is it not?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. The English translation is attached to your origi-
nal Japanese affidavit?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer the document in evidence and ask
that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 1."
Mr. Walter. Let it be marked as an exhibit and received in evi-
dence.
(The document above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit
No. 1," is filed herewith.)
Mr. Tavenner. I would now like to read the English translation
of the document, which was translated by Minora Endo, an official
translator of Japanese documents in the employ of general headquar-
ters, Far East Command.
(Reading:)
Statement by Yoshikawa MrrsrsAo-A, Government Official Building 1,
Dojunkai Aoyama Apartments 1. 1 chome, Aoyama Onden, Shibuya-ku,
Tokyo-to, February 19, 1949
I affirm that, according to my conscience, I will state the truth, adding nothing
and concealing nothing.
I voluntarily declare as follows:
That in October 1941, I was a procurator assigned to the procurator's bureau
of the Tokyo district criminal court; that on said date, in my official capacity I
was assigned to conduct a procurator's examination on Richard Sors;e who at
the time was confined in the Tokyo detention house: that I did conduct that
investigation until May 1942: that the investigation by me of Richard Sorge was
conducted in the procurator's examination room in the Tokyo detention house;
that during the proceedings Richard Sorge voluntarily made an offer to me to
prepare and submit a statement on the general outline of his espionage activities;
t bat as a result of this offer. Richard Sorge prepared such a statement in the
German language in my presence and in the procurator's examination room ; that
I be typewriter used by Richard Sorge for the preparation of said statement was
bis property which he used in his house before bis arrest and had been confiscated
as evidence : that after typing a chapter or a paragraph of said statement, Richard
Sorge read the same in my presence and made deletions, additions, and correc-
tions in my presence, and banded tbe same to me; that only one original copy of
said statement was prepared by Richard Sorge; that because in said statement
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1149
the portion concerning his activities in Shanghai was not sufficient, Richard
Sorge personally retyped said portion preparing anew 9aid portion bj supple-
menting thai which was Insufficient, and submitted said new portion to me;
that I replaced said portion in the original statement ; that the document at i ached
hereto, consisting i>r i_'i pages, is thai portion which I deleted from the original
document because I pu1 in the original statement thai portion which Richard
Sorge later retyped as stated above; that said document is a portion of a state-
ment which Richard Sorge first prepared and corrected in my presence in the
procurator's examination room within the Tokyo detention house during October
and November 1!>41 and handed to me; that said document does not bear the
Signature of Richard Sorge, the reason being that said document is no more than
a portion of a statement prepared by Richard Sorge and that Richard Sorge
affixed his signature at the end when the entire statement was completed and
thai he was nol asked particularly to atlix ids signature on said document which
was a portion Of said statement ; that said document has 1 n in my possession
from the afore-mentioned date until February IS, VM'.K on winch date it was
turned over by me to Lt. Col. Paul Rusch, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East
Command, United States Army, at said officer's request.
YOSHIKAWA MlTSlSAIiA.
i Translatob's Note. — A seal bearing the name "Yoshikawa" appears over the
bottom part of the signature. The same seal is also affixed overlapping the first
and second pages.)
February 19, 1949.
I certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ
of General Headquarters. Far East Command, and that to the best of my ability,
skill, and judgment, the within and foregoing is a true and accurate translation in
the English language in two pages of the photostat of the original document
attached hereto consisting of four pages which is the affirmation of Yoshikawa
Mitsusada.
Minortj En DO.
Mr. Tavenner. The statement which you gave at that time over your
signature and seal was true ; was it not '.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Your statement under oath refers to 24 pages at-
tached to your affidavit as being the document which Richard Sorge
wrote on his own typewriter in German ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. I will ask you to examine the 24 pages attached to
your affidavit and state whether it is the document written by Sorge
on his own typewriter in the German language.
Mr. Yoshikawa. The paper and typewriter impounded were used
by Sorge.
Mr. Tavenner. And this is a photostat which he attached to the
same document ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you examine the document and state whether
or not the corrections" appearing therein were made personally by
Richard Sorge in your presence?
Mr. Yoshikawa. That is true.
Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer this document for identification only
at this time, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2."
Mr. Walter. Let it be market for identification only.
(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit
No. 2" for identification only.)
Mr. Tavenner. I hand you now a document written in Japanese
consisting of eight pages, and ask }'ou whether or not your signature
and seal appear on that document '.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
1150 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
I dictated this document, but the signature and seal are mine.
Mr. Tavenner. This is a sworn affidavit which you gave over your
signature and seal ; is it not ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. And does it bear date of April 1, 1949?
Mr. Yoshikawa. It does.
Mr. Tavenner. Attached to your affidavit is the English transla-
tion ; is that correct ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I desire to offer this document in evidence, both
the Japanese and the English translation, and ask that it be marked
"Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 3."
Mr. Walter. For what purpose are they both offered ?
Mr. Tavenner. The main purpose is that it is really one exhibit.
One is the translation of the Japanese. It is all one exhibit.
Mr. Walter. It will be marked and received.
(The documents above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit
No. 3," are filed herewith.)
Mr. Tavenner. I will read the English translation. [Reading:]
Oath
I hereby swear that I will state the truth according to my conscience, adding
nothing and concealing nothing.
April 1, 1949.
/s/ Yoshikawa Mitsitsada. [seal]
Statement
I, Yoshikawa Mitsusada, having taken the oath prescribed by Japanese law
which appears on the attached sheet, do hereby make the following statement.
1. I am presently serving as Chief of the Special Investigation Bureau of the
Attorney General's office. During or about 1941 and 1942. I was procurator in
the procurator's office of the Tokyo District Criminal Court. I worked on the
so-called international intelligence ring case involving Richard Sorge, Ozaki
Hozumi et al., myself examining Richard Sorge, Kawai Teikichi, and others.
Because of the serious nature of the case, and because of the implication of
Ozaki Hozumi, a Japanese [of] comparatively high social position, and aliens like
Richard Sorge, Max Klausen, and Branko de Voukelitch, ample consideration had
to be given to its international repercussions. My investigations were conducted
in strict secrecy, and I was careful not to libel the defendants and others involved.
I exercised strict supervision over the judicial police who assisted me in the
investigations, personally attending the investigations as a witness on frequent
occasions to see that torture and other coercive methods were not employed.
Of course, I never resorted to torture or other coercive methods in my own
investigations of Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi, but assumed throughout
as gentlemanly an attitude as possible.
At Sorge's request, I arranged to have the judicial police examinations in
his case take place in the morning, and I myself examined him in the after-
noon. At his suggestion, I investigated the broad aspects of the case, and I
allowed him to type his statement in German before me. Following the com-
pletion of the judicial police investigations, I was with Sorge both in the morn-
ings and in the afternoons. After he had finished the afore-mentioned state-
ment, I examined him with respect to the concrete details of his intelligence
activities, and, at his request, compiled the results into an interrogation record
in the presence of an interpreter.
During the afore-mentioned investigations, Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi
described the intelligence activities of Agnes Smedley in China, and Richard
Sorge made a statement concerning the intelligence activities of Giienther Stein
in Tokyo. No changes were made in the facts stated by Richard Surge and Kawai
Teikichi with regard to Smedley and Stein during the course of the investiga-
tions by the police ami procurators, the preliminary examinations, and the public
trials.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1151
Daring the investigation, I realized thai Smedley and Stein were key litres
in the ring, but I was unable to arresl and indict them because they were not in
Japan at the time. Had they been in Japan, I am convinced that, as a procura-
tor, I would have arrested and indicted them.
The foregoing is a voluntary statement. I was notified before making it that
it would be recorded and thai it might be used as evidence.
April 1, 1949.
/s/ Yosiiikawa .Mil SISAIIA. [SEAL]
The translator's certificate is attached, which I will not read. 1
translator's certificate
I. Tadao Yamada, CWO, USA, W2141047, having been duly sworn, state that
1 am an official translator of the Japanese language employed as such by General
Headquarters, Far East < Command, since July ]!»47, and that the foregoing English
translation of the statement executed by Yosiiikawa Mitsusada, dated April 1,
1!)4!>, is a true and accurate translation to the best of my ability, skill, and
judgment.
April 10. 104!>.
/s/ Tadao Yamada,
Tadao Yamada,
CWO, USA, W21J,10Jtf.
/s/ G. A. Hedley.
G. A. Hedley,
Captain (sic). Infantry Summary Court.
That is a true and correct statement; is it?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavexxer. I now hand you a certificate over your signature and
seal bearing date March 4, 1049, and I will ask you to identify that
document and your signature and your seal.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavexxer. And to it is attached the English translation of the
certificate, appearing over your signature and seal?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavexxer. I desire to offer the certificate, accompanied by the
English translation, in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa
Exhibit Xo. 4."
Mr. Walter. It will be so marked and received.
(The documents above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit
No. 4," are filed herewith.)
Mr. Tavenner. I believe your seal also appears under your signa-
ture on the English translation ; does it not \
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavexxer. I desire to read this certificate. [Reading: ]
General Headquarters. Far East Command,
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff.
CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that the two booklets listed below are printed reproductions
prepared by the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of accurate
Japanese translations made by Translator Ikoma Yoshitoshi of original Ger-
man notes written by Richard Sorge, whom I examined in my capacity as a pro-
curator of the Tokyo District Criminal Court, and incorporated together with
the original notes into the official case records: and that the contents of the
booklets are identical with the contents of the said translation.
1. "Sorge case materials (2)" (pt. 1 of translated notes of Richard Sorge),
February 1942, Criminal Affairs Bureau. .Ministry of Justice.
1 Printed for the record, but not read.
1152 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
2. "Sorge case materials (3)" (pt. 2 of translated notes of Richard Sorge),
April 1942, Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice.
March 4, 1949.
I shall not read the translator's certificate. 1
/S/ TOSHIKAWA MlTSUSADA. [SEAL]
Chief, Special Examination Bureau,
General Headquarters,
translator's certificate
I hereby certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the
employ of General Headquarters, Far East Command, and that to the best of my
ability, skill, and judgment, the above is a true and accurate translation in the
English language of the attached document.
/s/ Tadao Yamata,
Tadao Yam ada,
CWO USA W2141047.
This certificate refers to two volumes [indicating another docu-
ment]. I hand you a document in Japanese marked "Consecutive
Exhibit No. 17," enclosure No. 2, and I will ask you if that bears the
identification information of the first document which I read to you
from your certificate?
Mr. Yoshikawa. The original, which was sent to the court, did not
have the table of contents and index. The table of contents and index
were made by the Criminal Affairs Bureau. The rest is an exact
document.
Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer that document in Japanese listed
as the first document in Yoshikawa Exhibit 4 for identification only,
and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 5."
Mr. Walter. Let it be so identified.
(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit
No. 5" for identification only.)
Mr. Tavenner. I hand you now another volume identified as con-
secutive exhibit 20-B, enclosure 2, which bears on the front certain de-
scriptive data, and ask whether that is the same descriptive data as
the second item in Yoshikawa exhibit No. 4 ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. It is the same document to which you referred in
your certificate ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Except that the table of contents and index were
not in the original.
Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer this document for identification
only, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 6."
Mr. Walter. Let it be so identified.
(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit
No. 6" for identification only.)
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa, did you prepare and furnish the
material which went into the composition of those two documents?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes, I did; and Mr. Ikoma translated it.
Mr. Tavenner. I want to ask you a very few questions relating to
some of the individuals mentioned in the course of these reports.
You have previously referred to Miyagi. Do you know whether
Miyagi was an American citizen ? I believe I asked you that question
before.
Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't have an exact recollection. However,
1 Printed for the record, but not read.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1153
Miyagi intended to go back after his mission was completed in Japan,
therefore I thought that he was an American citizen.
Mr. Tavenner. You mean hack to the United States?
Mr. Yoshikawa. He said before his death that he wanted to go
hack" to America.
Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation disclose the circumstances
under which Miyagi first came to Japan?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. I didn't personally and directly investigate
Miyagi. I only saw him several times.
Procurator Yoshioka was in charge of the investigation of Miyagi.
Also, a policeman investigated him.
I received their reports and gave them direction.
I don't have a clear recollection since it was an incident of 10 years
ago.
I recall that Miyagi belonged to the Japanese section of the Ameri-
can Communist Party.
I recall that Miyagi stated that he received an order from the
higher echelon of his organization to engage in the world revolution in
Japan.
Mr. Tavenner. World revolution?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. To do some important activities in Japan for the
sake of the world revolution.
Miyagi told me that he belonged directly to the Comintern doing
espionage activities.
That is what he thought.
I do not have an exact recollection about how he came to Japan.
But I recall the names Yano and Roy who are involved in sending
Miyagi to Japan.
I do not recall where Miyagi met those people, whether in New
York or in Los Angeles.
I recall also that Miyagi mentioned in addition to those people he
met an American Jewish person, but I don't have a clear recollection
on that.
He went to Japan with instructions to meet a person who put up
a newspaper ad saying "Ukiyo-e print wanted."
Mr. Tavenner. Stating what?
Mr. Yoshikawa. "Ukiyo-e print wanted."
According to Sorge's statement, he also had instructions to watch
for the newspaper ad "Ukiyo-e print wanted," and he found that and
found the person in Ueno.
Mr. Tavenner. Ueno is a park in Tokyo?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
That is what I vaguely remember.
Mr. Tavenner. In the course of the documents referred to there ap-
pears the name "Jacob." Did your investigation disclose who Jacob
was or whether or not it was a name thai was used as a code name?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I asked Sorge about it. but Sorge said, "I know
him as Jacob," but he didn't say whether he knew him or not.
Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation disclose whether or not he
was an American citizen?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Sorge said that he was an American news-
paperman.
Mr. Tavenner. Stationed where?
Mr. Yoshikawa. In Shanghai.
1154 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
When Sorge went to Shanghai from Moscow, he met Smedley, and
with the help of Smedley he got the cooperation of three Caucasians,
three foreigners.
When I heard Sorge saying that, I asked him who they were. Sorge
said he got the cooperation of three foreigners and not more. He got
the cooperation of the Japanese and Chinese and only three foreigners.
When I asked who they were, Sorge told me Jacob was one of them.
Sorge didn't give any information about Jacob any further, and
so I asked him what kind of cooperation he got from those people.
He wrote by typewriter, "These kinds of information."
I couldn't get any information out of him any further.
Mr. Tavenner. Was any statement made as to what newspaper or
newspapers the man identified as Jacob was a representative of or
correspondent for ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. He didn't say.
Mr. Tavenner. You spoke of three Caucasians, but you have told
us just of the individual by the name of Jacob. Who were the other
two?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Another person, he didn't disclose his name, but
he was an American. He was a young person. He was on the staff of
the American consulate.
Mr. Tavenner. He was a member of the staff of the American
consulate ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Located where?
Mr. Yoshikawa. In Shanghai.
Mr. Tavenner. Was any further description obtained of the in-
dividual on the staff of the American consulate?
Mr. Yoshikawa. He didn't say anything about him, so I asked
him what kind of information he got out of him.
(Kepresenative Clyde Doyle left the hearing room.)
Mr. Yoshikawa. He told me that the person was quite brilliant and
was giving him information concerning the American foreign policy
toward China and the Nanking government.
Mr. Walter. Did he give the name ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. No. He laughed and did not disclose his name.
Mr. Potter. What was the date ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't remember exactly, but it was around 1931
and 1932 when Sorge organized the so-called Shanghai group.
Mr. Potter. How long did this group work for Sorge ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. It was for about 2 years.
And Sorge's successor was receiving information from that group.
Mr. Potter. From that same group ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Walter. This information from the American consular office
in Shanghai was given to Sorge in 1931 and 1932; is that correct?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. You have given us information relating to two of
these Caucasians whose assistance was given to Sorge. Who was
the third one?
Mr. Yoshikawa. He said that it was a German woman.
Mr. Tavenner. Can you give us further information regarding
her?
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1155
Mr. Yosiiikawa. I didn't get any information about her of her than
expressed in bis own story.
Mr. T.w TENNER. The name "Paul" and the name "John" appear in
the course of Sorge's con fession. Did your invest igation disclose any
further identification off hose two persons?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. The information I got concerning Paul appeared
in Sorge's story, but when I instructed Procurator [wo to investigate
Sorge, he got further information about Paul; but, since I do not
have the documents, I do not have a clear recollection.
While Sorge was working in Shanghai, Ozaki was recalled by a
newspaper. Asalii.
Ozaki recommended his successor to Sorge, a Japanese man.
This Japanese was cooperating with Paul after Sorge left Shang-
hai.
This Japanese man was Funakoshi.
Mr. Tavenner. You spoke of the giving of information, after Sorge
left Shanghai, to Sorge's successor. Who was Sorge's successor?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. Paul.
Mr. Tavenner. The same person called Paul '.
Mr. Yoshtkawa. Paul was Sorge's successor.
Mr. Tavenner. Can you furnish the committee with any identify-
ing information as to the nationality, or any other information re-
garding Paul '.
Mr. Yosiiikawa. I do not know about the nationality of Paul, but he
belonged to the fourth section of the Red army, and his rank was
major general.
Mi'. Walter. Was he a German, do you know?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. I am sorry, but I haven't conducted a full investi-
gation about Paul.
Mr. Tavexner. You spoke about the third Caucasian furnishing
information to Sorge as being a German woman. Did your investiga-
tion disclose any connection on the part of a woman by the name of
Regattenhein with the Sorge principals; that is, the principals in the
Sorge ring '
Mr. Yoshtkawa. When Regattenhein appeared in Japan, she was
in the Japanese group and not the Chinese group.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words, this person by the name of Regat-
tenhein had no connection with the Chinese phase of the Sorge spy
ring?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. I don't have any information about that. I didn't
make any investigation of it.
Mr. Tavenner. I assume from what the witness has said that Sorge
knew of her presence in Japan \
Mr. Kuroda. Regattenhein.'
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
Mr. Yosiiikawa. Sorge said so.
Sorge said that Regattenhein is the girl friend of Guenther Stein.
She was very cooperative with Guenther Stein, and she went to
Shanghai as a messenger of the group.
She gathered information also.
Mr. Tavenner. Was she arrested in Japan in connection with your
spy investigation?
Mr. Yoshikawa. No. She wasn't in Japan when the arrests came.
She left with Guenther Stein.
1156 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any information as to what country
she traveled to when she left Japan ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't have any information about that. Since
she disappeared, we lost interest in her. We heard Guenther Stein
was going to Hong Kong, but really we didn't have any information
about her.
Mr. Tavenner. There is an incident related in the course of the
confession by Richard Sorge regarding his traveling through the
United States on his way to Tokyo.
It refers to the fact that while in New York an arrangement was
made for him to go to Chicago, where he was instructed to meet a
certain employee of the Washington Post at the Chicago world fair.
Did you endeavor to ascertain the name of the individual whom Sorge
was supposed to meet in Chicago ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I instructed Policeman Ohashi to get that inform-
ation, and I recall that Ohashi gave me his report, and I tried to con-
fer with Sorge about it when I talked to him. I also instructed
Ohashi to find out who that person was. I also asked directly to-
Sorge who that person was, but Sorge did not disclose his name.
(Representative Clyde Doyle returned to hearing room.)
Mr. Walter. In discussing his trip through the United States, did
Sorge give you the names of any Americans who escorted him or with
whom he came in contact?
Mr. Yoshikawa. He didn't disclose the names.
Before he formed a Chinese group and Japanese group, Sorge was
vice chief of the information bureau of the Comintern.
Mr. Walter. Did your investigation reveal any information with
regard to an American named Willie Lehman?
Mr. Yoshikawa. He was chief of the Lehman group in China.
Mr. Tavenner. What do you mean by the Lehman group in China?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't have an exact recollection about it, but it
was either a group belonging to the fourth section of the Red army or
belonging to the Comintern.
Mr. Tavenner. By that do you mean a separate group from the
Sorge group ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. That is right.
I recall that Sorge told me that Sorge and Lehman were personally
acquainted.
Mr. Tavenner. What part of China was the seat of the activities of
the Lehman group?
Mr. Yoshikawa. In Shanghai ; so I remember.
I don't have an exact recollection.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any recollection of the names of any
American citizens who were connected with the Lehman group in ad-
dition to Lehman himself?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Concerning a group in which Americans had any
connection, I recall the Harbin group in Manchuria.
This group existed as a mail box for Sorge while he was working in
China, and this group belonged to the fourth section of the Red army.
Klansen was transferred to the Harbin group by order of the fourth
sect ion of the Red army.
I recall that Sorge himself also went to Harbin.
The radio transmitter was established in the American consulate
in Harbin.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1157
Mr. Tavenner. Do you mean the radio station that was used in
the transmission of messages to Moscow?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Were those messages transmitted in code?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Smv: I think so.
Mr. Tavenner. When did thai occur?
Mr. Yoshikawa. About L931 or L932 Sorge was using hi- Harbin
group as a mail box.
Mr. Tavenner. If a radio station in the Ajnerican consulate in
Harbin in Manchuria was being used t<> t ransmit messages to Moscow,
who was it in the American consulate who permitted that use or him-
self engaged in the use of t tie radio for t hat purpose \
Mr. VcsniK.wvA. I don't remember the name.
1 instructed Procurator I wo. who was in charge of Klausen, to in-
vest igate t hat.
I recall that Mr. [wo reported to me about the name of that Amer-
ican, hut I don't recall exactly his name.
Mr. Tavenner. Was there more than one American connected with
the Harbin group of the fourth section of the Red army, as far as
your investigation disclosed?
Mr. Vosiiikawa. 1 don't have any recollection, so I cannot say.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether the confession of Max
Klausen will throw light on the identification of the American in
Harbin who cooperated with the fourth section of the Red army \
Mr. Vosiiikawa. I think so.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa. you were engaged for a long period
of time in the investigation of international communism in connec-
tion with the Sorge case.
Mr. Vosiiikawa. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Have you any observations or suggestions that you
would care to make to this committee, which is a committee of the
Congress of the United States, with regard to investigations of inter-
national communism '.
Mr. Yoshikawa. The Sorge case revealed that the investigation of
international Communist activities cannot be conducted successfully
alone by any one country.
The ivw nat ions of the world should cooperate in helping each other
to conduct the invest igat ion.
Information should be exchanged.
National sectionalism is very harmful.
We have to keep secrets. However, we need cooperation; so I think.
My desire is t hat from now on, in the future, we would like to have
cooperation and assistance from America.
The second point is : I have found that the spy network of Moscow
covers all over the world.
On this point we would like to have American cooperation and
assistance.
Mr. Tavenner. Thank you very much.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walter. Mr. Yoshikawa, I trust that your visit here to the
United States has been a pleasant one and a profitable one.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you.
1158 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Walter. And I do feel that there should be cooperation between
the Government of the United States and other governments of the
world so that we may exchange information that will aid all of the
free peoples of the world to understand what this conspiracy means.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you.
Mr. Walter. And I express the hope that your visit here has
provided some sort of basis for the cooperation you have spoken of.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you.
Mr. Walter. And I assure you that we appreciate very much your
cooperation with this committee.
Mr. Yoshikawa. As a person working in the Japanese Government,
I would also like to express my appreciation to your committee.
Mr. Walter. Mr. Doyle.
Mr. Doyle. I wish to thank the gentleman also. It is very encourag-
ing. May I ask one question :
You stated that Sorge had confessed before you expected him to.
Why did he do it so early ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. I was expecting that it would take a longer time,
and if it had taken a longer time I thought I would be pushed in a
difficult position because of pressure from the German Embassy as
well as from the Japanese Army.
His collaborators were all rounded up, and also the evidences came
up ; so he realized that he had no chance.
Before he confessed we had this conversation :
I talked to Sorge and said to him that Klausen belonged to the
Fourth Section of the Red Army. Voukelitch was of the Comintern.
Ozaki and Miyagi were also members of the Comintern. And their
statements were in discrepancy, and so I told Sorge, "I will explain
to you about this question."
We were talking about this, and then he began to confess.
Mr. Doyi:e. Thank you. May I ask this question : About 3 weeks
ago four gentlemen from Japan visited this committee. You were
one of them. May I ask, when you go back home do you think of
having a committee such as this in your own legislative body, or are
you going to recommend something like this committee?
Mr. Yoshikawa. About the establishing of a committee similar to
this, we are going to study that very carefully, but for us the most
important thing is that the people of Japan realize the menace of
international communism.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much.
Mr. Walter. Mr. Potter.
Mr. Potter. Mr. Yoshikawa, 1, too, wish to thank you for your
splendid testimony.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you.
Mi-. Potter. Your telling us the story of your efforts in the Sorge
case has been a dramatic example of how international communism
works; so we are most grateful to you for giving us the benefit of your
knowledge.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you.
Mr. Potter. 1 would like to ask one question.
I noted your statement that the Japanese people are aware of the
conspiracy as contained in international communism. Do you feel
that due to the awareness of the Japanese people the Government <>f
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1159
Japan lias taken all adequate precautions t«» expose and eliminate the
conspiracy from the country?
Mr. Ktjroda. My translation was: I understood him to say the
important thing was to make the Japanese people realize more fully
about the menace of international coniinunisin.
Mr. Potter. Do you feel the Japanese people do realize the menace
of international communism?
Mr. Yosiiik.wva. And also they are afraid of it.
Mr. Potter. Do you have any Communist members in your Japa<
nese Diet \
Mr. Yosiiik.wva. Yes.
Mr. Potter. How many, in proportion of the total membership of
the Diet?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. Twenty-five in both Houses.
There are about 25 Communists in both Houses, but this number is
after the puree by the SCAP | Supreme Commander of Allied
Powers]. Before the purge there were more Communist members.
Mr. Potter. Do you feel that the Communist members in your Diet
will decrease rather than increase in the future?
Mr. Yosiiikawa. The number will decrease.
In Japan, members of the Communist Party, like members of other
parties, have to register.
As of June last year, the members of the Communist Party regis-
tered were 1 1 0,001 >.'
But the number decreased and now it is estimated at about (50,000.
In my estimation there are about 20,000 unregistered Communists
in addition to those.
About 250,000 sympathizers are in Japan. They are not members,
but are sympathizers.
Mr. Potter. Do you have any trade-unions that are dominated by
Communists ?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. There are trade-unions which are under the
influence of the Communist Party.
Mr. Potter. In what fields?
Mr. Yoshikawa. Metal and various industrial fields.
Also, the Communist Party has operatives operating secretly
within the democratic organizations.
Once the Communist Party captured 2,500,000 votes, but now their
following is dwindling.
The Communist Party membership is decreasing now.
Mr. Potter. That is to the credit of the people of Japan, after a
war when the Communists used that war to gain their end. That is a
credit to the wisdom of thepeople of Japan.
Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you, but the Communists are waiting for
the next revolutionary wave.
Mr. PoTrER. Both in Japan and in the United States,
Mr. Walter. Anything further, Mr. Tavenner?
Mr. Tavenner. No, sir.
Mr. Walter. The committee will stand adjourned.
( Thereupon, at 4 : 25 p. m., an adjournment was taken.)
HEAKINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHAKD
SORGE SPY CASE
(Based on Testimony of Mitsnsada Yoshikawa and
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1951
United States House of Representatives,
Committee on Un-American Activities,
Washington, D. 0.
PUBLIC HEARING
The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to call at
10 : 45 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S.
Wood (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present : Representatives John S. Wood (chair-
man), Francis E. Walter, James B. Frazier, Jr., and Harold H. Velde.
Staff members present : Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel ; Thomas W.
Beale, Si\, assistant counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator;
Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of re-
search ; John W. Carrington, clerk ; and A. S. Poore, editor.
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order, please.
Whom do you have ?
Mr. Tavenner. Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby.
Mr. Wood. General Willoughby, will you stand and be sworn,
please ? Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God ?
General Willoughby. I do.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY
Mr. Tavenner. Will you please state your name ?
General Willoughby. Charles Andrew Willoughby.
Mr. Tavenner. What is your present position ?
General Willoughby. Major general, United States Army, awaiting
retirement for partial disability and length of service as a veteran of
several wars, namely, World War I, 1917; World War II, 1941; the
North Korean war, 1950; and the Chinese Communist war, 1951.
Mr. Tavenner. Where did you last serve and in what capacity ?
General Willoughby. I served as Mac Arthur's chief of intelligence
since 1939 throughout the campaigns of the Southwest Pacific and the
occupation of Japan, and in the same capacity throughout the Korean
conflict.
90929—51 3 1161
1162 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Tavenner. I understand you desire to make a general state-
ment as the basis for your testimony in this hearing ?
General Willoughby. With the permission of the chairman, I
would request the privilege of stating my position throughout this
entire hearing as follows :
Recent newspaper reports have developed a tendency to attribute
sensational qualities to my impending testimony before certain con-
gressional committees, under normal subpena. I am described as
"threatening a brand-new ruckus," as being "sore at the Pentagon,"
as "vowing to jar the Capital with spy tales." Yet, another enfant
terrible of the press charges me with "promises to redden faces and
to set off explosions," and as being "a thorn in the side of the Penta-
gon." These are pure journalistic exaggerations.
I have no direct issue with the Army or the State Department. The
Army is sound. It was put to a most cruel test in Korea, and it has
passed summa cum laude, as on many other historical occasions. After
41 years' service, since 1910, 1 leave the Army with a feeling of regret.
The Regular service is a hard taskmaster, but it is also a delightful
fraternal organization.
As regards the State Department, I have served as military attache
for many years in our embassies of Caracas, Bogata, and Quito, in
the period 1920-30. The field personnel is first class. The American
diplomatic posts abroad are maintained with the dignity commen-
surate with a great nation. They operate in an atmosphere of sharp
competition, since foreign establishments are maintained on a more
or less lavish scale. Tokyo is a most conspicuous example.
The real subject matter of my presentation to Congress is in a field
of international danger, in which all political parties could meet
amicably, on grounds of common interest. Consequently, my proposed
statements are completely devoid of any political motivation or
purpose.
There are recognizable historical factors, the dangerous impact
of which is only now beginning to be felt. The dead hand of the past
rests heavily on a precarious present. We are still in the shadow
of Cairo, Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam. Retribution has been swift
and terrible. The victors of 1915 have created a Frankenstein that
may yet slay them : the Red menace of international communism. It
is only fair, however, to accept that the present administration is
staggering under an intolerable burden which it inherited from its
predecessors and did not itself create.
It fell within the purview of MacArthur's Intelligence Section to
confront this menace in the Far East, and to unmask the grimacing
face of the Red Medusa.
The story of Richard Sorge, Soviet master spy, became the vehicle
of presentation. It has been covered initially by Drew Pearson, then
by Walter Simmons and Alfred Kohlberg, and more recently, in its
main features, by Newsweek and United States News & World Re-
port. However, their stories merely scratched the surface. For a
period of years, Tokyo has filed with the War Department a most
extensive documentation on Sorge, contained in a number of consecu-
tive exhibits, aggregating over a million words, with hundreds of
plates, photostats, and illustrations.
While certain individuals emerge sharply in this report, they must
be viewed against the sinister background of a world conspiracy, the
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1163
essential framework of which should be known to our legislators and
to our people. In its unimpeachable and devastating evidence, this
case should dispel carefully nurtured false notions on the responsibili-
ties for the China debacle and place this controversial subject into
proper focus. The real cause for the communization of China is the
long-range subversive operation, over the last two decades, conducted
by professional Communists under orders of the Kremlin-controlled
Third Comintern.
The element which intrigued Mac Arthur's Intelligence was the
immediate recognition that Richard Sorge's story did not begin or end
with Tokyo, but was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet
strategy.
An investigation was opened into the Shanghai period and the Third
Comintern "apparatus." In Shanghai, in the early 1930's, we are
not dealing with the period of uneasy alliance with the Soviet, 1941-45,
but with the more significant prewar years of 1929-39, in the heydey
of the Third Communist International, prelude to the infamous
Stalin-Hitler Pact, sole factor that made World War II at all possible.
We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the history of
modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here were
sown the dragons' teeth that have ripened into the Red harvest of
today — and the spadework was done by men and women of many
nationalities who had no conceivable personal stake in China other
than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien cause, the Communist
"jehad"' of Pan-Slavism for the subjugation of the western world.
Most of the old wheelhorses of the American Communist Party
appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another,
the professionals of the clandestine fraternity, as well as mere acolytes
and dupes, flirting moth-like with the Red menace; such as Earl
Browder, Sam Darcy, Eugene Dennis, Harry Berger, Gerhart E'isler,
and many others.
My cumulative reports contain over 180 identities, surnames, aliases,
and code designations, derived from court records authenticated by
American lawyers, or from the fabulous dossiers of the French and
British sections of the Shanghai international police. In protection
of innocent people, a sharp distinction has been made by us between
the "operators" and the "bystanders" — the "joiners" who did not quite
appreciate the character of the organizations they helped support.
The exact degree of relationship or association ranges from direct
espionage by Comintern "agents" to the twilight zone of fellow-
traveling dupes and befuddled liberals — apparently unaware that
they have drifted into an^ international conspiracy for the sole benefit
of an alien and hostile Government. While this case applies pri-
marily to Japan and China, it represents a recognizable pattern that
is working in the United States today.
I have filed detailed evidence with appropriate Federal agencies
and certain congressional committees. They are now in a position to
follow up these leads. I am not a prosecutor. I am only a police-
man and investigator. It is thus that I discharge a moral obligation
toward the United States, which has received me as an immigrant
boy and given me shelter and citizenship as a man.
I have no doubt that the hue and cry will start again, as it did in
1949. I expect to be attacked by the Communist press, from the China
Digest in Hong Kong to the Far East Spotlight in New York City.
1164 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Orders will go out from the shabby loft building on 35 East Twelfth
Street, New York. The Red cells will disgorge their indefatigable
little workers. The pinko columnists will sharpen their quills. The
smear brigade will swing into action. Some Red mouthpiece will
prostitute the law of the land and sue me for libel, as before, and I
will accept, as before. Yet, in the cacophony of frenzied accusations,
I am reminded of an ancient saying :
It is better to fail in a cause that must ultimately succeed, than to succeed
in a cause that will ultimately fail.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wood. Any questions, Mr. Counsel ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wood. Proceed.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, stating as you do that the
Richard Sorge story was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet
strategy, is it not your opinion that a full disclosure at this time of
the ramifications of that story would be useful to the Congress and
the people of this country in understanding the background and mean-
ing of incidents which Jiave occurred in this country and which likely
may recur ?
General Willoughby. I am in entire agreement with Mr. Counsel's
opinion. There is no doubt that a disclosure or the development or
tracing of links that exist between an international spy master and
the present is of immediate practical value, and this committee is
peculiarly appropriate to receive this testimony. Ten thousand miles
away, while on duty in Tokyo over many years, I have followed with
admiration the investigative work of this committee. Their record
is unimpeachable, and I consider it a privilege to appear before you.
In this connection, I might pause to pay tribute to a similar com-
mittee which has taken its techniques and inspiration from the House
committee, namely, the California State Legislature's Senate Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities, under the able Senator Jack
Tenney.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, the problem of putting before
the Congress and the people of this country the Sorge story so that
they may see and understand similar incidents which have occurred,
or incidents of somewhat like character, in this country, and so that
they may be on guard as to the recurrence of such things, is one of
the purposes of the committee in conducting this hearing.
I should also add that it is the immediate purpose of this com-
mittee, in looking into the Sorge case, to ascertain the nature and ex-
tent of participation in that great conspiracy of persons of United
States citizenship, and what place, if any, those persons have in the
Communist conspiracy in the United States as it exists today.
Those are the two major purposes of our hearing.
General Willoughby. I shall attempt to comply with your out-
line, Mr. Counsel. In the course of this presentation we will establish
the link between Sorge, on the one hand, and the Shanghai operations,
perhaps much more important, on the other hand.
We will also develop the similarity of techniques in penetration of
political and social fraternal organizations, so-called fronts.
As stated in general outline in my introductory statement, these
relationships will be developed. In other words, we are not treating
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1165
the Sorge report as a historical incident or as a repetition of some-
thing that lias already been told. I will show you that in Sorge's
fragmentary reports there are enough descriptive data of certain
organizations in Shanghai which are of paramount interest now be-
cause American citizens, especially members of the American Com-
munist Party, were active then. Had we known this, I am sure that
in the last few years we would have been less tolerant, less patient,
with these people.
Therefore, the purpose, as I see it, of your inquiry, is exactly as
you have stated, to link the pasl \\ it h the present, and I feel confident
that the consecutive questions and answers that will be presented here
will accomplish this purpose before a committee which, as I have said,
is especially qualified and peculiarly appropriate for this type of
inquir}'.
Mr. Vfxde. May I ask a question at this point, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde.
Mr. Velde. General, there is a lot of sentiment in this country, and
a lot of people have said, that this is merely water over the dam, some-
thing that has happened in the past, and the ramifications are no
longer important to the American people at this time. What is your
idea on that issue ?
General Willoughby. May I refer to my introductory remarks,
which were designed as an outline or program of what the committee —
and I consider myself a collaborative agent of this committee — hoped
to accomplish.
I have said that "The element which intrigued MacArthur's Intelli-
gence was the immediate recognition that Richard Sorge's story did
not begin or end with Tokyo, but was only a chip in the general mosaic
of Soviet strategy." You will obtain a glimpse of Soviet international
intrigue, the work of the Third Communist International, which is a
tool of the foreign policy of the Kremlin. That will become crystal
clear in the course of this presentation.
Likewise, you will find the activities of American Communists.
The well-known Gerhart Eisler, who embarrassed the Justice Depart-
ment through his escape, is present in Shanghai. He did the same
thing then that he pulled on the Batory. There is your link with yes-
terday. Earl Browder and Eugene Dennis, the chief of the American
Communist Party, appear in the Sorge Shanghai channel. So there
is you connection. Your connection is a case history which presents
certain operational details that were applied 15 years later, or 10
years later, by well-known Communist operators in the United States.
Or, as I stated in my opening remarks, again —
Most of the old wheelhorses of the American Communist Party appear to have
been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the
clandestine fraternity, as well as mere acolytes and dupes, flirting moth-like
with the Red menace ; such as Earl Browder, Sam Darcy, Eugene Dennis, Harry
Berger, Gerhart Eisler, and many others.
Mr. Velde. In other words, General, to simplify it a little bit, you
feel that we have to study the manipulations of the Communist Party
and the international Comintern over the past quarter century in order
to get a clear picture of what their present manipulations might be?
General Willoughby. I feel that strongly, and I agree entirely
with your view on that particular subject.
1166 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Walter. You feel that the same forces at work then are still
at work, toward the same objective?
General Willoughby. Indeed, I do.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, during your tenure in Tokyo,
did you have occasion to further investigate the Richard Sorge spy
rings which were operated in China and Japan ?
General Willoughby. Yes. A perusal of the Sorge reports, frag-
mentary or incomplete, indicated, nevertheless, and very plainly so,
that his activities in Tokyo were connected with China, Manchuria,
and the Siberian mainland.
Mr. Tavenner. After looking into the Sorge case, were you led, as
a result of this inquiry, to other localities ?
General Willoughby. Yes. I became interested in Shanghai as a
focal point of international intrigue and espionage, and specific data
in the Sorge papers that the Soviet Third International, known as
the Communist Third International, to be referred to hereafter as
the Comintern, was operating in that city.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you subsequently determine that there was
available in Shanghai information regarding the activities of Com-
munist agents and sympathizers in Shanghai ?
General Willoughby. Yes. I learned that the international police
in Shanghai, especially the British and French political sections in the
thirties, had developed a considerable volume of information regard-
ing subversive activities of Americans and foreign nationals. In
some instances these activities were connected with personnel of the
American Communist Party.
Mr. Tavenner. As one result of these investigations conducted by
you, was there compiled by your command a group of 34 consecutive
exhibits containing the records and results of the Japanese arrest,
interrogation, and prosecution of Richard Sorge and other defend-
ants ?
General Willoughby. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Are there also included in these exhibits subsequent
interrogations and legal opinions compiled by your command after
the occupation of Japan ?
General Willoughby. There are. May I give you a brief defini-
tion of this material ? We use the phraseology "exhibit" as a matter
of convenience. Actually, they are authenticated, notarized court
translations, notarized by a battery of reputable American lawyers.
As this material is voluminous, aggregating hundreds of type-
written pages, I felt it my duty to assist this committee or any other
investigative body, to prepare personally a brief, rarely exceeding two
to three pages. These briefs to these exhibits are referred to as G-2
comment, number so and so. They are in your possession.
This is roughly a description of the material and the dispatch of
these exhibits, if that meets your requirements, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I think I should state for the record
that certified copies of the exhibits referred to by the witness were
delivered by the Department of the Army to the staff of this com-
mittee at various times, the first delivery being made in March 1949
and the last delivery being made on the 15th day of February 1951.
I am advised that at substantially the same times, copies of the
same exhibits were delivered to the FBI, CIO, and the State Depart-
ment.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1167
As a part of the investigation, the committee, on December 9, 1949,
through one of its investigators, endeavored to obtain information as
to the availability of Agnes Smedley, whose name appears throughout
these reports, for the purpose of serving a subpena upon her, and
ascertained that Agnes Smedley left the United States for Great
Britain on December li, which was just 7 days prior to the making
of that effort.
Now, the exhibits to which you and I have referred, General Wil-
loughby, appear on the table next to you. I will ask you to examine
them and state whether or not they are the exhibits which were
prepared by your command and under your direct ion and supervision \
General Wh-lottghby. 1 have examined these exhibits, Mr. Counsel,
and identify them as being either originals or copies of the consecu-
tive reports filed by us in Washington.
May 1 add a remark, sir? Your statement that you received these
exhibits through the assistance of the War Department, I would
heartily concur in, and say that the Intelligence Section, Department
of the Army, under Major General Boiling, have been and are most
cooperative in this entire enterprise.
What you said about Smedley and your attempt to summon her,
before this committee is news to me, and indicates that you had been
aware of the implication of this case for a long time.
Mr. Tavenner. Each of the exhibits is numbered. I believe you
have them numbered consecutively, from 1 to 34?
General Willoughby. I believe so. To refresh my memory — [after
examining documents] yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer these exhibits,
not in evidence, but merely present them to the committee at this time
and ask that they be marked for identification only in the same manner
and in accordance with the same numbers that they now have, for the
sake of clarity and future reference to them. In other words, they
would be numbered "Willoughby Exhibits 1 to 34, inclusive."
Mr. Wood. There is no objection on the part of any member of the
committee, and they will be so marked.
(The consecutive reports above referred to were marked "Wil-
loughby Exhibits Nos. 1 to 34, inclusive," for identification only.)
Mr. Tavenner. As a further result of your investigation of the
Sorge case, which led to your travels to Shanghai, were there com-
piled by your command certain documents relating to Communist
activities of numerous individuals in Shanghai ?
General Willoughby. Yes, sir. May I amplify this, please?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
General Willoughby. I was able to track down and obtain a sub-
stantial portion — though not the complete file, a substantial portion —
of the Shanghai municipal police files, with the assistance of British,
French, and Chinese officials and the Central Intelligence Agency,
with whom I had been on efficient and friendliest collaboration for a
number of years.
Mr. Tavenner. As a result of your efforts, you did obtain all of the
files which were left intact?
General Willoughby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. I refer you now, or show you, point out to you, two
metal lockers. I would like for you to examine the lockers and their
1168 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
contents and state whether or not they are the Shanghai police files
to which you refer ?
General Willottghby (after examining lockers and contents). Mr.
Counsel, they are. In consideration of the extensive labor of this
committee, and realizing that your research staff was probably limited,
I have attempted to organize these files in the technique of a reference
library in which the contents are systematically numbered, and alpha-
betical card indexes and cross-references have been prepared.
Mr. Tavenner. I notice in the top of the trunk two typewritten lists.
What are they?
General Willottghby. These are entitled "Indexes to Contents."
They identify the contents both by title and reference number.
Mr. Tavenner. These trunks were shipped to me, Frank S. Taven-
ner, as chief counsel of the Committee on Un-American Activities on
May 7, 1951, from Tokyo, were they not?
General Willottghby. I concur.
Mr. Tavenner. I desire to present to the committee the two trunks
with their contents, and ask that they be marked '"Willoughby Exhib-
its 35 and 36" for identification only.
Mr. Wood. So ordered.
(The two metal trunks above referred to, together with their con-
tents, were marked "Willoughby Exhibits 35 and 36," respectively,
for identification only.)
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, you will recall that this com-
mittee first contacted you relative to the subject of this inquiry in
1949. Subsequently, we requested you to prepare at your conven-
ience a concise report on the Sorge case, embodying the essential
parts of that case, particularly those of interest to the United States,
in order that this matter might be presented more completely at a
public hearing. Is that correct ?
General Willoughby. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. Were you able to fulfill that request ?
General Willoughby. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, General Willoughby has filed a
copy of his report with the staff. This report has been invaluable in
the preparation of this hearing and in various investigations which
the committee has from time to time conducted relating to these mat-
ters, and will be used consistently throughout the conduct of his hear-
ing, both by the witness and by me as counsel.
General Willoughby, are you acquained with Yoshikawa Mitsusada ?
General Willoughby. Yes, I am, over a number of years. He is a
brilliant Japanese lawyer, long in government service, and I con-
gratulate the committee on having obtained his appearance here and
his statement in the general premises.
Mr. Velde. Would you spell his name, please, General ?
General Willoughby. Y-o-s-h-i-k-a-w-a, surname, M-i-t-s-u-s-a-d-a ;
Yoshikawa Mitsusada.
Mr. Tavenner. You are aware of the fact that he testified before
this committee regarding certain affidavits which are included in the
exhibits prepared by you ?
General Willoughby. Yes; I was very happy to obtain this infor-
mation through press reports, and consider his contribution, that is,
his authentication, of correlated Sorge data as important, perhaps
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1169
supplemental to the equally important authentication by a battery of
American lawyers in Tokyo.
Mr. Tavennee. These affidavits were executed by Mr. Yoshikawa in
19 19 at the request of your command, attest ing to the aul henl icity of
the Sorge interrogations and confessions which he personally observed.
That is true, isn't it \
General Willougiiry. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Tavennee. A persual of the exhibits, which are in the posses-
sion of the committee, indicates a quite extensive and sincere effort
on the part of American authorities since the occupation to establish
beyond any question of a doubt the validity of the Japanese trials of
Sorge and his co-defendants, and the validity of the police investiga-
tions in the Sorge case, and the authentic character of the records
which you have produced here.
With reference to this aspect of your investigation, what did you do
to establish the validity of the trials, according to our concept of trials,
and the authenticity of the records?
General Wellottghby. I am very glad to take advantage of your
question, Mr. Counsel, because juridical authentication, if presented
at this time to the satisfaction of the committee, appears to me essential
for the entire range of documentation that is submitted. We felt in
1949, although the reports date back to 1947, that that authentica-
tion was desirable because a question had been raised — primarily by
Miss Smedley at the time, utilizing all the facilities of publicity so
generously placed at her disposal — and that we should go over this
case again and have the material notarized in the approved technical
manner prescribed by American law.
Without going into details, I would like to go on record with ref-
erence to so-called exhibit 12, including the G-2 comments previously
described, as follows
Mr. Velde. Before you go into that I would like to ask you what
you meant by the statement you made with reference to Agnes Smed-
ley and her use of the press and use of the fact that these documents
were not authenticated ?
General Willotjghby. I get your point, Mr. Velde. We will have
to go back to comparatively ancient history as far as I am concerned,
namely, that when the report was published by the War Department
in 1949, in February of 1949, Miss Smedley, assisted by Mr. John
Rogge. her attorney, protested the entire publication, charged the
contents as being false, untrue or illegal, and obtained, shall we say,
a generous allocation of radio broadcast time and the full support of
that portion of the American press which has been ascribed by refer-
ence to the coloration pink, fellow-traveling, or pale rose, as the case
may be.
That statement by her was given, as you recall, extraordinary pub-
licity at the time. Our response to that was probably one of acquies-
cence and a desire to go over the evidence once more, this time with
the support of competent American legal opinion, which is the purpose
of my reading.
My reaction personally at the time was to accept Miss Smedley's
threat of suit for libel which she flung into the airways and which I
unhesitatingly accepted at the time. She did not press her suit, or
rather, her lawyer. I believe a Mr. John Rogge, did not press this suit,
for obvious reasons.
1170 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Velde. Was any suit filed by Agnes Smedley at all for libel?
General Willoughby. No. My reference to this legal opinion of
authentication is related to your question. We felt that a report by
an investigative agency should be good enough, considering that this
agency has a record of long service, but we also felt that since reputa-
ble American legal advice was available in Tokyo, that we should call
on them, and they are: Messrs. J. Woodall Greene, member of the
Maryland Bar; Joseph S. Carusi, member of the Connecticut Bar;
Franklin E. N. Warren, member of the Oklahoma Bar and member
of the New Mexico Bar.
These men occupied high positions in the occupation headquarters,
and are on duty there now.
In addition to this American talent, we also employed, because of
the language element, the services of an international Japanese-British
firm : Messrs. E. V. A. de Becker and R. Usami, member, Middle Tem-
ple, London; member, Inner Temple, London; member, Tokyo Bar.
Upon examination, item for item, and notarization of the docu-
ments, these gentlemen made the following signed summation
statement :
We, the undersigned, fully realizing that certain processes and procedures are
necessary for the authentication or verification of documentary evidence before
they may be introduced in courts of record in the United States, or be used as
a basis for evidence, have examined the methods and procedures used for the
authentication and verification of the documents listed, and after having duly
considered the testimony of witnesses and having examined their written state-
ments and interrogations, together with their seals and signatures appended
thereto, have arrived at the conclusion that the authentication and verification
of the documents, including the statements from witnesses, is in accordance with
existing laws and procedures.
We, therefore, certify that it is our opinion that the authentication and veri-
fication of each of the several documents mentioned —
And I am now speaking of this entire collection, both here and in the
Shanghai files —
is legally sufficient to give legal standing to their full use within the scope of
the rules of civil procedures for the courts of the United States, or foreign courts
adhering to Anglo-American jurisprudence.
If the committee desires, there is additional opinion by the Judge
Advocate of General Headquarters, Tokyo, Japan. With your per-
mission I will file an abbreviated extract, if I may. This is taken
from exhibit No. 14, one of these folders. It is entitled, "Opinion of
Legal Section, Far East Command, Opinion of the Judge Advocate
General, Far East Command and Related Matter." [Reading :]
In further support of the opinions of prominent American, British, and Japa-
nese lawyers, currently employed in various civil sections, Headquarters Tokyo,
there is enclosed herewith the opinion of legal section, Far East Command.
In this opinion, legal section, Far East Command, supports the conclusions of
the Sorge Spy Ring report of December 15, 1947, and attests to the value of the
documentary evidence on hand in G-2, Far East Command.
In their brief, legal section, Far East Command, points out and concurs in
the general appraisal of evidence in this report, viz:
(i) The evidence has definite probative value.
(ii) Ample basis and justification for the report.
(iii) Evidence is considered to have a rational probative force.
(iv) It is considered acceptable to reasonable men.
(v) It is of type employed in congressional investigation committees.
Apparently, as of the date of this opinion, which is 2 to 3 years old,
we had a feeling, in our correspondence with this committee, that
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1171
sooner or later this material might become of more than local interest.
[Continuing reading:]
(vi) There is strong evidence of careful Japanese investigation.
(vii) No indication of employment of force or manufactured testimony.
(viii) Statements of various accused arc mutually corroborative.
(ix) The (l-J. report December 15, L947, was justified and properly made.
Mr. Tavf.xxki:. Mr. Chairman, at this time T would like fco offer in
evidence the exhibit formerly identified by Yoshikawa Mitsusada and
marked for identification only as "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2," and
ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 37."
Mr. Wood. Let it be admitted.
(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit
No. 37," is filed herewith.)
Mr. W alter. Is that the exhibit that was marked when Mr.
Yoshikawa testified?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes. This exhibit, it will be recalled, consists of
the first draft in German of the Sorge confession and its English
translation. According to the testimony of Mr. Yoshikawa, this con-
fession was not accepted on the ground that it was inadequate, and
Mr. Yoshikawa, in his individual capacity retained possession of this
draft. Subsequently, Richard Sorge completed his confession and
as the contents of this document are embraced within the completed
confession, it will not be necessary to allude to it further.
General Willoughby, I now call your attention to a document en-
titled '"Sorge Case Materials, Part I of Translation of Statement of
Richard Sorge," dated February 1942, and immediately following that
document, "Sorge Case Materials, Part II of Translation of State-
ment of Richard Sorge," dated April 1942, which appear in your
report under these titles. These two documents appear also in the
consecutive exhibits as 20-A and 20-B. Will you tell the committee
the genesis of this document and what it comprises ?
General Willoughby. Identified as classified by you, its full and
official title, translated from the Japanese, is known as "Sorge Case
Materials." It consists of two parts : "Part 1 of Translation of State-
ment of Richard Sorge" and "Part 2 of Translation of Statement of
Richard Sorge." It was published by the Ministry of Justice in its
Criminal Affairs Bureau.
The foreword, I believe, Mr. Chairman, describes its content. The
foreword is contained on the first page of a special number, No. 191,
and marked "Top secret," top secret at the time as applied to the Japa-
nese Government, a very interesting sidelight, if I may digress.
When this ring was discovered and the members of the ring ar-
rested, a very leisurely investigative process ensued, because the Japa-
nese Government at that time was in a state of neutrality with Soviet
Russia and did not wish to disturb this by the implication contained
in this case. For that reason, the publications were marked "Secret"
and were handled with very considerable delicacy. It was some years
later when it became apparent to the Japanese Government that the
Soviet neutrality would soon end. Then they proceeded with more
vigor in this case, to the extent of condemning the principals Sorge
and Ozaki.
I now proceed with the reading of the foreword, to comply with the
request of counsel.
1172 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Velde. General Willoughby, can you fix the period of this neu-
trality between Japan and Russia a little more exactly?
General Willoughby. Yes. Our war entry is December 7, 1941.
And, incidentally, Sorge will have something to say about this in his
coded messages to Moscow. The Japanese Government felt it pru-
dent, shall we say, or within the realm of their international purposes,
to enter into a neutrality agreement with the Soviets.
Mr. Tavenner. That was in April 1941 as Matsuoka was returning
from Germany to Japan ?
General Willoughby. Yes ; some months prior to our entry into the
war.
Mr. Velde. Approximately how long prior to our entry into the
war was this period of neutrality, as you call it ?
General Willoughby. Six months, roughly. Roughly 6 months
would cover the period of negotiation, of weighing and balancing
favorable and unfavorable factors and the decision to develop a neu-
trality pact with Russia.
Mr. Velde. General, in your investigations did you find any evidence
that the Russian Government was aware of the planned attack on
Pearl Harbor?
General Willoughby. Yes, Mr. Velde ; and, if I am permitted the
liberty of suggesting, the counsel has provided for that in a later ques-
tion.
Mr. Velde. I withdraw the question.
General Willoughby. And I am sure he will call your attention to
it. Your question is well taken and is an important historical ele-
ment. They did get the information. We will read, probably, the
contents of that message later on. In other words, they knew in
advance what was going to happen, and I wish I had known it in
advance, too. We were then sweating it out in the Philippines, know-
ing that the Philippines would be a very probable target.
Mr. Walter. May I ask a question at this point, General ?
General Willoughby. Certainly.
Mr. Walter. The Ozaki you mentioned was the political adviser to
Konoye, and Ozaki was a Communist agent ?
General Willoughby. Yes. He was the closest right-hand man to
Dr. Sorge. It is a sort of astonishing piece of information that an
intimate of the Prime Minister of Japan, with access to the secrets of
the Foreign Office of Japan, should also be an intimate of a Russian-
controlled espionage identity.
Mr. Walter. He was more than an intimate ; wasn't he the political
adviser to Konoye ?
General Willoughby. Yes. I think we will cover that later on, but
I will be glad to outline it to you. Ozaki belonged to a group of
political experts. He was rated as an expert on China and the Man-
churian Railway, and as such he was a consultant to the Foreign
Office; that was actually his official position. But he was more than
that, because he developed an intimate personal relationship with the
Prime Minister, who had around him what was then known as a group
of bright young men around the Foreign Office who met with the
Prime Minister at irregular intervals in an informal fashion at break-
fast, and sometimes at dinner, and became known as the Breakfast
Club. The Breakfast Club meant something to the Japanese, although
it meant nothing to us until the development of the Sorge story. We
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1173
found there a local related group of consultants and Foreign Ollice
officials who were to some extent responsible for at least the dra I' l Lng of
foreign policy, and this man was a member of t Ids powerful and influ-
ential group. What he found he immediately relayed to his boss and
associate. Dr. Sorge, who put it on his radio station which he main-
tained, and it was relayed to Khabarovsk, the Russian official relay
station in Siberia, and then onward to Moscow.
So, this extraordinary man, this Dr. Sorge, had access on the one
hand to the inner councils of the Japanese Government, and on the
other hand to the inner councils of the German Government, because
he occupied the position of press attache to the German Embassy in
Tokyo. In other words, he got it coming and going.
Mr. Tavenner. Didn't he also have access to more or less a degree to
the inner councils of the British Foreign Office?
General Willoughby. Yes. His ring involved an English subject,,
Guenther Stein, who was persona grata with the British Foreign
Office in Tokyo.
He also had access at one time or another to American information
through Smedley and her associates.
Mr. Tavenner. May I suggest, General, that to go into the details
of this matter now, which you are doing in response to my question,,
may rather interfere with the orderly development of the testimony ;
and I suggest, if satisfactory to the committee, that we proceed more
or less in chronological order.
General Willoughby. Very good. Needless to say, I am delighted
to respond to a question by Mr. Walter, but I was aware
A Ir. Tavenner. Well, I asked the question about the British, and I
realize we are getting deeply into testimony with which we will be
concerned later.
General Willoughby. Indeed, sir.
In order to get back on the track, your last inquiry was the identi-
fication of Sorge Case Materials, and I suggested that the foreword
of the document is self-explanatory. I will read this foreword, which
should dispose of this important document :
The German Richard S'orge entered the German Communist Party in 1919,
was sent to Comintern headquarters —
Russian headquarters —
in January 1925, immediately became a member of the Russian Communist
Party, joined the staff of the Comintern intelligence department and engaged in
espionage activities in the northern European nations, China and elsewhere. He
was ordered to serve as a spy in Japan in 1933, went to that country as a corre-
spondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung, organized a secret espionage ring, includ-
ing the German Max Klausen, a member of the German Communist Party and
radio technician sent out by the same Soviet intelligence authorities; the Yugo-
slav and member of the French Communist Party, Branko de Voukelitch, the
United States Communist Party member Miyagi Yotoku, who had been sent to
Japan by his party to perform espionage work —
I pause here to point out the significance of the international recruit-
ment by which this man was furnished a member of the French Com-
munist Party, a member of the American Communist Party, and a
member of the German Communist Party as a part of his working
staff. With reference to your question, Mr. Walter [continuing
reading] :
the political adviser to the Chinese Comnmnist Party Ozaki Hozumi, whom.'
Sorge himself had recruited around 1930 in Shanghai —
1174 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
In other words, Ozaki Hozumi, in the early part of the 1930's, irre-
spective of his future high official position with the Japanese Govern-
ment, was also listed by Sorge as a political adviser to the Chinese
Communist Party in 1930. There are many items I have either for-
gotten or that the detailed investigation has brought forth. [Contin-
uing reading:]
and others, and directed and supervised the said ring in the collection and trans-
mission to Soviet headquarters, either in writing or via radio, of information
concerning military affairs, foreign relations, politics, economics, and other mis-
cellaneous subjects.
The contents of the present printed document comprise part 1 of a translation
of typewritten German notes prepared by Sorge in lieu of a statement at the
direction of the Tokyo District Criminal Court.
Mr. Tavenner. At this point, I desire to offer in evidence as "Wil-
loughy Exhibit No. 38" the German notes and the English translation
referred to as being a part of consecutive exhibit 20-A.
Mr. Wood. It will be received.
( The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No.
38," is filed herewith.)
Mr. Tavenner. All right; if you will proceed to part 2.
General Willoughby. Part 2 has an identical title. Its foreword
merely consists of this description :
This document comprises the second and last part of a translation by the
Procurator's Bureau of the Tokyo District Criminal Court of typewritten German
notes prepared by Richard Sorge in lieu of a statement.
Mr. Tavenner. I desire at this time to offer in evidence so much of
consecutive exhibit 20-B, both in the German text and in the English
translation, as conforms to the witness' description.
Mr. Wood. It will be received.
(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No.
39," is filed herewith.)
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, these two documents, marked
"Willoughby Exhibit No. 38" and "Willoughby Exhibit No. 39," are
what is known as the Sorge confession ; are they not ?
General Willoughby. Yes; they are, though the correct title has
been read by me now, namely, "Sorge Case Materials." We finally
gave it a convenient title of our own out in Tokyo; namely, "Sorge s
Own Story." Actually, it is a rather loose designation. They are not
confessions; they are not really Sorge's own story; they are not a
diary ; but they contain elements of all three, and you are at liberty to
refer to them as you choose. We have used those terms indiscrimi-
nately for some time.
Mr. Tavenner. And the translation of the title of the document
itself, the printed title which I read, is "Parts 1 and 2 of the Statement
of Richard Sorge" ?
General Willoughby. Sorge Case Materials.
Mr. Tavenner. Let me put the question this way : There is no diary
or confession by Sorge separate and apart from the document which I
introduced a moment ago, previously marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 2,"
and these two documents, "Willoughby Exhibit 38" and "Willoughby
Exhibit 39," which have just been introduced?
General Willoughby. There is none.
Mr. Walter. As I understand it, when Yoshikawa put the story
together and reduced it to typewritten sheets, they were submitted to
Sorge and he initialed them ; isn't that correct ?
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1175
General Willoughby. I think he made corrections. The original I
have seen shows ink entries of a leisurely, editorial, corrective process.
Mr. Walter. Did he initial each page?
General Willoughby. I don't recall that point, but I have accepted
this particular document at full face value.
Mr. Walter. It is just as much a confession as though the entire
thing had been written by his own hand ?
Genera] Willoughby. I think your point is well taken. The man
wrote it and filed it juridically, and I believe you could accept that
classification, sir.
Mr. Taykn'xkk. This confession or statement by Richard Sorge,
comprising exhibits 38 and 39, is very long. They are very interest-
ing, Mr. Chairman. They go with great detail into the history of the
Communist Party and the Comintern in the East ; but, as they are ex-
hibits, we will not undertake to read the documents. I would like,
however, to question the witness more or less in a chronological fash-
ion regarding matters that are set forth in the diary.
General Willoughby, I call your attention to page 14 of part 1 of
exhibit 38, in which there appears chapter 4, entitled "The Writer's
Espionage Group and Activities in China Between January 1930 and
December 1932." Will you please give the committee the benefit of
the information contained therein relating to the organization of this
group? In referring to "the writer," I was referring to Richard
Sorge.
General Willoughby. I think extracts from this very voluminous
exhibit, which is available in totality, will give the story. For ex-
ample, when he speaks of the organization of the China group he has
this to say :
I came to China with two foreign coworkers who had been dispatched on or-
ders from the fourth bureau of the Red army.
That is a rather significant line. They had been dispatched on
orders from the fourth bureau of the Red army. The fourth bureau
of the Red army is the intelligence section of the Soviet army, and
Sorge says he came to China with two coworkers who had been fur-
nished him by the fourth bureau of the Red army. That indicates he
was working for the fourth section of the Soviet army ; he was an
operator, an agent, an under-cover agent, so to speak, of the intelli-
gence section of the Soviet army.
Now, he says :
The only person in China upon whom I knew I could depend was Agnes Smed-
ley, of whom I had first heard in Europe. I solicited her aid in establishing my
group in Shanghai and particularly in selecting Chinese coworkers. I met as
many as possible of her young Chinese friends, making special efforts to be-
come acquainted with those who volunteered to cooperate and work with
foreigners for leftist causes.
Then later on, to pick another significant fragment, he said :
I used the same method in obtaining foreign coworkers for my espionage
group. At first I selected people from among Smedley's friends, approaching
them by asking Smedley to introduce me to them and then waiting until I
could negotiate with them directly.
Then this will interest Mr. Walter :
It was in that way that I met Ozaki, and I think Smedley was the one who
introduced us. After that Smedley and I met Ozaki frequently at Smedley's
home.
1176 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
He goes on in the same vein in this lengthy description of his
operations.
Mr. Tavenner. I call your attention to page 15 of this same exhibit
28, where there appears subtitle C, entitled "Methods Used in Collec-
tion of Information by Japanese Members; Methods of Contacting
Japanese Members," and ask you to tell the committee what Sorge had
to say about his contacts with Japanese members.
General Willoughey. Here again I make some selective references
to his statements because they are descriptive of his work. He said :
My meetings with Japanese members took place at restaurants, cafes or
Smedley's home * * *. I felt most at ease when we met at Smedley's home,
and I took Ozaki and Kawai there on many occasions.
May I pause here to identify this man Kawai, K-a-w-a-i ? Kawai
is a member of Sorge's ring, arrested, tried, and convicted, whom we
released under the political amnesty following the occupation of
Japan. We released a lot of people under the casual classification of
political prisoners. The fact that they included convicted espionage
agents and a slight assortment of murderers was incidental. We were
too busy with the occupation of Japan to go into case histories. Later
we got those people.
Kawai became important because he is an actual living eyewitness
of this association with Smedley and others, has said so, his affidavit
is available, and were funds available he could have been brought
before this committee.
Mr. Tavenner. In that connection, General, is it not correct that
he is one of the two individuals of whom this committee wrote you
regarding the taking of his deposition by this committee during April
1950 when a subcommittee was in Hawaii ?
General Willoughby. Quite. I am glad you reminded me of it,
Mr. Counsel, and it shows that this committee has been actually work-
ing on this case over a long period.
This affidavit was prepared in lieu of a personal appearance, and it
has the same probative value.
In other words, if Smedley and her lawyers in her days — and she
had to defend herself, of course ; I had no objection then or now to
this attitude — if she maintained this was a typical forced Japanese
disclosure, it has been supported by witnesses of high standing willing
to make that statement before an American investigative group such
as this one. Kawai is in a more important category than Ozaki be-
cause you can summon him if you want to, though he has made a
sworn statement, notarized, and so forth.
Mr. Velde. You have mentioned meetings between Ozaki and
Kawai in Smedley's home. Can you place the time they were held
and where was Smedley's home ?
General Willottghby. These conferences were in the city of
Shanghai. Smedley and Stein were never active in Japan, and refer-
ence to her is as to her work as Sorge's assistant in Shanghai. Later
on — and I did not know it at the lime — our interest in the Sorge file
brought confirmation of that in the Shanghai police records. A Japa-
nese court record of an espionage ring points to activities in Shanghai,
and that is confirmed by a later investigation of collateral supporting
information of identical quality by a reputable international policing
body, the Shanghai municipal police, which at that time was an extra-
territorial enclave in China.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF .RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1177
Mr. Velde. You think the evidence such I hat il would sal isfy almost
any American court?
Genera] Willoughby. Yes. 1 would accept it.
Mr. Vki.dk. What was the period?
General Willoughby. 1929 to 1934. Am I correct about that, Mr.
Counsel? As a matter of fact, the counsel to this committee lias be-
come much more expert than I am on these files.
Mr. T.wk.nxkr. 1 think the interrogation will indicate' that these
particular conferences took" place in L932 and the last one in 1933, so
far as Kawai is concerned.
General Willoughby. I was tempted to throw into the hopper the
Shanghai police document.
Mi'. Tavkxxki;. Before you do that, you referred to Guenther Stein
not having been involved in Japan.
General Willoughby. I take that back.
Mr. Tavenner. Wasn't that an error?
General Willoughby. Yes. That was a slip of the tongue, an error.
Smedley was not in Japan, but Guenther Stein was there. In fact,
he ran a radio station for Sorge for a long time.
As to the relationship between the Sorge report, a Japanese report,
and the report of the British and French concessions of the Shanghai
municipal police, the committee holds in the Shanghai files a typical
dossier containing an elaborate report and a typical index card on
Smedley. This is a 5- by 3-inch index card, and it fixes the date.
"Shanghai municipal police" is written in the upper left-hand
corner; file number; date, August 1933; American; age, 23/2/1892;
height, 5 feet G inches; hair, brown; eyes, gray; face, oval. I would
say a rather slipshod description.
Antecedents: Agnes Smedley, alias Alice Bird, alias Mrs. Petroikos, American
citizen horn in Osgoo, Mo., United States of America, on February 23, 1892.
Member of the following societies.
That is rather interesting. From 1933 to 1951 we have heard of such
lists elsewhere, where fellow travelers and joiners join certain fronts.
[Continuing reading:]
Friends of the U. S. S. R., Hindustan Association in Berlin, Berlin Indian
Revolutionary Society, Noulens Defense Committee —
The "Noulens Defense Committee" is a forerunner of the Civil Eights
Congress; it works in Shanghai on the same principle as the Civil
Eight Congress works in New York City now ; namely, legal defense
of Communists caught in the business.
Mr. Walter. What is the American counterpart ?
General Willoughby." 1 The Civil Rights Congress. I will trace it
from its noble birth to its American tendrils.
Mr. Walter. Noble birth? I would say birth out of wedlock.
General Willoughby. I accept your fine genealogical nuance, Mr.
Walter. [Continuing reading:]
All China Labor Federation, and the China League for Civil Rights. Speaks
English, French, and German and is in possession of two passports — German
and American.
I will show individuals with 15 passports. [Continuing reading:]
Arrived in Shanghai in May in2D from Berlin as the correspondent of the
German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung.
90929—51 4
1178 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
That is the same cover Sorge had, who was also a correspondent for
the Frankfurter Zeitung. [Continuing reading:]
She is in the service of the eastern branch of the central committee of the
Communist International and is definitely known to have assisted local Indian
seditionists on several occasions during the past few years. It is believed that
her chief duties comprise the supervising of Communist organizations among
workers and that she receives orders direct from the central committee of the
Communist International in Moscow.
This is a statement by the Shanghai municipal police, who did not
then know or have, of course, Sorge's record, known here as exhibit
38, but they had a fair knowledge of it. [Continuing reading :]
May 1929 to May 15, 1930—85 Avenue Dubail. May 15, 1930, to October 1930—
Canton, and French concession, Shameen. October 1930 — 72 Route Groushy —
A Shanghai street. [Continuing reading :]
January 22, 1931, to March 5, 1931— Nanking. June 16, 1931, to July 5, 1931—
Canton. December 1931 — removed to apartment 102, I. S. S. Apartments, 1552
Avenue Joffre.
On May 17, 1933, she left Shanghai by rail for Peiping. Unconfirmed informa-
tion is to the effect that she intends to proceed to Moscow. October 23, 1934 —
returned to Shanghai —
A lapse of 2 years. [Continuing reading :]
from the United States, in the S. S. President Coolidge —
And so forth and so forth.
Behind this brief, typical index card maintained by the Shanghai
police, there is a more extensive file, but here is a rough fixation of
the time period, views of the British police, her aliases and her asso-
ciations, in broad outline, of which a more complete record is going
to be filed by the counsel.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Willoughby, I call your attention to section F,
page 16, part 1, of the document referred to — that is, exhibit 38 —
which is entitled, "Persons Directly Attached to Writer's Chinese
Group," and by "writer" I am referring to Richard Sorge.
Will you tell the committee what Richard Sorge had to say about
this subject?
General Willoughby. With reference to foreigners, Mr. Counsel?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes. It is section F.
General Willoughby. Yes, sir. I have it. Here, again, I act as an
assistant counsel in protecting the limited time of the committee and
picking out what I know from my long experience to be the high
lights. This is the type of comment he makes on his foreign associates.
He has one by the name of Seber Weingarten :
Weingarten, the man in charge of wireless operations in my group, remained in
Shanghai after I returned to Moscow. He was a graduate of the radio school in
Moscow who had been ordered by headquarters to work with me.
He has this to say about Agnes Smedley, though he has other things to
say in other parts of this document :
She was an American and a correspondent of the German newspaper Frank-
furter Zeitung. She was used in Shanghai by me as a direct member of my
group. She worked for me very competently.
Then there are a number of code and surnames. Some we have identi-
fied ; others we suspect ; and others we don't know who they are. One
was John :
John — He was sent to Shanghai to work for me by the fourth bureau of
the Red Army in 1931. Although he acted as my proxy in a few liaison
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1179
duties, he was chiefly concerned with code :md photographic work. He was a
Pole, a former member of the Polish Communist Tarty.
Here we have an interesting one. By cross reference to Sorge and
the Shanghai police, we have been able to establish his identity :
Paul — He was designated as my successor by the fourth bureau of the Red
Army. While I was in Shanghai, he was chiefly concerned with military mat-
ters, on which he was an expert. He became the leader of the group after I left.
Here, while the mater is covered more extensively later on, I would
like to pause and read to you again one of those police identities, and
it is in line with the purposes of this committee. In a general manner,
this is what I said in my correspondence with Washington :
The significance of this material of yesterday is that it, carries into tomorrow.
Time in its issue of April 25, 11)49, featured Eugene Dennis. There is no point
in repeating this terse, well-writen story of the growth and world itinerary of
a Soviet agent ; important, however, are certain connecting links with the Sorge
case.
Dennis, who used to be Francis X. Wahlron, obtained a fraudulent passport as
'Paul Walsh'* and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The world-wide
ramifications of the Third International, with Shanghai as the far eastern
operating center, are reflected in the itinerary of this prominent American disci-
ple. Paul Eugene Walsh, alias "Paul" or "Milton," suddenly appears in the
records of the Shanghai police.
The Shanghai police had the same type of card on him as I read to you
on Smedley.
Mr. Tavenner. And a person designated by the name Paul is said by
Sorge to have been his successor at Shanghai ?
General Willoughby. Yes. Here I am quoting the Shanghai
police report :
Name : Paul Eugene Walsh ; alias Milton.
Date and place of birth : Unknown.
Address in Shanghai : 35-D, 643 Route Frelupt.
Particulars of passport : American Passport No. 331741 issued by the Depart-
ment of State, Washington, D. C. on 12.12.1930.
When and how Walsh arrived in Shanghai are unknown, as are his previous
activities. From December 1, 1933, until June 1, 1934, he resided at Flat 0,
Gresham Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue Joffre. On May 30, 1934, the lease of
Flat 34-D, Foncim Apartments, No. 643 Route Frelupt, was transferred to his
name from Harry Berger —
This is important. Harry Berger is a well-known international Com-
munist identity. [Continuing reading:]
with whom he was obviously on terms of good friendship. Walsh resided at
the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9, 1S34, when he secretly left
Shanghai for Trieste on the S. S. Conte Verde. It has been established —
says the Shanghai police —
that Walsh was one of the master minds of the local machine of the Comintern,
and as such was responsible for the collation of many important documents re-
lating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far East.
Now, Sorge describes this particular Comintern machine, and we
will read it shortly. Sorge does not always give complete identities.
He was cautious, even in his story, because he hoped against hope,
from 1941 to 1944, that the Soviets would intervene and rescue him
from his predicament.
The cross-reference, Mr. Velde, is that this Comintern apparatus
or machine with which the police associates him, and which is de-
scribed fully by Sorge as to its purposes, was founded by Earl Browder,
1180 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
the head of the American Communist Party. It was Dennis who
took the place of Browder. That constitutes the value of this pseudo-
historical tracing of fine lines of relationship which is one of the tasks
of this committee and one of the tasks of the Tokyo intelligence system.
Mr. Velde. Do I get you right that the corroboration consists of
the Shanghai police reports, which mention the names of Browder,
Dennis, and others, and they are also contained in the Sorge file ?
General Willoughby. Yes ; either in code name or surname.
Mr. Walter. General, you stated that some of the names you merely
suspected. Have you pursued all avenues of investigation to determine
who they were, and do you think we might well look further for the
identity of these persons ?
General Willoughby. We have done practically all we could in the
Orient, but when you encounter identities of persons, then the local
investigative agencies, including your committee, would pursue this,
and it is my understanding this is being done. American investiga-
tive agencies have become interested in these clues or leads or refer-
ences, and this case might still be said to be open, in that whenever such
unidentified or partially identified individuals appear the investigative
processes are in course now. These sources are not available to me,
since I left my post under dramatic circumstances 60 days ago.
Mr. Tavenner. I might add to what you have said that, where the
identities of persons in Japan have been made available to the com-
mittee, this committee is endeavoring to ascertain where they are now
and what they are doing.
General Willoughby. May I compliment the counsel and this com-
mittee. I was surprised at the amount of information this committee
has on persons whose names appear in the oriental files. I am sure this
will be brought out in the course of these hearings. I have a feeling
that a number of these identities are already known and have been
investigated on parallel lines by this committee.
Mr. Tavenner. There are some names we do not desire to disclose
at this time.
General Willoughby. The committee controls the subject matter.
Mr. Tavenner. Have you completed your answer to the question
relating to section F %
General Willoughby. Yes. I have picked a few of his comments.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you turn back to section F, page 17? I do
not believe you have completed your testimony with regard to that.
General Willoughby. Your point is well taken, sir. Sorge lists
a few more which are important, such as Max Klausen :
Klausen, who went to Shanghai before I did, handled wireless operations
for his operator, a man known as Jim. He wasi attached to the Fourth Bu-
reau of the Red Army in Moscow. I first met him in his role of wireless
operator in Shanghai. He worked for me for quite a while at Canton, although
not as an active member, after which he was transferred to a group in Man-
churia. I knew he was an able man ; so I proposed at Moscow in 1935 that
he be sent to Japan.
Klausen, Sorge's radio operator, established radio stations both in
Shanghai and Tokyo, used to relay messages to Khabarovsk, Siberia,
which were then relayed to Moscow.
Klausen is well remembered by me because he was released in
Tokyo under this political amnesty, and he disappeared. He disap-
peared with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy. That started me,,
actually, in tracking down this case. I felt if this individual, or any
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1181
individual of this crowd, was that important, that this thing was an
international case. We found later on, as will be developed by the
counsel in connection with exhibit 17, that an attempt was made to
get this Sorge case in the International Tribunal in Tokyo, where
it met strong opposition by the Russian member; again, to any
trained intelligence or investigative ollicer, indicative of the impor-
tance of this material.
We will come to that later.
Mr. Tavenner. It appears that after a discussion of the paragraph
relating to Paul in Sorge's statement, you omitted the next threei
paragraphs. When you returned to the records relating to Paul you
failed to pick them up. So, will you go back to the paragraph be-
ginning "A German woman"?
General Willoughby. Oh, yes. We find an entry :
A German woman who was called "Hamburg." She offered us the use
of her home and engaged in various liaison functions, such as performing mes-
senger duties and holding materials for us.
The next entry relates to Jacob :
Jacob — a young American newspaper reporter. For the most part he gathered
various kinds of political information from foreigners.
I have not been able to obtain an identification on this entry.
Mr. Tavenner. Have you been able to identify the newspaper for
which the individual worked as a reporter?
General Willoughby. I am sorry to say, no.
Mr. Walter. Does the record disclose his first name, his given name ?
General Willoughby. Just "Jacob," which could be his code name
or his surname. You find some names like "Hamburg," who is prob-
ably Miss Weitemeyer, and there is a great deal known about her.
These were clues to descriptive activities, such as a spy-ring apparatus.
Mr. Tavenner. There is still another paragraph.
General Willoughby. Which one ?
Mr. Tavenner. It begins with "A young employee."
General Willoughby. Oh, yes:
A young employee of the American consulate who brought in economic and
political news.
Sorge then says :
I have forgotten his name.
Sorge hoped for 4 years that someone would "spring" him. He
bragged to the Japanese: "I am an important Soviet operator; I hold
the rank of colonel in the Soviet Army," and so forth. He played on
the desire of the Japanese to have no friction with the Russians during
the war years, the neutrality arrangement. So, we felt that his own
statements were more or less influenced by this cautious, protective
attitude. But the systematic interrogation of other members of his
ring brought out other facts, and that shows the importance of your
witness, Yoshikawa Mitsusada.
Mr. Velde. As to this young employee of the American consulate,
is there any corroborating evidence in the Shanghai police records ?
General Willoughby. Our efforts were to try to grab the Shanghai
files. Everything points to Shanghai as headquarters, with Tokyo
an outpost. We tried to do that, but we were charged with the occu-
pation of Japan, a nation of 80 million, and my job was not to pursue
1182 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
these juicy morsels, but to keep a sort of FBI surveillance in Japan
and to maintain tranquillity in Japan. So, we could not engage in
activities in China.
I am continually charged with failure to obtain information else-
where. It would be the same as if the FBI was giving you the records
of the French Surete Nationale in Paris. We have done all we could
to track down these "birds." Actually, I was less interested in getting
the dope on Jacob than on Earl Browder, Eugene Dennis, and Gerhart
Eisler. They were in the headlines, and I feel if that had been known
Judge Medina's job would have been easier.
Mr. Velde. Don't misunderstand me, General. I realize your juris-
diction was limited to Japan and the Philippine Islands, as I
understand it.
General Willoughby. Quite.
Mr. Velde. And you had no jurisdiction in Korea, either at that
time ?
General Willoughby. I did not. Of course, I had interest and
picked up everything that was not nailed down.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa was asked the question whether or
not effort had been made to identify the individual alleged to have
been in the American consulate and furnishing information. His
testimony was that they had been unable to establish his identity, but
it is possible that the State Department has information that would
lead to discovery of at least the names of persons in the consulate at
that time, which is not your function, but probably our function.
General Willoughby. I feel that the committee is in a position
to inquire from the State Department directly.
Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir.
Section J on page 23 of the same document, exhibit 38, is entitled
"Other Groups in China." The first group listed thereunder is the
"Jim" or "Lehman" group. What does Sorge report on this group?
General Willoughby. With an eye on Mr. Velde, now we come
to a portion of Sorge's own story which, on perusal, led me, or us,
the investigative intelligence groups, to try to obtain further data on
the operations in Shanghai, and it is this portion of the Sorge story
which, while cautiously worded, nevertheless gave us really the bird's-
eye view of the international Comintern character of the organizations
then in Shanghai. When you read this and put yourselves in out-
place, or my place, there was enough there — though Sorge, as usual,
was conservative in his designations — enough of the purposes of these
organizations to recognize a similar pattern in the United States.
After we pursued this investigation which resulted in the Shanghai
file and saw the picture that evolved from it, we felt that we then had
a pattern recognizable in the United States.
For example, if we find Noulens is a type case of a protective legal
defense of a captured convicted espionage agent which is an exact
counterpart of the Civil Rights Congress, when we see that, we bring
the report up to date.
When we find the same man — namely, Gerhart Eisler — operating
in Japan, and find him later defended by — what is her name? Carol
Wise?
Mr. Walter. Carol King.
Mr. Beale. Carol Weiss King.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1183
General Willougiiby. Then there develops a pattern which must
be known by the legislators and the people so that they can under-
stand and identify these things. For example, I notice Mr. Saypol —
I am speaking as a reader of several papers, such as the New York
Times — though I don't feel so kindly as to the Herald Tribune; as
a matter of fact, I wonder why New York requires the Herald Tribune
when it has the Times. Is the Times man here? And including that
unmatched series of papers known as the Hearst papers, completely in
favor for years. Mr. Sentner [addressing reporter].
When we see that Gerhart Eisler is defended by an organization
headed by Miss King, and we find Eisler in Shanghai, and find Noulens
defended in Shanghai in a similar manner to Eisler's defense in the
United States, then we can trace the Kremlin-sponsored, Comintern-
created so-called International lied Aid, which became the Labor
Defense in the States, which became the Civil Rights Congress and
the Association for the Defense of the Foreign Born ; and that is a
pattern which I think is of substance and value to the committee and
the Congress and the people.
This is a departure from your question to introduce the importance
of the description of these organizations. Xo doubt you will recog-
nize them. They are operating in the States under some other name.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you read what Sorge had to say about the
"Jim" or "Lehman" group?
General Willougiiby. That will take us a bit of time.
Mr. Tavenner. Then, Mr. Chairman, I believe this woidd be a good
opportunity for a break.
Mr. Wood. The committee stands in recess until 2 : 30.
(Thereupon, at 12:40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m.
of the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY—
Resumed
Air. Tavenner. General Willougiiby, I refer you again to section J,
on page 23, of exhibit No. 38. That section is entitled "Other Groups
in China." The first group listed thereunder is the Jim or Lehman
group. AVill you examine the exhibit, please, and state what the Sorge
statement shows on this unit?
General W 7 illoughby. Mr. Counsel, I regard this section of the
Sorge story as possibly' the most important in this documentation,
because it led us to believe that, while fragmentary, the descriptions
of these international people then working in Shanghai for the pur-
pose of communizing China were so descriptive in their functional
outline that we might have something of value to the American people
today. And, actually, as I read these, I would like to suggest that
you put yourselves in our positions in Tokyo, groping with this
uncrystallized information at the time, and at the end of the reading
realize we would have had to go after the Shanghai record or to pro-
cure someone who would know about that activity.
1184 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Consequently, this represents a turning point in the process 'of in-
vestigation, in the sense that we had already disposed of Sorge, you
might say, as an interesting specimen of international espionage
somewhat in the manner of what was later disclosed in Canada ; but
these next two pages, written by an individual who was in the busi-
ness, an expert in his line, gave us the clue to the existence in Shanghai
of a number of bodies that looked very much like the Communist
fronts everywhere in the world, including America.
Here, again, we go into that twilight zone of why and how a his-
torical case, so to speak — because everything of 5 or 10 years ago is
in the realm of historical research— can be linked to something that is
of interest to the committee today.
I will link it, or the counsel, through his questioning, will develop
it, and I will pause in one of these groups and trace it from 1935 until
1951, in a comparatively brief statement.
Mr. Walter. Did your investigation develop a connection between
that group and a group in the United States?
General Willotjghby. It did, unmistakably and positively, and
that is of value to your committee, to get that on the record.
Mr. Tavenner. I suggest you read on page 23 the portion dealing
with that group, that is, the Lehman group.
General Willotjghby. Yes, sir. This is a series of groups or appa-
ratus or front organizations described by Sorge.
The first is the Jim or Lehman group, code name of the person in
charge. He said :
The first group to work in Shanghai was the Jim group, also known as the
Lehman group. I had never heard of it until I had arrived in Shanghai. Jim had
been sent out from the fourth bureau of the Red army, arriving in Shanghai
slightly before me. His chief duty was to establish radio communication between
Shanghai and other parts of China and Moscow. * * * When I arrived in
Shanghai, he had already succeeded in establishing radio communication between
Shanghai and Moscow and was trying to establish contacts with other districts
in a similar manner. However, it seems that he was unsuccessful in the case
of Canton. Jim employed Klausen—
who became Sorge's radio operator —
as his subordinate. Futher, he employed a White Russian called Mischa or
Mishin in Shanghai.
We do not know too much about Lehman. Does he appear in your
files, Mr. Tavenner, L-e-h-m-a-n?
Mr. Tavenner. Whether it is the same Lehman or not, I am unable
to say.
General Willoughry. Nevertheless, the sense of this description is
that Shanghai is a radio-transmitting station or relay station en route
to Khabarovsk and then Moscow The operator who appears here
first, Klausen, later on used himself in establishing his own station
in Tokyo.
Mr. Walter. When was that, approximately?
General Willougitby. In Japan in the period 1935 to 1941, roughly.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you proceed to the next group listed there,
known as the Harbin group ?
General Willougiiby. Sorge says about this group :
The next group with which I came into contact in the course of my work
was the Harbin group, which had also been sent out by the fourth bureau of
the Red army.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1185
You have this recurrent reference to his job description, namely, an
agent of the fourth bureau of the Red army, the intelligence section
of the Red army. [Continuing reading :]
Its duty was to gather military Informs I ion in Manchuria. As a sideline, it gath-
ered political intelligence as well. The Harbin group acted as a letter box for
me; I forwarded letters ami documents from Moscow to it. and it sent them on.
Money sent to me by Moscow also came through this channel. Liaison with
the Harbin group was established in the following way: To begin with, some-
body from the group came to Shanghai to confer on the technique of the letter-
box communication system, and thereafter members of my group and members
of the Harbin group took turns in serving as mail carriers and traveling be-
tween Harbin and Shanghai.
Klausen acted as contact lor me on numerous occasions. I believe it was in
the spring of 1032 that I myself carried mail to Harbin.
The significance here is the carrier or mail delivery method which oc-
curs throughout the technique of Sorge, that is, how such a ring oper-
ates in a foreign country. And some of the names he mentioned ear-
lier, in the main, were the ones he used again in Japan; and some of
the names occurring now you will find recurring elsewhere as this
presentation proceeds.
The next group
Mr. Tavenner. I believe you still have another paragraph to read
in connection with the Harbin group.
General Willougiiby. Yes:
I met Ott-Gloemberg, chief of the Harbin group, for the first time in Shang-
hai. I called on him at Harbin to turn over the mail to him. I also met Fro-
lich, sometimes called Theo, who had formerly worked at Shanghai, at Harbin.
I do not believe I met the radio technician, Artur, at Harbin, although I, heard
about him. Theo and Ott-Gloemberg left Harbin in 1932. I happened to meet
them by chance and not in connection with my work in Russia in January 1933.
My relationship with the Harbin group was strictly a letter-box affair. There
was no administrative relationship at all.
The significance there is that these elusive names appear elsewhere.
The Shanghai record will pick them up. They had them under sur-
veillance. There is your bridge from Sorge to Shanghai today. I keep
repeating that, but it is a very practical element in these proceedings.
Mr. Tavexner. Now if you will describe the Frohlich-Feldmann
group in Shanghai according to Sorge's statement.
General Willoughby. The next group reported on by Sorge is the
Frohlich-Feldmann group in Shanghai. He said :
The Frohlich-Feldmann group was also operating in Shanghai in 1931. Like
the others, it had been sent out by the fourth bureau of the Red army. Its duty
was to make connections with the Chinese Red army and to gather intelligence
concerning it.
Here Sorge reports on a staff, a group or front whose duty it was to
do what? To make connection with the Chinese Red Army and to
gather intelligence concerning it, an interesting sideline. [Continu-
ing reading:]
It had its own radio connection with Moscow and therefore did not use our
station. The chief of the group was Frohlich, also known as Theo, who held the
rank of major general in the Red army. Feldmann was a radio technician and
held the rank of lieutenant colonel. There was another man in the group, but
I do not know who he was. Unable to fulfill their mission, these people left
Shanghai during 1931. I had no working relationship with them and met them
only by chance. Shanghai is such a small city that it was difficult to avoid such
chance encounters. I did not receive instructions from Moscow to contact
them. They had their own mission to perform and there was no formal con-
nection between us.
1186 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
All of this, fragmentary to some extent, nevertheless describes the
mechanics of the operation, and describes their missions. The duty of
the Frohlich-Feldmann group was to gather intelligence concerning
the Chinese Red army. That is the same Red army which we are
now fighting in North Korea. Therefore, any collateral relationship
that will develop, as the case may be, may have found its origin in the
reading of this, shall we say, slightly historical case known as the
Sorge case. Without that we would never have been interested in
Shanghai at all. After all, we had a lot of more pressing questions.
But that development was enough to make Shanghai an irresistible
target of investigation.
The next group is a key group. Always bear in mind that Sorge
is not going to identify this group by name, he is not ready to do this
when he writes this paper, but he tells enough about it that we are
able to establish its identity later on.
Mr. Tavenner. What is the name of the group to which you refer?
General Willoughbt. He calls it the Comintern group in Shanghai.
I will give you the correct identity later. Sorge says :
I met the Comintern group in Shanghai by chance in 1931. It consisted of a
political branch and an organization branch, the latter comprised of Noulens—
a name to which I invite your attention —
who became famous after his arrest, and one or two assistants. Karl Lesse later
came to Shanghai to assume the post left vacant by Noulens. The organization
branch bad various duties to perform, but it was primarily concerned with the
maintenance of liaison between the Comintern, the Chinese Communist Party
and the political branch of the Shanghai Comintern group. Liaison duty was of
three* different types: (1) Personnel work, i. e., the movement of personnel be-
tween Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party; (2) the transmittal of docu-
ments and letters; and (3) radio communication. The organization branch also
assumed the duty of financial liaison between Moscow, the Chinese Communist
Party, and the political branch; assisted in finding meeting places and houses
for the organization branch and the Chinese Communist Party ; rendered all kinds
of technical and organizational assistance to illegal activities in China ; took an
active part in the exchange of secret materials between Moscow and China ; and
assumed responsibility for the safety of members of the political branch. In
this last connection, it had the authority to issue orders to political branch mem-
bers, restrict their movements, etc.
Now, this description of the job of this outfit is then later confirmed
by the Shanghai files and other investigations which we conducted.
Its name and personnel then is disclosed. Sorge did not disclose it
except to refer to Noulens, which is a famous case quite similar to the
defense of Gerhart Eisler, for the same reason and conducted by the
same legalistic front which is used for such purposes, namely, the
International Red Aid, a Communist-financed unit whose counter-
part to the American organization will develop as we proceed.
Then Sorge describes the political branch :
The political branch consisted of Gerhardt —
Eisler ; I will supply the last name —
whom I had known in Germany and worked with in my Comintern days, and one
or two assistants. I did not meet the assistants.
Incidentally, Eisler's wife * appeared before this committee quite
recently, I believe.
1 Hede Massing, former wife of Gerhardt Eisler.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1187
Mr. Taykxner. That is correct.
General Willoughby. In her book, This Deception, she knew In I Le
about Eisler's China mission. 1 will put in a plug for Hede Massing's
book, This Deception, published by Duell, Sloane <S Pearce, because one
of the Pearces ol that company worked for me in Japan.
Sorge continues :
I chanced to meet Gerhardt [Eisler] in Shanghai and renewed our old acquaint-
ance, but our work was absolutely unrelated. Gerhardt's duty, or rather that of
the political branch, was to act as a spokesman for the political policy with
respect to the Chinese Communist Party decided upon by the Comintern general
conference. It also acted as an intermediary for the exchange of information
between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern and submit tod reports
concerning all the social problems involved in the labor movement in < 'hina. The
reports were forwarded to Moscow through the organization branch. I must
state here that these reports were never sent through my radio facilities or my
other liaison channels. With the arrest of Noulens, Gerhardt's status in Shanghai
became precarious, and he decided to return to Moscow in 1931.
He skipped, just as he did on the Batory. He is an internationally
skillful dodger.
I would like to pause here. Knowing that the essence of this pres-
entation is linked with today, this is too tempting an opportunity.
Of course, Ave are now all familiar with the elusive Gerhart Eisler.
I call your attention to an article in the Saturday Evening Post, in
its issue of February 17, 1951. I pause, in fact, to pay tribute to the
Saturday Evening Fost, as this article is brilliant. The author, Craig
Thompson, unknown to me, is a most skillful investigator of Com-
munist fronts.
The title of the article is "The Communist's Dearest Friend," and its
lead photograph shows one Carol King, smiling amiably, I suppose,
and leading by the hand her protege and client, one Gerhart Eisler.
Mr. Velde. General, is there any question in your mind that the
Gerhart referred to by Richard Sorge is one and the same as Gerhart
Eisler?
General Wieloughby. Xone whatever. We know he was in Shang-
hai. The Shanghai police said he was. His wife said he was. He
was not there for his health. Furthermore, the story of Sorge tells
what he was doing.
Mr. Tavenxer. For the purpose of the record, I would like to refer
to an interrogation which took place before this committee February
6, 1947, of Ruth Fischer, a sister of Gerhart Eisler :
Mr. Russell. When did you next learn of the whereabouts of your brother and
what country was he in?
Miss Fischer. * * * Eisler had been in disgrace during 1928, 1929, and
1930, and everybody of the^Communist Party in Berlin expected his expulsion
from the Communist Party of Germany because of his rebellion against Stalin
at that time.
Then he was sent to a mission in China, with the GPU delegation, to purge
rebellious Chinese Communists. At that time Eisler's mission was not a very
high one, in China ; he was one of a group of men sent there to carry out orders.
In these Chinese purges he behaved so cruelly and carried out the orders so
well that the report about him in Berlin said that he was really the hangman
of the rebellious Chinese Communists, who were sentenced by the decisions of
Moscow.
After the Chinese trip, he came back in 1930 or 1931 to Moscow, where he then
married his wife, and where his daughter was born, and where he remained until
1933. What missions he carried out between 1931 and 1933 I do not know, but
I want to repeat that he has not walked on German soil in these years.
1188 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
General Willoughby. That is a very interesting interview, not
known to me, and would merely confirm me in my current under-
standing.
Mr. Tavenner. You were proceeding to discuss the article of Craig
Thompson.
General Willoughby. Yes. This article, as of February 1951,
covers the evaluation of organizations and the participation of Miss
King in the development of a systematic legal defense for Commu-
nist agents that have run afoul the American law.
The article says in 1925, in association with one Brodsky, who was
the United States receiver of party funds from Moscow.
Mr. Wood. Who is that? Brodsky?
General Willoughby. B-r-o-d-s-k-y. Together they helped organ-
ize and launch the International Labor Defense.
The records in Shanghai and elsewhere will show, in an organiza-
tion chart which is included in my studies, that the International Red
Aid is the Kremlin mother unit of defense bodies in all countries for
the defense of this type of clientele.
So it became known as the Labor Defense in this country, and this
article, with which I am in complete agreement, so states. The
author, who knows his business, also says :
This effort had been preceded by a meeting in Moscow at which a directive,
binding on Communist parties everywhere, was issued. It demanded : "The
proletariat must gather and organize those lawyers and learned barristers in
various countries who sympathize with the liberation struggle." From this was
born a world-wide Communist bar association called International Red Aid. The
International Labor Defense was its United States section.
Without going into details which are in this file, the International
Red Aid, Soviet-Comintern sponsored, becomes the International
Labor Defense, and the American Labor Defense becomes the Civil
Rights Congress. And, incidentally, again Weiss, as an organizer,
develops other agencies, such as the American Committee for the De-
fense of the Foreign Born, and several other organizations, all of
which have been analyzed and commented on adversely by Mr. Morris
Ernst, a reputable New York lawyer, who resented, apparently, ever
having been mixed up with this group.
The coincidence that Eisler and Noulens find legal counsel, one in
China and one in New York, all connected with the International Red
Aid, is so impressive that an investigative officer dare not ignore it.
Pausing again, in order to tie this thing into a recognizable pattern,
you will find that what Sorge cautiously called the Comintern group,
is reported by the Chinese police much more specifically. It will be
covered later on, but I dwell on it now. It is the Pan-Pacific Trade
Union Secretariat, abbreviated PPTLTS. and its parent organization,
the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau. They were the most-
important and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activi-
ties in the Far East during the late 1920's and early 1930's.
The PPTUS, set up in 1927 at a conference in Hankow, was attended
by several prominent Comintern leaders, including Lozovsky, who,
incidentally, has risen to a high position in the Soviet labor movement.
Another member of the Hankow conference who later became first
head of the PPTUS was the American Communist Earl Browder, who
was assisted in his work in China by an American woman. Other
Americans prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS were James H.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1189
Dolsen, a journalist, and one Albert Edward Stewart, and Margaret
Undjus.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you idenf i i'y Jim Dolsen as one of the individu-
als connected with this organization?
General Welloughby. Yes. He was connected with the organiza-
tion in the thirties.
Mr. Velde. Will you spell that?
General Willoughby. D-o-l-s-e-n, James H.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, Jim Dolsen is the person who has
been identified as a member of the Communist Party by Matthew
Cvetic in his testimony on February 21, 1950, and is one of those
arrested on August 17, 1951, in Pittsburgh.
General Willotjghby. That is news to me. It again shows the
efficacy of this committee's work in tracking down these people. This
is why the Sorge and related matters could not be ignored. Here you
have the case of an individual, Dolsen, trafficking in a Communist
front in the thirties in China ; he recurs in Pittsburgh in the forties,
and this committee picks him up and reports on him in this fashion.
If you were pressed for time and decided to terminate this meeting
now, you would still have made your case, because the reference to
Dolsen is only one of many others, almost repetitive in their similarity.
Mr. Tavenner. In describing Earl Browder as the head of the Far
East bureau, you referred to a person as his assistant who was an
American woman, but did not give the name of the American woman.
General "Willoughby. Perhaps an instinctive gallantry which is not
applicable in this kind of meeting. I will now fill the gap. Her
name, said he reluctantly, is Katherine Harrison, "K" as In cat, "H"
as in house. I am likely to misspell words in six languages, so I
occasionally get confused on the subject.
Since this committee is taking me from one surprise to another —
pleasant ones, I must say, as in the case of Dolsen — do you also have
something on Miss Harrison?
Mr. Tavenner. The committee is in possession of information that
she was the wife at one time of Earl Browder.
General Willoughby. A very interesting social relationship, I
should say.
I have strayed afar a bit. The point I made is, I became interested
in Shanghai through the slightly reluctant Sorge in describing these
people in Shanghai, and began to spend funds furnished me by the
benevolent Federal Government to find out some more.
Mr. Tavenner. I have some further questions to ask you about
the Noulens group, but inasmuch as some Americans are tied up pretty
closely with it in the Snanghai files, I will wait until we reach that.
General Willoughby. Very well. I will agree with you that the
Noulens case is very interesting. It is a prototype of the Eisler case
with respect to the abuse of legal defense.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you proceed with the Japanese group that
Sorge established in Tokyo in 1933, and will you tell the committee
what the Sorge report shows as to how he obtained the members for
his group in Japan? You will find it on page 6 of exhibit 38.
General Willoughby. I take it you are interested in some individ-
uals that Sorge recruited for his Japanese ring?
Mr. Tavenner. That is correct, but in addition, those who were
assigned to him by Moscow
1190 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
General Willoughby. We will go back to Shanghai. This is a
closing item of Sorge's activity. To go back to his work related to
Shanghai, he has this to say :
When the orders came through, I asked for a technical aide ( radio man ) , a
Japanese collaborator and a competent foreign assistant, and the services of
Klausen, Miyagi, and Voukelitch were made available. I was authorized to
recruit other personnel as necessary in the place where I was working.
Is this the item yon are interested in ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
General Willoughby. My idea of the significance of this comment
is that Sorge, when he gets a job, applies to the head office and says,
"I. want certain technicians, a radio man, a Japanese collaborator, and
a competent foreign assistant." If he were working for General Elec-
tric or some other reputable concern, they would look at their colored
pins on the map of the world and say, "We will transfer our represent-
ative from Buenos Aires to some other place," and it would be done.
By analogy, the way the Kremlin-Moscow staff organization worked
there was just as good. They pressed a button and summoned from
a world-wide job distribution, Klausen
Mr. Tavenner. Where was Klausen obtained from?
General Willoughby. He had gone back to Russia, and they pulled
him from there. The competent foreign assistant was Voukelitch,
who was a French Communist in Belgrade at the time. They pulled
him out, and these men converged and reported to their new jobs.
Mr. Tavenner. From where did they get the Japanese assistant?
General Willoughby. They went to California and found a Nisei, a
citizen technically but not in heart, and had him report to Tokyo.
Mr. Tavenner. Does the report say Miyagi was a member of the
American Communist Party?
General Willoughby. Yes. Here is what Sorge had to say about
Miyagi :
Miyagi's position was identical with that of Voukelitch. He, too, was a mem-
ber of a Communist Party (American), he, too, was ordered through Moscow to
participate in my activities, he, too, was a Comintern member in the broad
sense, he, too. was registered with and accepted by some major Moscow organi-
zation as a member of my group, and in his case, too, it made absolutely no
difference whether the agency in question was the Comintern, central committee
of the Russian Communist Party, or the Fourth Bureau of the red army.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, does there appear as one of
the 34 exhibits an interrogation of this individual, that is, Miyagi,
relative to his knowledge of the American Communist Party?
General Willoughby. My recollection is that it does, and I be-
lieve 3 r ou have custodianship of this exhibit.
Mr. Tavenner. Yes. I have before me exhibit 25, marked for
identification only, and, Mr. Chairman, rather than introduce the whole
document in evidence, I would like to read what I consider the perti-
nent portions of it. I am doing this because of its length.
The following are extracts from interrogations of Miyagi Yotoku
conducted in March and April of 1942. This is from volume 4 of the
procurator's records on Miyagi.
Question 3. The accused will describe his activities for the Communist cause
during his stay in the United States.
Answer. In about September 1D2G, I purchased a house facing Los Angeles
station, and in November I opened a restaurant there. My three business part-
ners (Yabe, Noritsugu; Matayoshi, Atsushi; and Nakamura, Koki), two other
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1191
acquaintances and I began to meet once a week in the dressing room at the rear
of the restaurant to exchange persona] views on social sciences, philosophy,
and art. This Social Problems Study Group, as we called ii, gradually ab-
sorbed new members, among whom were an anarchist and close friend of Kotoku,
Shusui, an Intimate Communist colleague of Katayama, Sen, and several clergy-
men. In the course of time, our liberal sessions gradually veered toward I he Left,
becoming completely leftist when .Marxists Herbert Harris, a Russian, and Fister,
a Swiss, who had joined the circle through the introduction of Communists Yada
and Takahashi of West Los Angeles early in 1927, volunteered to lecture to
us on Marxian theory.
Both Yada and Takahashi had joined our circle hoping to prevail upon the
members of the working class who attended it to form a Communist study
group. Our meetings, therefore, were the scenes of incessant wrangling be-
tween the anarchists and the Communist members. Yada and about 20 others
bolted the group eventually, leaving me and about 10 others behind, set up
their own .Marxist study group, and established a temporary office on Weller
Street in the Japanese section of Los Angeles. Their official organ, Class Strug-
gle (Kaikyusen), became the Labor News (Redo Shimbun) in about 1928.
It was around this time that Japanese Marxists began to join the American
Communist Party and to participate actively in its work. At this stage, the
Labor News moved to San Francisco, where Tatemono, Teiichi succeeded Yada
as supervisor, and Post Street became more or less the headquarters of the
Japanese division of the American Communist Party. I remained in Los An-
geles and had no further association with that group.
In about 1929, I joined the Proletarian Art Society and the Japanese branch
of the Red Relief Association (both organizations affiliated with the Japanese
division of the Oriental People's Section of the American Communist Party). I
lectured to the former on the history of fine arts, edited its magazine, and ar-
ranged exhibitions, while for the latter I helped collect money to aid Commu-
nists arrested by the authorities. When almost all the delegates to the party
eonvention held in Los Angeles in 1930 were arrested, including seven Japanese
who were served deportation notices, Hamakiyo, Yabe and I managed to gain
asylum for our seven countrymen in the Soviet Union.
Toward the end of the 1930, I was visited in Los Angeles by a Communist
named Yano who had just returned from Moscow with orders from the Comin-
tern to build up an organization in the United States. Yano was on intimate
terms with Sain Darcy, the organizer for District 13 (California). I kept in
touch with him and in the autumn of 1931, he encouraged me to join the Commu-
nist Party. I objected on the ground that my previous record was sufficient
reason for not doing so, but he said that I should be registered with the party,
and that membership would facilitate my activities. I then agreed to join and
assumed the party alias of Joe. Since I was not in good health, I was excused
from party meetings and a number of other activities. My chief tasks were to
study the distribution of Japanese farm workers and to analyze Chinese prob-
lems with the assistance of a party member named Yamada.
Though I went to assist the strikers when Yano informed me of the labor
dispute at the Japanese-American News (Nichibei Shimbunsha) in San Fran-
cisco in about May 1933, my work was mainly invisible.
Question 4 : Describe your current relations with the American Communist
Party.
Answer : I do not think I am a member of the American Communist Party
now. I said last time that Y T ano and a certain Caucasian approached me on the
question of my returning to Japan toward the close of 1932. On that occasion,
the Caucasian requested that I return within a month or so to the United
States, my place of residence, which meant that I was being sent to Japan
as a United States Communist Party member. He told me to contact Roy, a
party member in Los Angeles whom I had known personally for some time.
Although I had consented to return to Japan, I continued to help strikers
and roam about in search of suitable subjects for paintings. Roy urged me
repeatedly to sail at an early date, and one day in September 1933, Yano and
Roy called on me and informed me that I was to leave immediately. I em-
barked around the beginning of October with instructions from Roy to return
in about a month, or 3 months at the latest. I left my baggage behind because
I did not expect to be away for very long.
According to Mrs. Kitabayashi, Roy called on her and her husband several
times after my departure to inquire about my whereabouts and my activities.
1192 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
I believe he assumed that I was postponing my return indefinitely in order
to engage in activities in Japan and arranged to have my name stricken from
the register of the American Communist Party.
Question 5 : The accused will describe his relations with the Comintern.
Answer: When I joined the United States Communist Party (i. e., the Ameri-
can branch of the Comintern) at Yano's request, I did not go through the usual
formality of submitting a signed application ; I entrusted all the details to
Yano. Since he maintained direct contact with the Comintern as the party
organizer in the United States, I am certain that he registered me with the
Comintern under the alias of Joe, shortly after I gave him my acceptance.
Since I have been engaged in espionage work for the Comintern as a member
of the Sorge ring since my return to Japan, I believe my registration is stiU
effective and that I am a member of the Comintern intelligence department.
Question 6 : Were you given travel expenses and operating funds before you
sailed for Japan?
Answer : Roy gave me $200 to cover travel expenses just before my departure.
In addition, he handed me a dollar bill which I was to use in contacting an
agent in Japan. He told me that the other man, to whom I was to present the
bill, would have in his possession a similar bill bearing a successive serial num-
ber. I carried it the first time I met Sorge, but we did not bother to make the
comparison.
In describing further the Communist Party of the United States,
Miyagi had this to say :
The headquarters of district 13 of the United States Communist Party, the
California branch, is in S'an Francisco (organized by Levin Owen). Party
organizations have been established in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Berkeley,
Oakland, Sacramento, Fresno, San Jose, San Pedro, and other cities. Subordin-
ate to the party organization are such unions, people's groups, and youth societ-
ies as the following :
1. Workers International Relief.
2. Friends of the Soviet Union.
3. Anti-Imperialist League.
4. Young Pioneers of America.
5. Young Communist League of America.
6. International Labor Defense League.
7. Marine Workers Industrial Union.
8. Trade Union Unity League.
Inasmuch as these organizations, as is the case the world over, are subject to
Comintern policy and direction, I shall not discuss their activities.
Further, he stated :
Participation by Japanese in party activities.
Here he names several Japanese prominent in the Communist Party
in the 1920's.
Then, the last I shall read in this interrogation is what occurred, ac-
cording to his deposition, in 1930 :
In this year, there were fresh developments in the party movement, the result
of orders from American party headquarters calling for a new program of ex-
pansion and solidification and a more vigorous policy toward the masses. ( S'am
Darcy was made the organizer of district 13, the California branch.) In Cali-
fornia, the party launched a campaign in the rural communities to enlist farm
workers (particularly seasonal farm labor), sought to organize the marine
workers, and work to strengthen the Young Communists League and Young
Pioneers.
The Japanese division was absorbed by the Oriental Peoples Section and
given the new mission of cooperating with the Chinese and Filipino membership.
In 1930 the Japanese division adopted the popularization of the party as its
watchword and embarked upon a concrete program designed to organize farm
and fishery workers. It fostered strikes in the Imperial Valley against such
large capital concerns as the Gerard Co. and the Sun Fruit Co. and agitated
among the fishermen and fishing industry workers in San Pedro. (Except in
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1193
isolated cases, these efforts ended in dismal failure because of the firm inter-
vention of the authorities. »
A movement was also started to boycott Japanese celebrities visiting Los
Angeles, specifically Bunji' Suzuki, Totsudo Kato, Toyohiko Kagawa, Tenko
Nishida, Tokuzo Asahara, Shunji Tahara, Ki Kimura, and [kuo Oyama. (By
arrangement with Local Foreign Otiiee officials ami Japanese-language papers,
these so-called celebrities made it a practice to defray their traveling expenses
by charging admission to lectures at wifieh they ostensibly enlightened the audi-
ence on the Japanese situation. To give a few examples, Bunji Suzuki collected
several thousand dollars for three lectures delivered in Los Angeles while he
was en route to an international labdr conference, and Totsudo Kato and Toyohiko
Kagawa each took from $20,000 to $30,000 from needy Japanese immigrants
during a week of religious lecturing. These meetings were nothing but a Cheap
fraud.) Meanwhile, party members began campaigning on the streets.
The expansion of the party's sphere of activity to the streets merits praise in
that it attracted public attention, but it was not without its adverse effects, one
of the most noteworthy being the aggravation of the hostility of the local Japa-
nese community toward the party. This blunder may be traced to lack of
caution in evaluating the Japanese mind and the predominant position occupied
by the traditional Japanese spirit.
As party activity started to get into full swing in May and June of 1930, the
repressive hand of the American authorities tightened. In a mass arrest staged
during a meeting of the Los Angeles branch in Long Beach, Comrades Hakomori,
Fukunaga, Nishimura, Miyagi ( Vosaburo), Nagahama, Shima, Matayoshi, Yoshi-
oka, and Teraya were taken into custody, and the Japanese division, deprived of
its leading members, was brought to the verge of collapse.
General Willoughby. May I raise a question, sir?
I take it, Mr. Tavenner, that you established by these quotations
that a bona fide member of the American Communist Party who was
a Japanese linguist was requested by Sorge, and he got him as a push-
button request in such organization, and this man has been identified
as a member of the American Communist Party from district 13, the
California branch.
Mr. Yki.de. Do you have any information as to where Miyagi Yotoku
is now '.
Genera] Willoughby. My recollection is he died of illness, either
in prison or shortly after our political amnesty in 1945.
Mr. Tavenner. I think he died in prison.
General Willoughby. He was tubercular, I believe.
Mr. Tavenner. That is right.
General Willoughby. I read this many months ago.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, to return to other members
of the Japanese group, it would appear from Sorge's statement that
other than the three individuals who he was advised would be avail-
able in Tokyo when he arrived there, the rest of his Japanese group
was recruited in Tokyo by Sorge?
General Willoughby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether that is the way in which
Guenther Stein was recruited into the organization?
General Willoughby. It was.
Mr. Tavenner. What does the record disclose its to the extent of
Guenther Stein"s activities in Sorge's Japanese group?
General AVilloughby. That is a very interesting figure, this Guen-
ther Stein. I would prefer to read the summation of the three Ameri-
can lawyers who passed on this documentation, although the docu-
mentation, meaning statements to the court, on the subject of
90929—51 5
1194 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Guenther Stein, are also in your possession. This is a matter of
preserving the time of the committee. This is what the record says :
Guenther Stein, special correspondent for a London newspaper, was a regular
member of the Sorge spy ring. A notebook confiscated from Sorge listed six
members of this ring, together with their aliases, and Stein was listed among
the six. An intercepted radio message to Moscow referred to his code name.
There is testimony by Max Klausen and Sorge that Klausen, a wireless operator
specialist, erected a wireless transmission set in Stein's residence to forward
reports to Russia. Stein not only was living on the premises at the time, but
gave his consent. Being a correspondent for a reputable English newspaper, he
had various contacts which permitted him to secure valuable information. This
information, passed on to Sorge, was forwarded to Russia. Stein also acted as a
courier for Sorge and carried photographs and microfilm to Shanghai where they
were delivered to a liaison agent from Moscow at the Metropole Hotel. On one
occasion Stein was instructed to, and did bring back from Shanghai a smoking
pipe of extraordinary design, a woman's shawl, and a brooch. These items,,
given to him by a liaison agent from Moscow, were later used by Anna Klausen
for identification purposes when she was sent to Shanghai in 1937-38 to deliver
20 to 30 rolls of film to the Moscow agent.
These are high lights. Each of the entries I have read is supported
by a direct reference to a sworn statement in the course of the court
interrogation.
I will add to this, again to link Stein with yesterday, as it were:
When the original report was published in 1949, and prior to the
protestation by Agnes Smedley, Guenther Stein disappeared. In
other words, not knowing exactly what the outcome or implication of
this report might be on either the public or official action, he felt it
prudent to vanish.
Personally, I would be interested in how fast one can vanish. Ap-
parently he procured both passport and transportation facilities to
Europe in 24 hours, something which I challenge anyone of legitimate
purposes and identification to accomplish.
Then he was not heard from for a couple years, until he got himself
arrested by the French Police, Surete Nationale, for espionage. He
later went to Poland, where he holds citizenship.
Here you have the case of a man who disappears to Europe and gets
himself arrested once more for doing business at the same old stand ;
namely, espionage.
Mr. Tavenner. Did he leave Japan prior to the breaking of the
Sorge case ?
General Willoughby. Yes, he left, prudently, prior to the breaking
of this case.
Mr. Tavenner. Did the procurator in Japan state that if he had
remained in Japan he would have been indicted ?
General Willoughby. He did.
Mr. Tavenner. I regret that we cannot go further this afternoon.
It will be necessary to call you back again tomorrow.
Mr. Wood. The committee will stand in recess until 10 : 30 tomorrow
morning.
(Thereupon, at 4:30 p. m. on Wednesday, August 22, 1951, an
adjournment was taken until Thursday, August 23, 1951, at 10 : 30
a. m.)
HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD
SORUE SPY CASE
(Based on Testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa and
Maj.^Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)
THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1951
United States House of Representatives,
Committee on Un-American Activities,
Washington, D. O.
PUBLIC HEARING
The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to
adjournment at 10 :45 a. m. in room 226. Old House Office Building,
Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood (chair-
man), Francis E. Walter, Clyde Doyle, and Harold H. Velde (ap-
pearance as noted in transcript).
Staff members present : Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel ; Thomas
W. Beale, Sr., assistant counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator;
Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of re-
search ; John W. Carrington, clerk ; and A. S. Poore, editor.
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.
Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Tavenner ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to recall General Willoughby as a
witness this morning.
Mr. Wood. Very well.
Mr. Tavener. It will facilitate the handling of the introduction
of the testimony if I also have Mr. Owens, an investigator of the com-
mittee, sworn in, and introduce some of the documents through him,
(Mid then call upon the witness for his comments.
Mr. Owens, will you take the stand, please?
Mr. Wood. Raise your right hand and be sworn, please, Mr. Owens.
You do solemnly swear that the evidence you will give before this
committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. Owens. I do.
TESTIMONY OF COURTNEY E. OWENS
Mr. Tavenner. What is your name, please?
Mr. Owens. Courtney E. Owens.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you hold a position with this committee?
Mr. Owens. Yes, sir; I am employed as investigator.
1195
1196 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Tavenner. How long have you been so employed ?
Mr. Owens. Three years.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Owens, will you select consecutive exhibit No.
13 from the documents in front of you and examine it and describe to
the committee its contents?
Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. Consecutive exhibit 13, as compiled by G-2,
Far East Command, is entitled ''Foreign Affairs Yearbook, 1942."
From October 1941 to October 1942, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police-
Mr. Tavenner. Will you state again the nature of the document
you have before you ?
Mr. Owens. This document is entitled "Foreign Affairs Yearbook,
1942. " It was compiled by the Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of
Justice, of the Japanese Government.
From October 1941 to October 1942, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police
compiled the formerly undiscovered records of the Sorge spy ring.
Assembled from a great mass of official notes, interrogations, and so
forth, the Japanese collated this material and included it in pages
398 through 600 of their annual publication of the Foreign Affairs
Yearbook. That is to say, pages 398 to 600 deal exclusively with the
Japanese results of their investigations and interrogations in the Sorge
spy case.
Described by the Home Ministry officials, the Japanese Home Min-
istry officials, as a case "which may find no parallel in the history
of espionage," the undercover system of the Sorge spy ring in China
and Japan sought, found, and sent to Moscow over a period of 10
years top-secret plans and policies of the Japanese Government.
We have here the full English translation of that portion of the
Foreign Affairs Yearbook.
Mr. Tavenner. Now, this Foreign Affairs Yearbook of 1942 iden-
tified by you, pages 44 through 141 of the English translation, deals
with the information accumulated by Sorge and other members of
his ring and forwarded to Moscow. The first listing of his informa-
tion is that obtained by Sorge through his connection with the German
Embassy, I believe. The following paragraph precedes the informa-
tion Sorge received through the German Embassy, which I will read :
In addition to the agents working under him, Sorge had a rich source of
news in the German Embassy, where he enjoyed confidence and respect. Some
of the information he obtained through the Embassy is listed below.
And there appears a considerable listing of material, and this is
the general subject upon which General Willoughby testified early
in the hearing yesterday.
Some indication of the accuracy of his information is contained in
paragraphs 18 through 22, dealing with the Russian-German relations
prior to the German attack on Russia on June 22, 1941.
Will you please read to the committee the messages relating to these
negotiations?
Mr. Owens (reading) :
In March 1941, he was told by Ambassador Ott
Mr. Tavenner. When you say "he," you are referring to Sorge?
Mr. Owens. Richard Sorge, yes. [Continuing reading: |
He was told by Ambassador ott that Foreign Minister Matsuoka's trip te
Europe w:is being made at Hitler's invitation, and that Matsuoka \v;is author-
ized by the Japanese Government to give German; certain informal guaranties.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1 1 97
That is the basis of one message.
in the beginning of 1941, he learned from Ambassador Otl and a special
German envoy senl to Japan thai the envoy's mission was to find oul whether
or not there was any possibility of Japan's starting a war against the Soviet
Union.
In the middle of April 1941, Ambassador Otl told him thai he was surprised
by the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact, because German circles had been
expecting a crisis between Japan and Russia. Sorge was do! surprised; he had
already informed the Soviet Governmenl by radio thai one of the purposes of
Matsuoka's trip to Europe was to conclude a pact with Russia.
On the occasion of Hess - flight to England in May 1941, he was told at the
German Embassy that Hitler intended to make peace with England and to
flghl Russia, and that lie had sent Hess to England as a last resort. Sorge
judged that, in spite <>i' the Etusso-German Nonaggression Pact, a German attack
on Russia was inevitable and even imminent.
About June 20, 1941, lie was told by Military Attache - "Schohl," who was
proceeding from Germany to his new post in Siam, that Germany would launch
a full-Scale attack on Russia about June 20; that the main effort would he
directed against Moscow; and that from 170 to 190 divisions were concentrated
on the border. Colonel Kretschmar informed him that 175 divisions were
concentrated on the Russo-Gennun frontier.
Mr. Tavenner. ?Tust a moment. Kretschmar was the German mili-
tary attache attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo?
Mr. Owens. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. Then, as a result of that information, Russia learned
of the impending attack by Germany on June 22, 1941.
Does that complete the messages that appear at that point?
Mr. Owens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, yon referred in the course
of your test iuiony yesterday to certain messages that were received or
sent to Moscow through this Sorge ring. But, before asking you to
comment upon that, I want to ask Mr. Owens to refer to page 47,
where there appears an interesting message dealing with the Japanese
and German policies before the war with the United States. Do
you have it?
Mr. Owens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you please read it?
Mr. Owens. It actually involves four messages. The one you had
particular reference to is the last one.
Mr. Tavenner. And I would like for you also to read the message
which was referred to in the testimony of Yoshikawa, when he test-
ified here a week or two ago, so that we have the whole, picture as
complete as possible before General YVilloughby comments upon it.
Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. [Reading:]
In June 1941. he (Sorge) learned from the members of the German Economic
Mission to Japan. Wohl "Voss" and "Spinsler," that the upshot of the Ger-
man-Japanese economic discussions was that Japan would receive munitions
from Germany in return for rubber and petroleum and that the two countries
would collaborate in the establishment of factories in Japan.
The next message :
In the beginning of July 1941 he (Sorce) was told by Ambassador Ott and
Military Attache Kretschmar that it had been decided at a conference before the
throne that Japan would push forward her policy of expansion to the south,
hut that, at the same time, she would prepare to declare war on Russia when
the opportunity presented itself.
The third message :
In July 1941. he (Sorge) learned from Ambassador Ott. from the militarv at-
tache, and others that the Japanese armed forces were saying that they
1198 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
would enter the Russian war if and when Germany captured Moscow and Len-
ingrad and reached the Volga ; that the enthusiasm of the Japanese Army and
people for a Russian war was waning ; that Ott had had an unproductive con-
versation with Tojo because the latter was not interested in military problems
in the north ; and that Konoye had resigned and formed a third cabinet in
order to oust Matsuoka and open the way for a new agreement with America.
The fourth message :
During July and August 1941, after receiving information concerning Japan's
large-scale mobilization from Ambassador Ott and the military attache^ he
came to the conclusion that there would be no war against Russia that year.
His reasoning was as follows : At the end of the mobilization, approximately
30 divisions were concentrated in Manchuria. This corresponds to only one-
third of the newly mobilized forces. The divisions were sent out after August
15, which means that it is too late to start a war before winter. There-
fore, Japan will not fight Russia but will challenge America and England in
the south.
Now, the message you have reference to, that Mr. Yoshikawa testi-
fied about, was a radio sent in the beginning of October 1941, classi-
fied "State secret." Do you desire me to read that at this time?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes, if you will read it again. ,
Mr. Owens (reading) :
The American-Japanese talks have entered upon their final stage. In Konoye's
opinion they will end successfully if Japan decreases her forces in China and
French Indochina and gives up her plan of building eight naval and air bases
in French Indochina. If America refuses to compromise by the middle of October,
Japan will attack America, the Malay countries, Singapore, and Sumatra. She
will not attack Borneo, because it is within reach of Singapore and Manila. How-
ever, there will be war only if the talks break down, and there is no doubt that
Japan is doing her best to bring them to a successful conclusion even at the
expense of her German ally.
That was the message that Mr. Yoshikawa testified about.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, will you care to comment upon
the action of the Sorge ring and the transmission of these messages
to Moscow ?
Mr. Walter. Before you go into that, may I ask the General a ques-
tion, Mr. Chairman ?
Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter.
Mr. Walter. General, as a result of your very careful consideration
of these messages, are you of the opinion that when the attack came at
Pearl Harbor it came as a result of a complete understanding between
Germany, Italy, and Japan ?
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY—
Resumed
General Willoughby. That is a very difficult question, Mr. Walter.
The relationship with Italy and Germany at that time was initially
directed against the Third Communist International. It was a Comin-
tern political understanding rather than a military one, if I interpret
this series of messages correctly.
The fact, however, remained that at some time during the summer,
under the phraseology of these messages, the Japanese Foreign Office
veered away from an open military attack against Russia. And again
referring to the trend of these messages over several months, you can-
not take a single one and conclusively select it. You have to follow
the trend of all of them.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1199
The trend shows thai an attack- via Siberia was contemplated, and
certain military divisions were made ready for it.
Then public and official military opinion changed, possibly in
August, and the trend toward a movement in the south became pro-
gressively apparent. When I say "progressively apparent," Sorge of
course did not have any split-second service of information.. He had
to rely on Ozaki, who was his leg man. into the Japanese foreign office,
to keep him advised. And I notice that there are time lags of 2 to 3
weeks, even. So we may assume, then, that Sorge's mission was to
determine in broad terms : Are the Russians, are the Japanese, utilizing
the Manchurian or Kwantung army to attack Siberia, or is the military
power of Japan going to be shifted south ? That is the strategic ques-
tion, and that is the one that affects us immediately.
Once decided that the Japanese would move south in the direction
of Indochina, Malaya, and so forth, a collision with the United
States and England, of course, became inevitable. And had we known
this in August or September or October, it is of course historically dem-
onstrable that that would have been in the nature of advance warning
of the war ; not advance warning toward a specific date of a specific
month, but the general feeling that there is going to be a collision
between the Japanese Empire and ourselves.
(Representative Harold H. Velde entered the hearing room at this
point.)
And it is that report or the series of reports that are reflected in
this message exchange, that brought this question forward and solved
it; namely, as late as October 15, Sorge positively relayed to Moscow
a general statement that "it is decided to move south, and all military
preparations of the Japanese Empire are to that effect for that purpose
and that intent."
Now, I take advantage of Mr. Velde's entry now in an amicable point
of correction. Mr. Velde's question yesterday was practically the
same as yours, Mr. Walter, this morning, except that he put it in terms
of Pearl Harbor. Well, Pearl Harbor is a fixed date in a fixed month.
And that does not appear in the Sorge message, and it is comparatively
unimportant that it did not appear. The important thing is: Is the
trend of Japanese military operations in the summer of 1941 directed
to the south, meaning toward collision with the United States and
England, or is it directed toward the north, in other words toward
Russia? That was so important to the Russians, and inferentially
would have been so important to us had we known it, that the Russians
•did not dare to remove the divisions then stationed in Siberia and
transfer them to the west front, where they were badly needed, until
Sorge furnished that assurance. That is the historical interpretation
•on a broad basis rather than a specific-date basis.
I am not sure, Mr. Walter, if that is a satisfactory answer.
Mr. Walter. Yes, that is exactly what I wanted.
General W t illoughby. Historically we can say, without reference to
December 7 or December 12, a specific date, that if we had that informa-
tion in September or October that the Japanese decision was to move
south, I think it would have constituted an enormous political, eco-
nomic, and military warning, in which we might have gone on an alert
basis or at any rate we might have been perhaps better prepared to
meet the attack on the date it actually took place.
1200 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Velde. General, where were you stationed at the time of the
attack on Pearl Harbor ?
General Willoughby. I was stationed in Manila, in the same job that
I have been holding for the last 13 years, namely, MaeArthurs intelli-
gence officer. So, of course, this type of information was of vital
importance to us. We were the outpost of America, and we were
seeking desperately every clue, every nuance of public or other reperto-
rial opinion, in order to determine how close this menace would come.
And therefore it is an acute perception in these particular months of
the year or period of the year 1941 that I am talking about.
Mr. Velde. But you had no idea at that time that Japan would
attack Pearl Harbor ?
General Willoughby. This cannot be answered by a clear-cut "yes"
or "no:" We had assayed, appraised, examined the position of Japan
and their potential, and we knew that some movements had taken place
on the Chinese mainland. But the final decisive report, like Sorge
rendered to his master, Russia — he was not available to us, you see,
in anything of that quality.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, to consider further Mr. Walter's
question about the notice or knowledge that Italy and Germany may
have had regarding the actual plans of attack on Pearl Harbor, I
may say that that question was pretty thoroughly examined, and con-
siderable evidence introduced in regard to it, in the trial of Tojo and
others, and the actual message is in existence between the Japanese
foreign office and its ambassador in Italy, calling upon Mussolini for
his consent and approval of war with the United States, although Pearl
Harbor was not mentioned in any way in connection with the message.
And the documents also show that as early as December 2, conversa-
tions between the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, with Hitler, indi-
cated knowledge of the general plan, but no mention of Pearl Harbor.
If the committee is interested, I am pretty certain I can get the
exact judgment and finding of the international military tribunal on
those matters.
General Willoughby. I think Mr. Tavenner's remarks are of great
importance, since he was associated with the international military
tribunal in Tokyo. His work there, his superior work there, is of course
well known to me as a member of the Tokyo staff. He is probably as
well informed on the factors which this international tribunal searched
for, as any man available at this time.
Mr. Walter. Of course, it was more than a mere coincidence that
Italy was ready to declare war the moment the attack came. That is
the point. In other words, they had committed themselves to make
war on the United States in advance of the actual attack made by
Japan. And that was merely the signal to Italy and Germany to
declare war on the United States.
General Willoughby. May I ask Mr. Tavenner on this point : That
came up in the tribunal. What was their decision, their verdict, on
that point?
Mr. Tavenner. I would not undertake, I believe, to state what the
verdict was, without consulting the record. I am not certain that I
understood the question exactly.
General Willoughby. While I am not familiar with the European
situation, since I am fairly integrated in the Far East since 1938,
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1201
I would agree with you. Mr. Waller, thai the military commitments
between Italy and Germany on the spot, you see, < ailed for military
action together in the European theater of war, regardless of what
the Japanese mighl or might not do in the Far East. Actually, the
Japanese did not attack Russia. As you know, they sought instead
a painful neutrality, letting us fight it out alone until 5 days before
the end of the war.
Mr. Tavkxm.i:. There is no doubt hut what the terms of the tri-
partite pact between the three nations committed all three to join in
military force in the event of a war with the United States.
General Willoughby. Of a universal war? I believe that is so.
Mr. Walter. That is exactly the thing I was directing my attention
to. So that no matter which one of the three powers made t he attack
anywhere in the world, the others were committed at the same moment
to make an attack with joint forces.
Mr. Tavenner. And by reason of the document which was dis-
covered, as I mentioned a moment ago, Mussolini was questioned in
advance to ascertain whether or not he would abide by the terms of
the agreement in the event of such a war. And my recollection is that
he gave unqualified approval.
Mr. Velde. Again, you have had a lot of experience, of course, in
the intelligence field. And as far as I know, the only definite informa-
tion you have that Russia knew that Pearl Harbor w T as to be attacked
was the message of October 15 between Sorge and the Russian Gov-
ernment.
General Willoughby. I dislike to correct a member of this com-
mittee, of course. The message does not mention Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Velde. I realize it does not.
General Willoughby. The message mentions that a collision with
America and England had become inevitable ; their move south. Now,
whether they would attack Manila first or Pearl Harbor first was still
in the realm of the next 8 weeks after October 15.
Mr. Velde. Well, the question I was going to ask you, General, was
on the basis of your experience in the intelligence field, and it is in the
nature of an opinion. Do you, in your own mind, feel that Russia
knew that an attack on Pearl Harbor or any of our other possessions
or Territories was imminent?
General Willoughby. I sympathize with your query, because Pearl
Harbor was such a dramatic incident. But, after all, it was only one
of many war actions. The collision would take place somewdiere in
the Pacific once the Japanese had decided to move south.
So I go back again to^the broad historical interpretation of this
message, which does not mention Pearl Harbor. And I stated then
that it is unimportant that it did not mention Pearl Harbor. But
it mentioned the fact that they were on a political international de-
cision that would bring them into collision with the United States.
And the first target, in our opinion, then, was the Philippines.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, in answer to these various
questions, have you completed your comment as to the messages?
General Willoughby. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa, in his testimony before this com-
mittee, made it plain that in his opinion and from his study of the
records in the Sorge case and his knowledge of Japanese affairs, the
1202 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Sorge spy ring not only performed its duties as an espionage group
but it also acted in, at least in one instance, a political way.
This appears, I believe, from Sorge's own confession or statement.
I do not know whether you are well enough acquainted with it on
the spur of the moment to refer to it or comment on it. Suppose that
I read it first, and then you may make such comment as you desire.
General Willoughby. You have your fingers on it in the document.
Mr. Tavenner. I read from exhibit 39 a section of the Sorge con-
fession or diary or statement, as it has been variously called, as follows.
It is section E :
The political work of my group. 1. General remarks. I was strictly forbidden
by Moscow to engage in any nonintelligence activity, that is, to undertake any
propaganda or organized functions of a political nature.
This appears on page 24.
This ban meant that my group and I were not allowed to make the least
attempt to exercise any political influence on any persons or group of persons.
We obeyed it faithfully, with one exception, that we worked actively on other
people to influence their opinions of Soviet national strength. It was utterly
impossible not to violate a general restriction which made no special provision
for such cases. If Ozaki and myself as advisers, political experts and experienced
advisers, had endorsed the prevailing derogatory opinion and underestimation
of Soviet strength, our positions would have been directly endangered. It was
for this reason that our group took a special stand in connection with the evalua-
tion of Soviet strength. In doing so, we did not engage in propaganda on behalf
of the Soviet Union, but endeavored to teach various persons and classes of
society to evaluate Soviet strength with due caution. We encouraged individuals
and groups not to underestimate Russian strength and to strive for a peaceful
solution of the pending Soviet-Japanese problems.
Ozaki, Voukelitch, and I maintained this attitude for a number of years. When
the cry for war with the Soviet Union became urgent, in 1941, I sent an inquiry
to Moscow, prompted by conversations with Ozaki, in which he expressed the
belief that he could successfully exceed the limits mentioned above and influ-
ence members of his group in favor of a positive peace policy toward the Soviet
Union. He was confident that if he took a strong stand against a Soviet-Japanese
war in the Konoye group he could turn Japan's expansion policy south.
The inquiry was very general, outlining the possibilities of positive action
by Ozaki, myself, and other members of the group. The reply was negative,
not forbidding such activities outright but labeling them unnecessary.
I want you to look at that particularly, that the reply was of a
negative character, not forbidding the action but labeling it as un-
necessary.
With tension ever mounting over the outbreak of the Soviet-German war in
1941, I felt that it was within my authority not to interpret .the reply as a clear-
cut prohibition. I imported a wider and more discretionary meaning to the
word "unnecessary," refusing to construe it as an explicit ban on our partici-
pation in such activities. Accordingly, I did not restrict Ozaki's positive ma-
neuvers within the Konoye group, nor did I hesitate to work on the Germans,
particularly in view of the fact that my attitude had remained unchanged over
the past several years. The maneuvers that my group and I attempted were
confined to the scope and the political problems described on the two preceding
pages. Not one of our members exceeded this restriction, because to have done
so would have been to endanger our original and principal mission. I would
like to emphasize this point thoroughly. What we did was not propaganda by
any means.
The foregoing instance, in which we sent an inquiry to Moscow and received
a negative reply, was the only one in which I learned of maneuvers on Ozaki's
part. As far as I know, he began to work on his friends actively after our dis-
cussions. The argument which he employed was briefly as follows :
"The Soviet Union has no intention whatsoever of fighting Japan, and even
if Japan should invade Siberia would simply defend herself. It would be a short-
sighted and mistaken view for Japan to attack Russia, since she cannot expect
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1203
to gain anything in eastern Siberia or to wrest any sizable political or economic
benefits from such a war. The United Stales and Britain would very likely
welcome such a Japanese embroilment with open arms and seize the opportunity
to strike at the nation after her oil and iron reserves were depleted. Moreover,
if Germany should succeed in defeating the Soviet Onion, Siberia might fall into
Japan's lap without her raising a ringer. Should Japan aspire to further expan-
sion elsewhere than in China, the southern area alone would be worth going
into, for there Japan would find the critical resources so essential to her war-
time economy, and there she would confront the true enemy blocking her bid
for a place in the sun."
Ozaki worked in this way to ease the tension in 1941. Whether he attempted
any other maneuvers, I do not know, but I am sure that like myself he must
have disagreed at times with superficial evaluations of the Soviet strength and
the prevailing tendency to underestimate the enemy. In conversation he doubt-
less pointed out the lesson learned at Nomenheim and emphasized Hitler's mis-
calculation concerning the Soviet-German war.
That is Sorge's own story, or at least as much of it as he would tell,
regarding the political effort made by his group, and leading Japan
to the south instead of to the north.
General Willoughby. I take it, Mr. Tavenner, you would like my
professional off-the-cuff comment on the value of this maneuver, as
he termed it, Ozaki's maneuver?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
General Willoughby. I think it is very clearly put that regardless
of his instructions, he permitted his right-hand man, who had ex-
ceptional facilities and an exceptional position within the highest
official quarters of the Japanese Government, namely, the Foreign
Office — he permitted him, he encouraged him, to exercise whatever
influence he could develop toward keeping Japan from attacking Rus-
sia, and to encourage them, conversely, to move south toward a col-
lision with England and the United States. By so doing, and Ozaki
felt he was successful in it or felt confident that he could accomplish
it, they of course rendered Russia, in her war situation, a tremendously
vital service. The mechanics used, as you remember — that has already
been developed, I believe, or is available in the files — were the intimacy
of Ozaki with the Prime Minister, Konoye, and his position as a con-
sultant of the Cabinet.
Mr. Tavenner. This statement by Sorge also shows that the Soviet
Government was fully advised of the purpose and desire of Sorge and
his associates to use such a political influence.
.General Willoughby. Quite.
Mr. Tavenner. Sorge's own statement also shows that the Soviet
Government in its reply was not specific and was, by its very nature,
would you say, an invitation to Sorge to proceed on his own respon-
sibility?
General Willoughby. I would concur in your view, Mr. Counsel.
A tacit encouragement is the term.
Mr. Tavenner. Earlier in the course of the hearings, you have
referred to the fact that an effort was made to place information;
concerning the Sorge ring in the Tojo trials before the international
tribunal. Do you have any further statement you desire to make in
regard to that?
General Willoughby. Yes, Mr. Tavenner. Your intimate acquaint-
ance, of course, with the international tribunal is an introduction to
this incident which I, at least, attach considerable importance to. It
is practically proof of the commitment or involvement of the Soviet
1204 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Government in this spy mechanism, because they objected strenu-
ously and seriously to having their case introduced into the interna-
tional military tribunal in Tokyo.
Mr. Walter. May I interrupt at that point, General ?
General Willoughby. Yes.
Mr. Walter. Is that because this spy mechanism, as you described
it, is the same sort of mechanism that the Soviet has introduced into
other nations all over the world ?
General Willoughby. Yes, indeed, Mr. Walter.
Mr. Walter. Including our own?
General Willoughby. Yes. And they are reluctant or were
reluctant at such a dramatic public session as the international
tribunal, to have this story brought to public attention. It would
embarrass them.
Mr. Walter. In other words, these Trojan-horse tactics have been
and are being employed wherever it is possible, and it has been possi-
ble to employ them?
General Willoughby. That is my affirmative belief, sir.
Mr. Velde. General, in that connection, I think you had a little
difficulty, too, in introducing this evidence or getting the evidence
reported to Secretary of the Army Royall. I understand that Sec-
retary Royall repudiated the statements contained in your report.
Would you care to comment on that ?
General Willoughby. With your permission, may I comment on
it later? Because, at the moment, to assist the counsel, I was about
to cover the story of the international tribunal. But I will be de-
lighted to defer to your wishes, of course.
Mr. Wood. The question will be held for the time being.
General Willoughby. We will return to it, Mr. Velde. I have a
definite thought on the subject.
I invite your attention, Mr. Chairman, to what is our exhibit No. 17.
And the title is "The Sorge Case Before the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East" — about as public a setting as could con-
ceivably be devised. And the reaction to our proposal, meaning the
tribunal proposal, is very significant, in my opinion.
Mr. Cunningham, one of the lawyers on the defense panel, attempted to in-
troduce the Sorge espionage case (see case file No. 38456). In a record of 13
pages, there is a picture of an argument between Mr. Cunningham and the
Russian General Vasiliev, a member of the court, on question of evidence.
Mr. Walter. When was that, General ?
Mr. Tavenner. It was in September 1947.
And may I make a correction? General Vasiliev was the Russian
prosecutor; not a member of the court, He was not a judge on the
tribunal.
General Willoughby. A pertinent correction, sir.
Vasiliev entered 15 separate objections in keeping Mr. Cunningham's material
out of the record. The Russian evidently could not afford to get this material
in evidence. Mr. Cunningham would have brought out that Sorge worked for
the Soviet Government.
Of course, this Russian high-ranking official would react as he did.
But the inferential significance of this maneuver is that they just
couldn't afford to bring (his story out in their connection, which this
committee has already clarified, namely, Sorge working for the fourth
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1205
bureau of the Soviet Red army. So they squelched or killed the
attempt to inl roduce it.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Owen-, will you examine part L5 of the Foreign
A Hairs Year Book of 1942, pages 185 to 208, where there appears the
Dotes or confession by Sorgeas reported in that document?
On pages 201 and 202, a reference is made by Sorge to forged pass-
ports. We have at various times in this committee, in fact on many
occasions, had testimony relating to forged passports, and this com-
mittee has made every effort to discover the sources of these frauds
and how they have been set up. 1 would like you to read what Sorge
says about fraudulent passports.
Mr. Owens Yes. [Reading:]
When I went to the Soviet Union via the United Slates from Japan in lO.'iij, the
Communist Party contact man in New York gave me a forged passport. I used
it to go to Moscow and destroyed it in Holland on my return trip. I used a forged
passport because I did not want my real passport to show that I had been in
Soviet Russia. Prior to that, when returning to Moscow from Scandinavia, I
had also used a forged Scandinavian passport. In neither of these cases did I
forge the passport ; contact men gave them to me. I do not know, therefore,
whether or not there is a special section in the Comintern which makes forged
passports.
I used my real passport twice to go to Moscow; once when I first went there
from Germany in 11)24, and once when I returned from China via Siberia in
1933.
The passport I received in the United states was not new. It was an old one
that had belonged to someone, but it bore my picture and description. The
nationality was given as Austrian and the name was long and outlandish; I
have forgotten it now. An Austrian visa had been stamped on it. so all I had
to do in Paris was to get Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Russian visas. I had to
go through the regular procedure just like any other traveler; I was not given
any special privileges when I went to apply for my entrance and exit visas at
the Soviet consulate.
When I was buying a ticket at a steamship office preparatory to going to
Europe with the forged passoport, I found that I had forgotten the outlandish
name on it and had to take it out of my pocket to refresh my memory.
When I was leaving New York I had a suit tailored, giving the tailor my real
name, and on my return trip I went to the same tailor and gave him the name
in the forged passport. The tailor remembered me and noted that my name
was different, but he was not interested in the change and made the suit for me.
People in the United States do not think it strange if the same man uses two
different names.
In this respect, the British are rather strict and their passport inspection is
thorough. It is said that England knows more about spies than any other nation
in Europe, but I am not in a position to make a definite statement, because I have
made no special study of the subject.
I shall give an illustration of how loosely everything is done in the United
State . I did not pay my exit tax and forgOl to get a stamped receipt when 1
went on board the ship for Europe. Just as the ship was about to sail, a customs
officer found out about it, and it looked ;i s though he were going to lake me off
the ship, but I slipped him $50, and the matter was dropped at once. Things are
very flexible in the United States.
JNIr. Tavenner. In other words, according to Sorge's own state-
ment, there must exist in this country a fraudulent passport mill from
which lie would receive the necessary assistance to accomplish his
purpose.
Mr. Owens. It would appear so.
Mr. Tavenner. Since you have now gone into the subject of Sorge's
itinerary through the United States, I would like at this time to pre-
sent the results of the interrogation as to other experiences which
Sorge had in the United States. I believe, Mr. Chairman, it will
1206 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
facilitate matters if I were to attempt to read these exerpts, rather than
to do it through question-and-answer form to the witness.
We have taken from the exhibits produced by General Willoughby,
or rather through General Willoughby, an interrogation of December
21, 1941, of Sorge.
Question : Continue from where you stopped yesterday to your description of
your mission to Japan.
Answer : As I stated yesterday, I left Moscow and went to Berlin. On July
14 or 15 I departed from Berlin for Paris, where, as previously arranged, I reg-
istered at the Neua Hotel. On the following day a contact man called me at the
hotel, told me that a certain Voukelitch was already living in Tokyo in a large
apartment house, and told me the passwords I was to use when meeting him.
I might add here that back in Berlin I had been notified that a man was already
in Tokyo. Voukelitch was that man.
The contact man instructed me to register at the Lincoln Hotel, East Forty-
second Street, New York City. I stayed 4 or 5 days in Paris, sailed from South-
ampton, France, around August 1, 1933, arrived in New York
apparently he has the geography mixed a little —
in about 5 days, registered at the Lincoln Hotel, and saw a contact man, who
instructed me to meet a certain employee of the Washington Post at the Chicago
World's Fair.
I spent around 8 days in New York, around 3 days in Washington, D. C, and
around 4 days in Chicago. I met the man from the Washington Post in Chicago
at the fairgrounds on the shore of Lake Michigan and he informed me that a
certain Japanese would soon return to Japan, and told me how to get in touch
with him.
I would like to turn to the interrogation of Miyagi also taken from
the exhibits produced here, in which this question was asked :
Question 10. The accused will describe the circumstances leading to his par-
ticipation in espionage activities.
Answer. As I have told the police officer during his investigation, Yano and a
Comintern agent, a Caucasian, whose nationality I did not know, came from San
Francisco to Los Angeles to see me sometime around the end of 1932, told me to
return to Tokyo, said that I would learn the nature of my work when I got
there. They said I should be back in about a month. I left America in about
September 1933, and arrived in Yokohama in about the end of October. Using
the method in which I had been coached by Yano, I was able to contact Sorge
around the end of November.
Then, continuing again with Sorge's statement:
In December 1933 I called at the office of the Japan Advertiser, and as in-
structed by the American contact man inserted an ad in the Japan Advertiser
and the Pan Pacific, its weekly publication, to the effect that I was collecting
Yukioi and books on art and wanted interested persons to reply to the Japan
Advertiser. I ran the ad twice for several days in a row, called at the office of
the Advertiser to pick up the replies, had Voukelitch arrange a meeting with our
man, and finally met Miyagi at the Yuno Art Museum and brought him into the
group.
General Willoughby, in the course of your investigation, did any
knowledge come to your attention as to the identity of this person
referred to as an employee of the Washington Post, who gave instruc-
tions to Sorge as to how he was to contact the Japanese in Japan \
General Willoughby. No, sir; it is one of those cases where there is
reference in the files, in the records, to individuals whose identities,
in spite of our efforts subsequently, were not identified by us — mean-
ing Tokyo. It is one of those points of which we have been officially
apprehensive, in the sense that there was at no time a desire to em-
barrass people who are associated with these agencies, these subversive
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1207
agencies, by accident or physical location. And we have leaned
over backward, and I will continue to do so here within my limitations,
to protect individuals whose appearance may have been incidental.
When, however, the evidence is positive, then of course we made an
effort to develop this clue or lead, in police language, further.
In genera] terms, I believe it is the sense of this committee, too,
that that protective distinction is made wherever possible, and re-
gardless of what the files really show. After all, the Shanghai police
hies are just that. They are not an arraignment. They are a series
of reports that we have attempted to piece together. We found
astonishing coincidences here and there. And in many cases we have
drawn a blank. In that ease we will give the individual the benefit
of the doubt.
Mr. Tavenner. But as to this matter, this is not a matter relating
to the Shanghai police files. It is a matter that appears from Sorge's
own confession or statement.
General Willoughry. Your point is well taken, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. "Wood. But at the same time, as I understand from your state-
ment, General, you have been unable to so far obtain sufficient data
on the identity of this individual.
General Willoughby. In this particular case, sir.
Mi-. "Wood. Sufficient to venture a statement as to who he was.
General Willoughby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, you were not present, but Mr.
Yoshikawa testified before this committee several weeks ago that he
had endeavored to ascertain from Sorge the identity of this individual
hut had been unsuccessful in doing so. So the matter had been brought
directly to Sorge's attention, as to the identity.
Mr. Wood. For what reason had he been unable to do so? Because
Sorge refused to give him the information, or professed he did not
know a man by that name ?
Mr. Tavenner. My recollection is that a police officer by the name
of Ohashe obtained this information, and that the witness who ap-
peared here directed him to go back and ascertain the identity of the
individual. And as far as the witness was able to go, we must say
he had been unable to get it. The record is not clear as to whether
Sorge failed in his memory to identify the individual or whether he
would not disclose his identity. The record is not clear on that. There
is no record on that subject, and that is really what I mean to say.
Mr. Owens, will you turn again to the Foreign Affairs Year Book
of 19-12, part lfi, which contains the confession or statement of Max
Klausen, who was Sorge's radio operator in Tokyo? The portion of
Klausen's notes dealing with his first experiences in Shanghai \
Mr. Wood. Before going into that, Mr. Counsel, I would like for
the record to have it appear at this point that all facilities available
to this committee have been utilized and exhausted to determine the
identity of this person. And so far this committee has been unable
to proceed further with it than the information here disclosed.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Owens, the portion of Klausen's notes dealing
with his first experiences in Shanghai contains an interesting refer-
ence to an American citizen. Will you examine that and read it to
the committee?
1208 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. [Beading :]
* * * Around July 1929, as I was about to leave for Harbin. Miss Rett
Bennett, whom I shall discuss later, arrived in town. I believe she came to
Shanghai from the United States. Lehmann taught her how to encode and
decipher messages, and after I returned from Harbin she gave me messages
to be transmitted and I gave her incoming messages. She left Shanghai for
Moscow via Dairen and Siberia around November. To the best of my knowledge,
she was a member of the American Communist Party ; I believe that she had
been ordered by the party to proceed to Moscow and that she stopped at Shanghai
to assist Lehmann. She was about 25 years old, about 5 feet 5 inches tall,
of medium stature, and beautiful despite a large nose * * *.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the name, please ?
Mr. Owens. Eeh Bennett.
Mr. Tavenner. A portion of Klausen's notes deals with the 6 weeks
that he spent in Harbin in July of 1929 on a mission to set up a wireless
set for the Harbin Intelligence group, headed by Gloemberg-Ott.
Will you relate to the committee what Max Klausen writes about
his experiences in Harbin on this particular mission ?
Mr. Owens (reading) :
Nothing in particular happened on the trip to Harbin. The water police merely
inspected our passports before we landed in Dairen. Like any other traveler, I
bought a second-class ticket, boarded a train for Changchun (the present Hsing-
king), changed trains at Changchun carrying two suitcases containing spare
suits and other necessities, and arrived in Harbin in the evening.
I registei-ed at the Priston Hotel Moderne as directed by Benedict in a letter
to- Lehmann, met Benedict 2 days later, and took custody of the transmitter, which
had been brought in by the diplomat. Soon thereafter, I moved to a lodging
house near the broadcasting station.
Benedict introduced me to Gloemberg-Ott, who took me to his home, but,
perhaps because his wife was a White Russian, refrained from discussing secret
matters. Several days later, I accompanied Ott to a cafe operated by a White
Russian and then, for the first time, he asked me to install the wireless set and
gave me several hundred Harbin dollars so that I could buy parts for a receiver
and defray incidental expenses.
He told me about Lilliestrom several days later. Lilliestrom was a big fat
six footer about 50 years old. His house was a villa-type, two-story gray tile
brick building with a large yard enclosed by a palisade. He went to work at
the United States consulate from there.
Soviet-Chinese relations were rather tense at the time, with the result that
the Chinese police were busily making secret inquiries into the affairs of White
Russians and Russians living in China. Ott realized that the best way of
escaping detection was to use the private home of the American vice counsul,
which was conveniently located, and that, needless to say, the easiest way of
getting information was to gain Lilliestrom's confidence. I believe it was for
these reasons that he won over Lilliestrom as a sympathizer.
After spending the first 2 weeks idly with Ott and Benedict in conferences
and at eating places, I went to inspect Lilliestrom's home and decided to nse
two rooms (both were vacant; one was about an eight-mat room) on the second
floor, one as a wireless operating room and the other as a technician's room.
I bought an antenna and parts to transform a receiver into a short-wave
set
Mr. Walter. Does the record show when that was, Mr. Owens?
Mr. Owens. 1929 (continuing to read) :
began installation operations, completed the work in about 2 weeks, tested the
set with Wiesbaden for 2 days and delivered it to Ott * * *.
Mr. Tavenner. You referred, in the reading of those notes, to Max
Klausen having received direction from Lehmann. On yesterday.
General Wi Hough by described the Lehmann group, which was active
in the promotion of Communist purposes. I will ask you to look at
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1209
page 225 of the year book and see if at that point or at sonic other
point it fixes Max Klanson as a member of the Lehmann group.
First of all. can yon establish the fact that Max Klausen became
a member of t he Lehmann group?
Mr. Owens. I believe that part of his notes here will establish-
that.
Mr. T.wixnki;. All right. Will yon read it. please?
Mr. Owens (reading) :
* * * As a full-fledged member of the spy ring after my return from
Harbin —
relating to the trip which I just read —
I now became its wireless technician. I still received coded messages from
Lehmann and .wiss Bennett and transmitted them, in contrast to the typed code
messages thai Sorge gave me in Tokyo, the messages I received from Lehmann
and Miss Bennetl were always written out in longhand. 1 am inclined to believe
that the latter method is more accurate.
For 1! or :: months after my return from Harbin, I used Lehmann's transmitter,
hut during that period 1 built and began to use a new Armstrong set. All of
Lehmann's messages were short, consisting at the most of not more than 50-word
groups. Lp to the time I left for Canton, he sent a total of ahout 2,000 groups.
.Meanwhile. I also took care of photographing documents and smuggling out
the film. I photographed Intelligence documents written in English or Chinese
(they were typed and there were no photographs or maps) that Lehmann
brought in from somewhere, working in my room with a Zeiss camera which
they had previously given to me. It was postcard size (."> by 4 inches). I was
able to take six documents in one roll of film. I delivered the photographs
chiefly to Lehmann. but at times to Miss Lenin It when so ordered hy him. I
suppose they sent them to Moscow through some connection.
Mr. Tavexxer. Now, continuing with Max Klaussen's notes, he
states that in April of 1935 he returned to Shanghai, where he re-
mained until September. He states that he was called in to depart-
ment 4, where, in the presence of Sorge, "the chief of the Far East De-
partment informed me that I was to accompany Sorge to Tokyo, and
that as of that day I was assigned to the Far East."
Klaussen further states that prior to proceeding to Tokyo he was
authorized to rest up at Khimki.
On page 253 of the Yearbook, there appears a paragraph dealing
with an association in Khimki. Would yon turn to that page and
read the portion that deals with the association?
Mr. Owens. Page 253 of the Yearbook contains the following state-
ment by Klaussen, after he has dealt with having gone to Khimki to
rest prior to his leaving for Tokyo. [Reading : J
I might add that at Khimki, Charlie, an American Jew, was my next door
neighhor. lie lived there with his wife and two children. I understood that
he had served as wireless operator for a Shanghai espionage group for ahout a
year around 1934. He was around 40 years of age, stood around ."i foot 6, and
had dark hair; his only distinguishing feature was a big nose. I heard that
before going to Shanghai he had operated a fair-sized amateur radio station in
the United States, through which he had tried to contact the Moscow wireless
school, hut that his efforts, for the most part, were failures. Because of the dis-
tance between Russia and the United States, I believe that information is con-
veyed via the Russian Embassy rather than through radio contact.
Charlie presented me with a green huekskin belt with four pouches attached.
I took it with me to Japan and used it for hiding film when I went to Shanghai
on liaison missions.
Both Weingart and my wife were friendly with Charlie and his wife. I do
not know what became of them, since I left for Japan shortly thereafter, nor
do I know the names of Charlie's comembers in the Shanghai espionage group.
00929—51 6
1210 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
I understood that Charlie taught foreigners at one of the branches of the
wireless school, but the location of the school and the nationalities of the stu-
dents were kept secret. * * *
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, do you have any comment to
make upon this American identified only as "Charlie"?
General Willoughbt. Yes, sir. This is an interesting case, though
spotty evidence, in which a reference by one of Sorge's group fits into
a collateral possibly supporting evidence in the Shanghai files. I pre-
sent this merely as an incident in the technique of investigation. The
conclusions are not necessarily final. But with this vague description
and the coincidence of the year, the Shanghai files, in its abbreviated
card index, have the following to say about Leon Minster, as follows :
Leon Minster, Russian Jew, born 1898 at Selidovo, District of Ekaterinoslav,
became an American citizen in 1919. Holds passport No. 7152, of April 13, 1933,
Washington, D. C. ; home address : 167 Maple Street, Bridgeport, Conn., U. S. A.
Arrived in Shanghai from America 17, 10, 1934, in the S. S. General Pershing.
In November 1934 took over fiat No. 6, Loriot, on a lease expiring in 1935. On
December 4, 1934, rented a shop at No. 4 Voylon and started a business known as
the Ellem Radio Equipment, which was established as a cover for the installation
of a long-range radio transmitter. In March 1935, left for Yokohama to meet his
wife, children, and his brother-in-law, Harry Kahan, who came from America
in the S. S. Empress of Canada. They arrived in Shanghai on April 9th. Mrs.
Bessie Minster is a sister of V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the People's Commis-
sariat of the U. S. S. R. They have relatives, Robert Minster and his wife Emma,
nee Kantor, who were connected with naval espionage in the United States in 1932
and were connected with Mr. and Mrs. Switz, concerned in Soviet espionage in
France, in 1934. Minster left for Japan on May 21, 1935, in the S. S. Shanghai
Marti. It is definitely known that Minster was connected with a foreign Com-
munist known as Joseph Walden, who was arrested by the municipal police on
May 5, 1934. The connection there is in Klausen's sworn statement, referring to
this code name "Charlie."
I understood that he had served as wireless operator for a Shanghai
espionage group for years around 1934. In Shanghai he had operated
a fair-sized amateur radio station, and so forth, which fits the Ellem
Radio Equipment Shop, which is set up and which the Shanghai
police classifies as "no doubt established as a cover for the installa-
tion of a long-distance radio-transmitting station."
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, this is a convenient place for a
break, if you have completed your answer, General.
General Willoughby. Yes ; I have completed it.
I believe you have some collateral reference to Switz and to the
Kantors on naval espionage in 1932 ; also, the Switz in Soviet espionage
in France in 1934, in your own record.
Mr. Walter. Where was this naval espionage in 1932?
General Willoughby. That I don't know, Mr. Walter. I felt that
possibly the committee had better American references than I had
in Tokyo.
I recall personnally from reading the current newspaper at the
time that this couple, Mr. and Mrs. Switz, were picked up in France
in 1934, and we had some trouble in getting thorn out of there, and
the naval espionage case centers around Robert Minster and his wife,
Kantor. That is as far as I know 7 .
The Shanghai police, of course, picks up that kind of juicy col-
lateral information and records it. I presume it could be determined
by further research.
Mr. Tavenner. We have information on the subject, General Wil-
loughby, but it is executive session testimony.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1211
General Willoughby. Yes, sir.
I am prepared to answer Mr. Velde's question, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Tavenner. Due to another appointment that we have here in
just 10 or 12 minutes, I believe that we had better wait until this
afternoon for that.
Mr. Wood. We will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12: 05 p. in., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. this
same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. Wood. Are you ready to proceed ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wood. Let the committee be in order.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY—
Resumed
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, during the course of your testi-
mony you have brought out various facts relating to the association
of Agnes Smedley with Sorge and other members of the Sorge ring.
I think it would be well if I make as a part of the record of this
hearing some of the actual interrogations of members of the ring
with relation to Agnes Smedley's participation. Rather than burden
you with the reading of it, I will refer to these items myself.
In the interrogation of Ozaki on March 5, 1942, we find the fol-
lowing :
Question. Now describe your relationship with Agnes Smedley.
That is, Ozaki's relationship with Agnes Smedley.
Answer. I began to pay occasional visits to the Zeitgeist Bookstore on Soo-
ehow Creek around the summer of 1929, became friendly with Mrs. Wiedemeyer,
the manager of the store, and through her met Agnes Smedley around the end
of 1929 or the beginning of 1930. Smedley, the Shanghai correspondent of the
Frankfurter Zeitung and a well-known American writer, was contributing many
articles to the American leftist magazine New Masses at that time. She also
worked on behalf of the International Relief Society in Shanghai and devoted a
great deal of time to the famous Noulens incident.
Through .Mrs. Wiedemeyer, I met Smedley for the first time at her residence
in the British Settlement, and at her request agreed to exchange information
with her. At the time, we traded information mainly as newspaper reporters,
hut the fact that both of us inclined toward the left caused our conversations to
tend in the direction of exposures of internal conditions in the Kuomintang.
Not only did my relationship with Smedley continue after this, but it was she
who brought ahout the establishment of my contact with Sorge.
Question. Describe the circumstances surrounding your affiliation with Sorge's
espionage ring. %
Answer. A man named KitO, Ginichi, began to come to see me around October
or November 1930. He was connected with the American Communist Party and
had come to Shanghai from the United States via Annam to engage in espionage
activities. Soon after I became acquainted with him, he urged me to meet an
American newspaperman named Johnson, but I did not yet trust him completely
and felt that it might be dangerous to do so. 1 thought that I could find out
about Johnson from Agnes Smedley; so I got in touch with her and told her
what had happened. She looked extremely grave and asked whether I had
discussed the matter with anyone else, to which I replied that I had not. She
then said that she had heard of him but warned me strongly against mentioning
the subject to anyone else. Shortly thereafter I met her again, and she told me
that Johnson was a fine man; said that she herself would introduce me to him.
She took me to a certain Chinese restaurant on Nanking Road and there pre-
sented me to the foreigner. Tins man who called himself "Johnson" was
-"Richard Sorge.
1212 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Sorge asked me at that meeting to give him (1) the data on the internal
situation in China which I was able to gather as a Japanese newspaperman
and (2) information on the local application of Japan's China policy, and I
agreed to cooperate in his espionage activities by doing so. Since I had origi-
nally been approached by Kito, Ginichi, a member of the United States Com-
munist Party, and since I had been introduced by Smedley, an internationally
famous leftist writer, I guessed at once that Sorge was a functionary of the
International Communist Party engaged in espionage activities. My reason
for deciding to cooperate with him was that, as I have stated, I believed in
communism and had decided to become active as a Communist; I felt that I
would be doing something of real importance by assisting Sorge in espionage
work on behalf of the Comintern. From then until I left Shanghai in February
1932, I got in touch with Sorge about once a month at Smedley's room in a
suburban apartment on Tsing-An-Szu Road, at Chinese restaurants inside
Shanghai proper, and elsewhere, to turn over information and offer suggestions.
While my first assignment was as indicated above, after the outbreak of the
Manchurian incident in September 1931, I was directed to take up such prob-
lems as (1) Japan's present and future Manchurian policy; (2) the effects
of Japan's Manchurian policy on her relations with the U. S. S. R., and (3)
Japan's present and future China policy, and was asked for information and
opinions concerning them. I prepared reports on them, but I have forgotten
most of the details now.
Question. Describe the composition of the Shanghai Sorge spy ring.
Answer. While in Shanghai, I was not in possession of detailed information
concerning the nature of the group with which Sorge was operating. I knew,
of course, that Smedley was working with him, but I was not clear as to whose
position was the higher, although I conjectured, from the manner in which
they talked to one another and from the nature of the reports which were made,
that Sorge was the superior.
Smedley was the only foreigner in Sorge's group with whom I was acquainted,
but I knew that he had Japanese confederates. * * *
Another interrogation of Ozaki, taken on July 21, 1942, is as follows :.
Question. What was your impression of Sorge?
That question, of course, was asked of Ozaki.
Answer. Smedley introduced him as a reporter, but I was rather dubious
about that. At the outset, I was inclined to believe that he was a member of
Smedley's circle and associated with the Red Relief Association —
General Willoughby, I believe you will have something to say
about the Red Relief Association a little later in your testimony.
[Continuing reading:]
but his connection with the investigation of the Hankow flood damage in
1931 caused me to think it possible that he held a position of considerable im-
portance within the Comintern. I therefore assumed that he was either con-
nected with the International Relief Society or one of the top men in the Com-
intern's Far East section. Judging from .the fact that Smedley was extremely
respectful to him, I gathered that he held a position of considerable importance
in the Comintern.
Then on July 27, 1942, this question was asked Ozaki and answer
given :
Question. Did you investigate and report to Sorge on the new American ac-
tivity in China; that is to say, on new investments by Americans in Shanghai
and America's steadily increasing role in China?
Answer. That is correct. I recall having investigated and reported on the-
matter. In 1930 or 1931, a group known as the Kemmerer Committee was en-
deavoring to put the Nationalist Government's maladministered finances on a
solid footing, and the relationship between China and the United States was be-
coming increasingly intimate. I investigated the committee's activities with
Smedley's help and. at times, that of members of minority groups in the Na-
tionalist Government, and submitted information to Sorge which was quite re-
liable.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 121.3
Continuing with the interrogation <>f Ozaki, we find the following
answer to a question propounded on August L2, L942. The question
related to Ozaki's leftist activities involving Smedley after he him-
self had returned from Shanghai. This is the answer by the witness
Ozaki :
In the late autumn of thai year I L932), I received a message from Smedley
in Shanghai which contained her Peking address and said that she wanted to
inrct me in Peking to discuss certain matters. <>n a previous occasion, Smedley
had asked me to come to <'hina and I had replied thai I would be able to g<>
during my vacation in late December. < >f course, thai was the reason for the
above proposal to meet me in Peking. I sailed from Kobe around December 25
without notifying my employers, arrived at Peking on December 31, gol a room
at the Te-Kuo restaurant, and at once asked Smedley to come there, it developed
that, in \ie\\ of the vital importance n< w attached to the North China problem,
she wanted t<> establish a Sino-Japanese intelligence agency to operate in and
around North China. I bad kepi in touch with Kawai concerning my trip to
Peking, and I proposed to Smedley that he be made the keyman in the group.
Inasmuch as site knew him she agreed, and I took him to sec her at her Peking
residence, a little rented cottage within a Chinese home.
At this point I would like to leave the interrogation of Ozaki. At
this point the statement is made that Kawai was previously known
to Smedley, so I want to turn now to the interrogation of the defen-
dant Kawai relating to the earlier experience. In an interrogation
conducted on November 9, 1941, in answer to a question relating to the
witness' participation in espionage activities, Kawai replied as fol-
lows :
During the latter part of October 1931 I was, as previously stated, receiving
instructions and training as a Japanese intelligence agent under the direction
of Chiang of the Chinese Communist Party, which meant that I was a frequent
visitor at Chiang's 1 home. One day Chiang told me that he had some important
work for me to do, and shortly thereafter he introduced me at his home to
ozaki Hozumi, Shanghai correspondent of the Osaka Ashahi. whom I knew by
Bight. It was then that I first learned that Ozaki and * hi&ng were on close
terms. It struck me as strange when I heard Ozaki. in making arrangements
for this important task, tell Chiang : "Chiang, you're not going."
On the following day. I met Ozaki in front of the post office on North Szeehuan
Road. A Caucasian lady was waiting in an automobile, and Ozaki and I got in.
We got out of the car directly in front of a restaurant featuring Canton-style
foml in the neighborhood of Nanking Road, the name of which, as I recall, was
the Bsiang Hua Low, entered it, and found a tall foreigner waiting.
The gist of the conversation between the tall foreigner and myself, which was
interpreted by Ozaki, was as follows :
First, he asked: "I want you to go to Manchuria from North China. Can you
do it?"
I will omit several paragraphs which appear unimportant from the
standpoint that we are addressing ourselves to. After agreeing to
undertake the mission, Kawai says:
Concerning the foreign woman — when I contacted Funakoshi Hisao, my
superior during my Shanghai days, at Tientsin around January 1934, 1 was told
for the first time that her name was Smedley.
Then there was presented to the witness a photograph of Richard
Singe, and the question was asked:
Is this the unidentified Caucasian man to whom you referred?
Answer. Yes, it is. He is the one to whom Ozaki referred as Robinson Crusoe
(luring my Shanghai days.
Question. What do you know about the spy ring identified with Sorge and his
group?
Answer: I have already stated thai when embarking on these spy activities
in collaboration with Ozaki Hozumi, I felt it strange that there was no con-
nection with Chiang, the man in charge of the intelligence activities of the
1214 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Chinese Communist Party. Later on, after being introduced by Ozaki to the
Causasians Sorge and Smedley, and after working with Smedley and a Chinese
in North China, I gradually realized that we were working for the International
Communist Party (Comintern). Since I had already accepted communism,
and since I supported the Comintern and believed in the desirability of an inter-
national Communist society, I approved of the spy organization and continued
my activities in its behalf.
That is the testimony showing the connection between Kawai and
Agnes Smedley prior to 1932.
Now, continuing with the testimony of Ozaki at the place I departed
from the text, we continue :
We asked for the names of some persons whom he could trust absolutely,
and he listed two or three, among them Kawamura, whom I knew and endorsed.
I recall that I approved the others with the remark, "If you have absolute confi-
dence in them, they are all right with me," and asked him to arrange to get all
of them together without delay.
Parenthetically, I should explain that this was a conference between
Smedley, Ozaki, and Kawai. [Continuing reading:]
Smedley asked me to stay until the organization was completed, but I declined
on the ground that I had not told my employers about the trip and, therefore,
did not have the time. On January 3 I left Tientsin for Japan.
I learned from Kawai in the summer of 1933, when he paid me another visit
at my home in Inanomura, that he had rounded up two or three persons, in-
cluding Kawamura, parted with Smedley, and engaged in espionage activities
both in North China and in Manchuria. His reports had been submitted
through a Chinese contact man, but he had lost touch with him in April or
June of that year and was completely unable to resume the contact, with the
result that their activities had come to a standstill and he had come to ask
me to do something about it. At the time, however, my correspondence with
Smedley had been cut off completely because, as was revealed later, she had
gone to convalesce at a sanitarium in the Odessa area of southern Russia.
Mr. Velde. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to ask the
general a question.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde.
Mr. Velde. In view of the evidence that has been produced by you
and sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, con-
cerning the connections of Agnes Smedley with Soviet Russia, it is a
little difficult for me to see why Secretary Royall would repudiate the
statements made in your report, General. Can you explain that ?
General Willoughbt. Mr. Velde, in a public broadcast on Febru-
ary 21, 1949, 1 objected to what might be termed an inferential repudi-
ation by the Secretary. It might be said that I had a grievance then,
in 1949, but I feel differently today, in 1951. World events have
moved so rapidly, this Red menace confronts all of us. I am reluctant
to revive what might be termed interdepartmental wrangling, and I
am prepared to absolve the Secretary with my pontifical blessing.
Mr. Velde. I would like at this point in the record to read an article
that was written by a former statesman, now a columnist, Harold L.
Ickes. It is dated March 16, 1949, and captioned "Army tricks cover
general's mistakes." He says :
The nonchalance with which a high-ranking, shoulder-shrugging Army officer
can smear a private citizen is truly alarming. I refer, of course, to the report
given out recently by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, who is chief of G-2 on
General MaeArthur's staff in Tokyo. This report, handed out "inadvertently,"
to quote Kenneth Royall, Secretary of the Army, charged that "Agnes Smedley
(a native-born American citizen) is a spy and agent of the Soviet Government," -
still "at large." No facts; no opportunity to be heard; no right to cross-
examine witnesses on charges that tamo unexpectedly hurtling through the air
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1215
against a woman who denied them specifically and categorically and at once
demanded a retraction. Secretary Royall, on the Meet the Press broadcast on
February 25, when questioned about this Tokyo spy report, said that it was an
"inadvertence." Excepi for t his, be side-stepped questions relating to the incident.
Was it an "inadvertence" in the sense that Miss Srnedley was unjustly charged?
If so, common decency, as well as official responsibility, would seem to call for
an explanation and something by way of an apology. After all, neither a Sec-
retary of the Army, nor a high-ranking Army officer, should be allowed to get
away with what, as a matter of fact, is a cowardly act.
Do you feel that Mr. Iekes, or any of the others who wrote along
similar lines, had any influence on Secretary Royall in making him
retract the report that you made?
General Willougiihy. Mr. Yekle, while I was very anxious to make
fraternal concessions to a former Secretary of the Army, I am by no
means prepared to acquiesce silently in Mr. Iekes' classification of the
work of Tokyo intelligence regarding Miss Srnedley. In fact, while
you have made perfect extracts in your quotation, may I be permitted
to add another comment by this writer, referring to me, namely :
The nonchalance with which a high-ranking Army officer can smear a private
citizen is truly alarming. * * *
No one who knows Miss Srnedley would ever suspect that this courageous and
intelligent American citizen has stooped to be so low as to be a spy for any
country — even for her own, to which she is deeply attached.
I presume the attachment of Miss Srnedley is made in comparison to
my own of 41 years of service, not without honor. He continues :
And who is this gallant soldier —
referring to your witness —
wearing two stars, who, without producing a scintilla of evidence, charges an
American woman with being "a spy and agent of the Soviet Government" * * *.
And so forth, and so forth.
This fine flowering of American journalism is a classical example
of reportorial Communist labor. Indeed, as I look upon my research,
I am appalled at the thought to turning out a piece every 24 hours.
I think this effusion has been amply refuted by Miss Srnedley herself —
may she rest in peace — by leaving her ashes to Chu-Teh, commander
in chief of the Chinese Communist army with which the United
States is now engaged in war in North Korea, and having her ashes
placed, in a ceremonial gathering of the highest Communist hier-
archy, in a special shrine in Peiping, the heartland of Asiatic com-
munism.
However, if Mr. Iekes raised a historical question as to "Xo one
who knows Miss Srnedley w r ould ever suspect that this courageous and
intelligent American citizen has stooped to be so low as to be a spy," I
would like to cite to this committee a letter by Harold L. Iekes, then
Secretary of the Interior, to Robert Morss Lovett, dated April 25.
1941, on the subject of the League of American Writers:
The league is generally regarded as a Communist subsidiary. Its policies, of
course, always parallel those of the Communist Party.
That letter was signed by Harold L. Iekes, who apparently was
aware at that time, April 25, 1941. that Srnedley served on the staff
of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, the forerunner
of the League of American Writers quoted in this inquiry by Mr.
Lovett.
1216 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Mr. Ickes' memory evidently failed in the period 1911 to 1919; it
lapsed, with which I am to some degree in sympathy in view of my
own growing age.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, I believe you testified before
another congressional committee regarding certain documentation
affecting Agnes Smedley.
General Willoughby. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. I do not want to repeat any testimony that you have
heretofore given, unless it is absolutely necessary in our hearing, but
I believe in connection with that you prepared a separate documenta-
tion entitled "Smedley and Associates: 1918-48."
General Willoughby. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. I have it before me, and it is rather long, it is 17
pages in length, and I am inclined to offer it as an exhibit rather than
ask you to read it, and make it a part of the hearing record. I intro-
duce it in evidence and ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit
No. 40."
Mr. Wood. Is that for reference?
Mr. Tavenner. No, sir, that is introduction in evidence, and to be
made a part of the record.
Mr. Wood. Very well. It is so ordered.
(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No.
40," is as follows:)
Willoughby Exhibit No. 40
Smedley and Associates : 1918-48
The Truth and Agnes Smedley
Smedley was not juridically charged with anything. No one suggested trial
or prosecution. G-2 Tokyo merely reported Smedley's historical association
with a Soviet espionage ring and filed proof. Testimony of living eyewitnesses
was available. Collateral sources and court .records were Listed and officially
filed in photostat copies. A bibliography appended to the original report was
significantly or inadvertently omitted from the Army release; it would have
convinced the average reader that ample, numerous documentary evidence was,
in fact, available ; it might even have convinced the Department of the Army
Public Information Chief or made him pause in his bland but meaningless
generalizations.
There is nothing in Smedley's career to justify or explain the Army's strange
repudiation of one of its faithful henchmen. In simplest terms — if the public
were really that naive — the argument boils down to whom to believe ! On this
fascinating theme, Plain Talk found it necessary to editorialize and Congressman
Judd considered the editorial appropriate for full insert into the Congressional
Record.
Under the circumstances, one can hardly ignore a revealing bit of character
tendency which Agnes Smedley herself admits with disarming frankness :
" * * * It has been one of the greatest struggles in my life to learn to tell
the truth. To tell something not quite true became almost an instinct. * * *"
This trend, if congenital, is also one of the most useful attributes of the clan-
destine fraternity and will have to be acquired by the undercover operator or
espionage agent, in order to survive ; it explains, in part, Smedley's smooth
integration into all sorts of international intrigues.
Chronological organization of facts in Smedley's career show that, throughout
her adult life, she has thrown in her lot with social and political revolutionaries.
There is no specific evidence of Smedley's membership in the American Com-
munist Party and she repeatedly denied it; however, her own writings contradict
her habitual denials of Communist affiliations, the customary protective screen
expected to be used by an experienced political agitator.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1217
The Sorge report and Smedley's protestation*
Amies Smedley has dedicated her life to the political and geographical advance
nit'iii of communism in China, li is one of the vagaries of Americana thai this
woman, born in the heartland of the United States, in Missouri, should have east
her lnt with Mongoloid-Panslavism in the remote and alien Far Fast. Her intel-
lectual evolution is an interesting "case history" of the development of a party
worker and fellow traveler.
Life, in its issue of January l">. L948, has published a brillianl and incisive
essay that is like a flashlighl beam in a darkened room: "Portrait of an Amer-
ican Communist" i with the disarming party name of "Kelly" i . Agnes Smedley's
career is more dramatic more Significant and colorful than Kelly's. As regards
her public protests, coupled with the threat of a personal libel suit against
MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence, it was inevitable that a noisy and highly pub-
licized attempt at defense would he made because the issues accentuate the
sinister ramifications of American communism in the international field, already
brilliantly exposed by congressional investigations, particularly the House Un-
American Activities Committee inquiry into the Whittaker Chambers case.
The fanatical beliefs of Communist converts permit no moral obligation to the
State where they were born nor a grateful recognition of the civic protection
and advantages they enjoy. Their ability to secure professional legal services,
on call, is an index of the high moral order of American civilization, but it is also
a symptom of the cynical arrogance of these ideological renegades, who are
ceaselessly busy, termite-like, in destroying the foundations of the \ cry order to
Which they scurry for legal shelter when the storm begins.
In the case Of Agnes Smedley, her attorney is a former Assistant Attorney
General, < >. John Rogge, whose connection with the Department of Justice was
abruptly severed. It is highly suggestive that Rogge demanded an end to the
New York grand jury investigations into Soviet espionage activities. It is
equally significant that lie promptly appeared as the attorney of Anna Louise
Si rong.
Agnes Smedley has been one of the most active workers for the Communist
cause in China for the past twenty-odd years. In her third book, China lights
Pack. Hie dedication is "to my beloved brothers and comrades, the heroic dead
ami the unconquerable living of the Eighth Route Army of China" (the Chinese
Red Communist army). This partisan vein runs through all her Chinese re-
ports, revealing her as definite propagandist for the Chinese Communist Party,
then witli headquarters at Yenan.
Press reports from the United States have hinted at a link between Whit-
taker Chambers and Soviet espionage in the Far East in furnishing agents
for Japan in the Sorge period. It is noteworthy that Whittaker Chambers
served on the 1082 staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, on
which Miss Smedley also served in 1933. The IURW was founded in Moscow,
is Soviet dominated, and held its second conference in Kharkov, November 15,
1930.
Miss Smedley has also sewed on the staff of the League of American Writers,
an offshoot of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers. This league is
classified by the United States Attorney General as communistic, and is cited in
tlie House record of the Seventy-ninth Congress.
The second report of the Joint Fact-Finding Committee for the fifty-sixth
California Legislature, Sacramento, Calif., lists Miss Smedley as a member of
the National Council of the League of American Writers, an affiliate of the
IURW. This league was established at the First American Writers' Congress
in New York; the committee^ reported on this congress thus (pp. 121—122) :
"The committee is in possession id' a photostatic copy of the proceedings of
the First American Writers' Congress. The most naive spectator and quarter-
witted participant of this first writers' congress could not have been deceived
as to its Communist revolutionary character.
"A report by Moissaye J. Olgin, author of Why Communism V (one of the
most inflammatory and revolutionary pieces of modern Communist literature
in existence), was read to the congress. The report was on the First All-Union
Congress of Soviet Writers, and glorified Karl Radek and .Nikolai Bukharin,
old Bolsheviks who were 'liquidated' by Stalin's purge in 1937-38."
The league is repeatedly cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee
on Un-American Activities.
"The League of American Writers is generally regarded as a Communist
subsidiary. Its policies, of course, always parallel those of the Communist Party."
121S AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
(State Department, quoted in a letter from Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of Interior,
to Robert Morss Lovett, dated April 25, 1941.)
"The League of American Writers was founded under Communist auspices in
1935. The overt activities of the League of American Writers in the last 2 years
leaves little doubt of its Communist control" (Attorney General Francis Biddle,
Congressional Record, September 24, 1942, p. 7686).
As regards Smedley's association with Sorge, documentary evidence is available
in the intelligence files of Tokyo in the form of authenticated extracts from official
court proceedings against the three principals in the Sorge Ring. Their state-
ments establish conclusively that Smedley was heavily implicated in the general
activities of this ring. Numerous exhibits, in this series, have established these
points ad infinitum et nauseam.
There is nothing vindictive in the Sorge report ; it is an impartial recital listing
court records, eyewitness testimony and related judicial evidence. Agnes Smedley
is merely shown as caught in the web of a stupendous international intrigue,
through her own choice or her own indiscretions. She cannot complain that her
gown is spattered by the mud of her surroundings. She walked in the shadow
of dangerous companions, in a milieu of her own choice.
A semichronological review of her life, her activities and associations should
make this point crystal clear ; it is not the story of an average, law-abiding
American citizen, but that of a restless spirit, devoted to alien and subversive
causes, roaming in far places in the service of predominantly foreign interests.
Agnes Smedley: Chronology and biography
1894 : Born in northern Missouri, eldest of five children of Charles H. and
Sarah (Rallis) Smedley. At an early age she moved to southern Colorado where
her father was employed as an unskilled laborer and her mother kept boarders.
She did not finish grade school and never attended high school.
1911 : Student in the normal school at Teinpe, Ariz., supporting herself by
working as a waitress.
1912 : Married an engineer, Ernest W. Brundin, on August 25. Subsequently
-divorced. In her early twenties she went to New York where she spent 4 years.
Worked during the day and attended lectures at New York University at night.
She became involved with a subversive, Indian nationalist group, Friends of
Freedom for India, operating in violation of current United States laws. Smedley
kept their correspondence, their codes and foreign addresses, a significant early
trend.
1915 : Attended summer school at the University of California.
1918: Smedley was arrested (March 18/19) with Salindranath Ghose, an
Indian political agitator, on charges of acting as an agent of a foreign govern-
ment and aiding and abetting such actions in violation of section 3, title 8 of
the Espionage Act, and section 332 of the United States Criminal Code. She
was released on bail May 7 and the case was never brought to trial. A significant
facet of this case was the apperance of German funds, reaching Indian National-
ist groups. Smedley was aware of the nature of these funds. It must be
recalled that in these critical war years the German General Staff was notor-
iously engaged in fomenting subversive political movements throughout the
world to damage the allied war effort. Rebellions flared up from north Africa
to India. German secret agents stirred' up the Berbers, the Touaregs and
Senussi, the Kurds and Afghans. Subversive, nationalistic movements were
tailor-made for this purely military enterprise.
On June 11, parallel indictments were returned by Federal grand jury in
San Francisco against Salindranath Ghose. Tarak Nath Das, Kulin B. Bose,
William Wotherspoon, Agnes Smedley, of New York, and Blurna Zalnik, accus-
ing them of attempting to defraud President Wilson through representations that
they were on a accredited mission from the Nationalist Party of India. Smedley
was not brought to trial in this action either. Wrote her first short stories.
Cell Mates.
1919 : She sailed from New York on a Polish-American freighter as a
stewardess. Smedley jumped ship in Danzig and went to Berlin.
1920: In Berlin, she joined Yirendranath Chattopadhyaya, an international
agitator, with whom she lived informally for 8 years. They were never married.
She characterized him as the epitome of the secret Indian revolutionary move-
ment and its most brilliant protagonist abroad. He eventually became a
Communist Party member.
1921 : Smedley visited Moscow in June and attended a meeting of Indian
revolutionaries held at the Hotel Lux. In commenting on this trip, she admits
membership in the delegation from Germany. In October, Smedley was re-
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1219
ported to he in Geneva, Switzerland, and Information was received that she
was paid the sum of 5,000 marks by the Soviel Legation there Cor traveling
expenses. In the same month, she attended the Congress of Syndicalists at
Dusseldorf. At this meeting she used among several aliases that of Mrs.
Petroikos.
L923 : Lefl Chal topadhyaya twice to rest in the Bavarian Alps and later became
very ill. She soughl the help of an alienist who gave her psychoanalytic treat-
ments Cor - years. Smedley then tanght an English seminar at the Uni-
versity of Berlin and also lectured on Indian history. She entered the University
of Berlin to study for her Ph. D. but lack of scholastic background forced her to
drop this project before the end of the first term. Smedley wrote two works on
Indian history which were published in German historical journals. She also
joined a group of Republican. Socialist, and Communist physicians who were
trying to establish the first birth-control clinic in Berlin.
T.tL'7: Smedley spent a number of months in Denmark and Czechoslovakia
where she wrote her first book, Daughter of the Earth.
1928 : Broke off her informal liaison with Chattopadhyaya and went to France.
She later returned to Germany where she was hired as a correspondent for the
Frankfurter Zeitung. Smedley made her way to China, stopping in Moscow and
then traveling across Siberia. It is pertinent to note that the Soviet master spy,
Richard Sorge, also used an assignment as a Frankfurter Zeitung correspondent
as a convenient cover for his espionage activities.
1!t29: Smedley arrived in Harbin and after spending 3 months in Manchuria
entered China through Tientsin. She spent some months in Peiping, visited
Nanking and then went to Shanghai. It was here that she began to frequent
leftist and Communist groups.
(a) Arrival in Shanghai. — Miss Agnes Smedley, also known as Alice Bird and
Mrs. Petroikos, arrived in Shanghai in May 1929 as a correspondent of the
Frankfurter Zeitung, the official organ of the German Social Democratic Party.
She had traveled from Berlin via Moscow, Harbin, Mukden, Tientsin, and Peiping
on United States passport No. 1266 issued June 27, 1928, by the United States
consulate in Berlin ; she was known to possess an alternate German passport in
addition. During her trip across the U. S. S. R. she stopped in Moscow in the
period of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July and
August 1928. Shanghai police report that Smedley was in the direct service of
the far eastern bureau (FEB) of the Central Committee of the Third (Com-
munist) International (Comintern), receiving orders directly from the central
committee (ECCI) in Moscow but maintaining no direct connection with the
local Soviet Communists in order to camouflage her activities.
(b) Organisations. — Agnes Smedley arrived in Shanghai when international
Communist activities were becoming prominent again after the 1927 split be-
tween the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists and the subsequent rupture
in diplomatic relations between China and the U. S. S. R. had caused a break-
down of the Comintern structure. The Comintern already had organized the
Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) as its major organ for agitation
and propaganda in China, and a variety of collateral subversive organizations
received support from this Comintern agency. The Shanghai municipal police
soon placed Smedley under surveillance, on the grounds of being affiliated with
the Far Eastern Bureau and of having been charged by the Comintern with the
establishment of Communist organizations among workers, an undertaking simi-
lar to that of the PPTUS. Smedley's connections with Chinese radical move-
ments, however, were considered more direct than those of the foreign-run
PPTUS. Police considered her to be a member of the All China Labor Federa-
tion (Union Syndicate Pan Chinoise), an ostensibly Chinese labor group which
received considerable aid from the PPTUS and its parent body, the Shanghai
"branch of the Far Eastern Bureau.
Smedley was an active member of the Shanghai branch of the notorious
Nbulens Defense Committee, a world-wide Communist-front organization set up
by International Red Aid (MOPR) specifically to free Paul and Gertrude Ruegg,
more commonly known as Noulens. the leaders of the Shanghai FEB, tried and
convicted for espionage. With Harold Isaacs, she was a member of the China
League for Civil Rights, and of the local Friends of the U. S. S. R., a Communist-
front group, directed by the Comintern through local agents. When the Anti-
War Congress, another front for the Comintern's League Against Imperialism,
sent a mission to Shanghai in 19. ,. >, Agnes Smedley was listed prominently as
one of the local supporters. As an erstwhile member of the Hindustan Associa-
tion of Berlin and of the Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society, Smedley con-
1220 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
tinned to devote considerable attention to the independence movement in India,
a political agitation in which the Comintern took great interest. She was known
to have been in touch with anti-British Indians in Shanghai, on several occa-
sions to have edited anti-British propaganda on behalf of the Shanghai branch
of the Indian Youth League, and to have given considerable financial support
to Indian revolutionary organizations.
(c) Publications. — Agnes Smedley came initially to the attention of the
Shanghai authorities through an article published in the Frankfurter Zeitung
regarding alleged gigantic preparations taken by the Shanghai Municipal Coun-
cil for the suppression of anticipated Communist disturbances in August 1929.
The article was reproduced in Izvestia on December 8, 1929. In addition to
acting as correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung, Smedley contributed
articles to the China Weekly Review, a Shanghai publication with intermittent
leftist trends. An article under her own name entitled "Philippine Sketches"
was published in the June 1930 issue of New Masses, definitive American Com-
munist Party organ, and an anonymous article was ascribed to her entitled
"London Behind the Hangman Chiang Kai-shek," which appeared in Rote Fahne
(Red Flag), the organ of the German Communist Party September 5, 1931. In
1933 she appeared under her own name in International Literature, the foreign-
language organ of the Comintern International Union of Revolutionary
Writers, in an account of the Communist uprising in Kingsi. Her book, China's
Red Army Marches, an account of the Communist "Long March, - ' was banned
both by Chinese and 'Shanghai authorities shortly after its publication in 1934
because of its violently anti-Kuomintang tone.
(d) Associations. — Agnes Smedley was an associate of Harold Isaacs, and
C. Frank Glass, locally classified as a card-bearing Communist. Isaacs was
for some time the editor of China Forum, an English-language Communist peri-
odical first published in 1932. She was also in close contact with the German
woman, Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), a secret Comintern agent and dis-
tributor of Communist publications, who was involved in the Sorge espionage
case. Edgar Snow and his wife, who wrote under the name of Nym Wales, were
associated with Smedley both in Shanghai and later in Peipin^. where the Snows
edited the publication. Democracy. Shanghai police authorities knew that she
was closely connected with the Soviet propagandist, Anna Louise Strong, writing
articles for her Moscow Daily News, and with known and suspected Shanghai
Communists, often visiting Tass, the Soviet news and propaganda agency at
their Shanghai offices. Her secret association with *Sorge is not specifically
covered here, as it appears in the Tokyo records elsewhere. Her house became
the rendezvous of Sorge's ring ; it was here that Ozaki and Kawai were given
espionage missions and their reports were, in turn, received. The Shanghai
police were on her trail, though they never caught up with either Sorge or
Smedley though they came pretty close, through the Noulens case, which led
straight into the heart of the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB).
Smedley came to the more serious professional attention of the Shanghai
Secret Service when an arrested Comintern agent, Joseph Walden, was found to
be carrying a typewritten document listing several local persons who were
shadowed by detectives of the settlements, evidently a protective warning list.
Agnes Smedley's name led a column of 12.
1930: She visited the Philippines and Canton where she professed to be
concerned at the plight of workers in the silk industry. She was arrested in
Canton at (he insistence of the British secret police under a charge of traveling
on a false passport and being a representative of the Communist International.
Apparently she was released after protests were made by the German counsul.
Back in Shanghai, Smedley was introduced to Ozaki Hozumi, protagonist of the
Sorge Spy Ring, by Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), owner of the Zeitgeist
Bookshop, a Communist front and mail drop for Comintern spies. At Smedley's
request. Ozaki agreed to supply her with information. Later she became asso-
ciated with Richard Sorge when he arrived in China and introduced him to ( >zaki.
Smedley became a member of the Soviet spy ring headed by Richard Sorge and
became one of his principal and most trusted assistants. Her house was
often used as a rendezvous for Sorge's agents.
L931: Active in aiding Labor representatives in trouble with the Shanghai
police. In this period the Shanghai Evening Post and .Mercury branded her a
"bolshevik" and other publications openly charged that she was in league with
the I'. S. S. R. Local comments, based on intimate observations on the spot, are
Significant. The police records were simply Confirmatory. She left the Frank-
furter Zeitung, allegedly at the request of the British and other foreign interests
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1221
in China. She was introduced by <>/.aki to Kawai Teikichi and Smedley per-
suaded him to become a member of the Shanghai spj ring. She joined the
Noulens Defense Committee which was organized in behalf of Paul and Gerl rude
Ruegg (alias Noulens) who were jailed by Chinese authorities Cor espionage
activities, and tried and convicted as bona fide Comintern agents. Associated
with Smedley on the committee was Harold Isaacs, as well as many other
prominent leftists.
( Jonversely, the leading agitators in the movement were under orders of Moscow.
The frantic efforts in behalf of the Noulens were, of course, inspired by and with
the intervention of International Hod Aid, the Soviet agency for the assistance
el" secret operators in trouble. What looked like a humanitarian gesture by
the foreign colony in Shanghai was a brazen rescue scheme ordered by the
Comintern. In this period she also published an article on the Communist up-
rising in Kiangsi in International Literature, organ of the Comintern's Inter-
nation Union of Revolutionary Writers.
Even had Smedley not been professionally trained or skilled as an agent or
associate of agents, her experiences in Shanghai with the police would have made
her especially cautious in covering her tracks. Following is a digest of some of
her experiences in this connection :
"* * * I had been arrested by the Chinese police of Canton, acting upon
a secret official document sen! them by the British police of Shanghai; the docu-
ment had charged that I was a Russian Bolshevik, traveling on a false American
passport. When the German consul general intervened, the chief of police
showed him the document from Shanghai. The American consul general also
saw it, but equivocated when I asked about it * * * For weeks I lived under
house arrest, with armed gendarmes wandering in and out of my apartment at
will. If I went out. they followed * * This Canton Incident was really
the setting of Woodhead's attack on me. * * *"
]'.K','2: Smedley and Isaacs with a group of leftist sympathizers were members
of the first League of Civil Rights in Shanghai. This organization seems to have
been a failure. Smedley also became n member of the Society of Friends of the
F. S. S. R., Shanghai Branch, whose roster included such Comintern agents as
Irene Wiedemeyer. Smedley also became very friendly with a British Commu-
nist, C. Frank Class, a suspected Comintern agent. With the aid of Ozaki, Smed-
ley set up a spy ring' in Peiping and Tientsin and put Kawai Teikichi in charge.
This northern espionage organisation operated until June 1.933. She also en-
rolled Funakoshi Ilisao and met Xo/.awa Fusaji in the Shanghai ring.
1933: In failing health, she went to the Soviet Union, where she was at the
Workers' Rest Center at Kislovodsk, in the Caucasus, a concession not usually
granted to foreigners. She mentions close associations with Soviet and American
Communists. It was here that she wrote her hook China's Red Army Marches.
It seems unlikely that she could have ever gotten the manuscript out of the coun-
try if it had not had official Soviet approval. Her previous hooks had been
translated into Russian anil were widely circulated. Smedley remained in the
F. S. S. R. for 11 months. She again met Chattopadhyaya in Leningrad, where he
was connected with the Communist Academy of Sciences. At this time. Smedley
Served on the staff of the Intel-national Union of Revolutionary Writers, which
had been founded some years earlier in Moscow. Whittaker Chambers bad been
on the organization's staff in 1933.
l!t.",4 : Traveled through Central Europe and France and then returned to
New York, where she unsuccessfully sought a correspondent's berth with an
American publication. After visiting her family in the United States, she sailed
for china. Her ship, the President Cleveland, stopped for a day (October 19) at
Yokohama. She called on Ozaki at the Tokyo Asahi newspaper offices. He
took her to see the Imperial Museum and dined with her. This was the period
of Sorge's active operations in Tokyo.
F>.">r>: Smedley was back in Shanghai. Her name appeared on a list of 12
persons under Shanghai police surveillance. Amongst other incriminatory
documents, the list was found in the possession of Joseph Walden (alias Max-
im Rivosh), who was later sentenced to 15 years in prison for subversive
activities.
1936: In the fall, Smedley went to Sian, and was there when Chiang Kai-shek
was kidnaped. Apparently it was here that she made arrangements for her
later trip through Chinese Communist territory.
1937: In August, she went to the Chinese Communist capital, Yenan, where
she rapidly gained the confidence of top Red army leaders. Thereafter, Smed-
ley gives every personal, intellectual, and literary evidence of supporting their
1222 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
cause without reservation. She then went through Sanyuan to Sian, where
she was treated for a back injury. In October she was in Taiyuan, where she
met Chou En-lai. By late October Smedley was with the mobile headquarters
of the Communist Eighth Route Army. It was there that she became friendly
with Communist army leaders, Chu Teh and Peng Teh-hwei. She spent early
November with units of Lin Pao's First Front Army of the "workers' and peas-
ants' Red army from Kiangsi," a unit of the Eighth Route Army. Later in the
month Smedley returned to Chinese Communist headquarters. At the end of
November she was in Pingyanfu with fighting units. After another stay at
Communist headquarters, she started back to Hankow just after the end of the
year.
1938 : During the early part of the year Smedley was in Tungkwan. Then at
the request of Mao Tze-tung, head of the Chinese Communist Party, she went
to Hankow to continue her work for the Communist cause. Here she did pub-
licity for the Chinese Red Cross, lectured and wrote urging support for the
Communist armies. She left the city before it fell to the Japanese (October 25)
and started toward Chungking.
1939: Smedley visited units of the Communist New Fourth Army and made
her way through Central China with various Communist guerrilla groups. She
also visited certain Central Government units and finally rejoined the Communist
irregulars in Hupeh Province toward the end of the year.
1940 : In June she made her way to Chungking, where she lectured and worked
for increased medical aid for the Communists.
1941 : Flew to Hongkong, where she was treated for chronic illness and con-
tinued active in collaboration with leftist and Communist elements. She returned
to the United States in midsummer.
1943: Smedley spent considerable time at Taddo, Saratoga Springs, N. Y., a
retreat for artists and writers. She left to lecture at Skidmore College.
1944 : Smedley was working on a play about China and had in mind a revolu-
tionary novel on the same subject.
1945_47 : Lectured and wrote for periodicals, many of which were leftist. Dur-
ing this period she became active in the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern
Policy, a Communist-front organization. Smedley became a member of the
National Council of the League of American Writers, an affiliate of tbe Interna-
tional Union of Revolutionary Writers. The league has been branded a Com-
munist-front organization by the congressional Committee on Un-American;
Activities and by the Attorney General's office.
1948: Moved to Palisades, N. Y. She published articles on China in the leftist
New York Star. Smedley was one of the supporters of the National Writers-for~
Wallace Committee formed under the auspices of the National Council of Arts,.
Sciences and Professions. Smedley also published an article in The Protestant,,
which is listed by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a Com-
munist-dominated publication.
1949: Embroiled in a controversy with the Chief, Military Intelligence, Far
East Command, Tokyo, over release (by Washington) of a report, dated Decem-
ber 15, 1947, "The Sorge Espionage Case," she threatened to sue tor libel, aim-
ing at General MacArthur instead of General Willoughby, who was the respon-
sible head of the department that compiled and prepared the report. Having
gained the maximum amount of publicity from tying her name with that of
the famous wartime commander, Smedley lapsed into discreet silence and made
no motion to pursue her suit which would have brought to light the voluminous
records of this case.
The Communist press, the world over, took up the case of Agnes Smedley. Her
protest against the Army release appeared in the China Digest, March 194'.». a
mouthpiece for Chinese communism, published in Hongkong. At a distance of
10,000 miles, another Communist-front magazine, the Far East Spotlight, pub-
lished in New York City, took up her cause on practically the same date. This
perfect timing over vast geographical distances is an impressive example of
split-second coordination of international communism. The propaganda efforts
of the vacillating western democracies can hardly match this deadly precision.
Inferentially, the solidarity of the Communist front in defense of Smedley speaks
for itself.
Smedley's Red and pink associations
Not even a casual reader of Smedley's writings could fail to notice that she
carefully omits reference to all of her Communist, fellow-traveling, and/or leftist
associates whose work might be damaged by such publicity. Smedley did not
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1223
fully realize, however, despite her overt and covert attempts to protect her
friends and associates, thai the "Red net" in China was closely observed and
the actions of many of its agents recorded by a number of intelligence, police,
aud other agencies, particularly the special branch of the Shanghai municipal
police; thai such tracks as Bhe did uol cover furnished interesting lends into
the maze of Communisl operations in China which lii neatly into an unmistak-
able pattern. The following list of Smedley's associates can hardly be explained
away on the basis of purely journalistic contacts. For convenience, names are
grouped chronologically according to the approximate period during which
Smedley was associated, in varying degrees.
1920 28, Virendranath Chattopadhyaya : Indian revolutionary and one of the
founders of the League Against Imperialism, a Communist organization. Smed-
ley herself Leaves no doubt about the personal quality of their relationship.
1929-31, Max Klausen: Active member of the Sorge spy organizations both in
Japan and China.
19.'!0, Richard Sorge: Communist master spy who headed an intricate espio-
nage oganization in China and later operated an immensely successful spy ring
in Japan. Smedley worked as an active member of his organization in China.
Ozaki Hozumi: Sorge's principal assistant and source of much information
both in China and Japan. In Shanghai, Ozaki often reported to Smedley rather
than Sorge.
1030-36, Lu Hsun: Leftist writer, called "Gorky of China."
1930, Mao Tun : Leftist writer, pupil of Lu Hsun. Jou Shih, pupil of Lu
Hsun. executed as a Communist.
L931, Willi Muenzenberg : German Communist leader who organized the
Noulens Defense Committee.
Harold Isaacs : Publisher of the China Forum in Shanghai. He was associated
with Smedley on the Noulens Defense Committee and the Society of Friends
of the U. S. S. R.
C. Frank Glass: British Communist.
Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer) : Prominent Comintern agent who was the
proprietor of the Zeitgeist Bookshop, which sold Communist literature. She
was also a member of the Noulens Defense Committee.
Paul and Gertrude Ruegg (alias Noulens) : Two Comintern agents who were
apprehended, tried, and imprisoned by the Chinese authorities. Noulens was
an official in the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat, then headed by Earl
Browder, the American Communist.
Oswald Doenitz : A Comintern agent who was in Shanghai briefly after the
arrest of the Rueggs.
Victor Franz Nauman : Who was associated with Comintern agent, Oswald
Doenitz.
Mizuno Shige : Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai.
Yamagami Masayoshi : Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai.
Kawai Teikichi : Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai, who was a fre-
quent visitor to Smedley's home.
Funakoshi Hisao: Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai briefly after
the arrest of the Rueggs.
1032, Edmond Egon Kisch : Agent of the Third International and organizer
of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R.
Henri Barhusse: A member of the Comintern and publisher of the Communist
journals L'Humanite and Le Monde.
Rolf Audouard : An associate of Edmond Egon Kisch.
K. A. Seebohm : Member of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., known
to have been in close touch with Edmond Egon Kisch.
Victor Mussik : Czechoslovakia!] journalist, a close associate of Edmond Egon
Kisch.
Harry Berger : alias Arthur Ewert. Arthur Ernst Ewert, Braun (Brown).
George Keller, Ulrich Dach and Arthur Korner, an important agent for the Third
International in the Far East.
1933-34. Rudolf Herman Richard Konig: Associate of Paul Eugene Walsh
(Eugene Dennis). He acted as liaison agent for the Comintern Shanghai.
Fred Ellis: Staff artist for the Soviet newspaper Trud (Toil). He was also
on the staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers with Smedley.
Harry Pavton Howard, alias Ivan Kuzlof, alias Frank Godwin: Communist
reported to be an agent of the Third International.
Langston Hughes : American Communist and staff member of the International
League of Revolutionary Writers.
1224 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Kawamnra Yoshio : member of the spy group organized by Smedley and Ozaki
Hozumi in Peiping.
Nozawa Fusaji : In contact with members of Richard Sorge's Shanghai spy
group ; was recruited by Funakoshi Hisao.
F. H. Schiff : Member of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., and a close
associate of Edmond Egon Kisch.
1933-38, Ting Ling : Communist writer.
1933, Chou Chien-ping : Commander of the Tenth Red Army Corps who lived
for a time in Smedley's home in Shanghai.
1934-35, Leon Minster : Operator a radio-equipment business in Shanghai,
cited in police records as a blind for a long-distance transmitting installation.
His wife, Bessie, is the sister of "Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Politburo member.
1937-38, Chu Teh : Commander in chief of the Chinese Communist forces.
Mao Tze-tung: Secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party.
Peng Teh-hwei : Commander of the Front Red armies.
Chou En-lai : Vice chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and chief
representative of the Chinese Communist Party in the United Front negotiations
with the Chinese Government.
Jen Peh-si : Political commissar of the Eighth Communist Route Army.
Ting Hsiao-ping : Assistant to Jen Peh-si.
Kwang Keh-chin : Wife of Chu Teh and political worker with the Eighth Route
Army.
Lin Piao : Commander of the First Division, Eighth Communist Route Army.
Nieh Jung-chen : Political director of Lin Piao's division.
Ho Lung : Commander of the Second Red Army Corps.
Liu Peh-cheng : Commander of the One Hundred Twenty-ninth Division of the
Eighth Route Army.
Hsiao Keh : Political director of Second Red Army Corps.
Tso Chuan : Commander of the First Red Army Corps.
Chen Ken : Commander in Eighth Communist Route Army.
Chou Ping : Leader of the Communist guerrilla unit.
Mr. Walter. General Willougliby, when was the authentication
of the Sorge story completed \
General Willoughby. Mr. Walter, do you refer to the authentica-
tion by a battery of competent American lawyers and other technical
assistants?
Mr. Walter. Yes.
General Willougiiby. It was done after the period in which
Smedley's suit for libel would at least, if unchallenged, throw doubt
in the public mind on the quality of this testimony. It was done —
Mr. Tavenner, can you help ?
Mr. Tavenner. Offhand I am not able to state the date.
General Willougiiby. I think I can find the date. The date is
available.
Mr. Tavenner. I think it appeared in connection with your testi-
mony when vou read the statement by the lawyers.
General Willougiiby. May 18, 1949. Consecutive exhibit No. 14
is the opinion of the Legal Section, Far East Command, opinion of
the judge advocate general. Far East Command, and related matter,
and I think the three gentlemen of the bar, my benevolent collaborators
at the time in this same time period.
Mr. Walter. When did the Ickes article appear that you just read \
General Willougiiby. I can find that for you, sir, though I did
not find it necessary, as a literary gem, to keep it in my library.
Mr. Walter. I was wondering if it was before or after the authen-
tication.
General Willougiiby. I have a photo offset of it. I must have been
considerably annoyed, because I certainly would not keep it now.
March 16, i949. That is one, the one entitled "Army Tricks Cover
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1225
General's Mistakes." Then there are others, "Old Curmudgeon
Thinks MacArthur Should Be Sued,-' and "Some Brass in Rather
Than on Army Heads."
Mr. Tayennhr. You mentioned all this criticism in your report
to the staff I
General Willoughby. Yes, indeed.
Mr. AValter. It sounds like some of it might have been said by
some « > i* your junior officers?
Genera] WiujOughby, Quite possibly; quite possibly.
Mr. Tavennee. Genera] Willoughly, t ho references to the Shanghai
police cards referred to before are based on the Shanghai police records
which are in the possession of the committee, and have been produced
for identification as Willoughby exhibits 35 and 36. Will you assist
us in the appraisal of these files and their relationship to the Sorge
ease, if yon feel you have not already adequately covered the point?
General Willofoiiby. Being very anxious to assist this meritorious
committee at all times, I might give you my notes under exhibit 34,
which give you a glimpse of the genesis of the Shanghai files, as
follows :
AMERICANS CNDER SURVKII.ANCE IN SHANGHAI
Communist subversive activities in China drew the attention of Shanghai
municipal police (British and French division) in 1916. Police raids over a
Ui-year period resulted in confiscation of tons of subversive literature and in
I he arrest el' many Communist agents. Until 1926 these agents were principally
Russian and Chinese with a smattering of German, Spanish, and French nation-
als involved.
In 1927 Americans entered the subversive picture. Earl Browder, Gerhardt
Fisler, James H. Dolsen, W. A. Haskell, M. Undjus, and a German woman, Irene
Wiedemeyer, along with many others, arrived in Shanghai in the late 1920's to
join the Soviet's Far Eastern Bureau (FEB) or the Pan-Pacific Trade Union
Secretariat (PPTUS). The German woman, Irene Wiedemeyer, was closely
associated with Smedley. Sorge, and Ozaki in the Zietgeist Bookstore operation,
a mail drop and rendezvous of Sorge spy ring members, agents and leftist fellow
travelers.
*******
\Ut^ again, the pattern of Soviet Third International action is apparent.
Working through trade unions, bureaus and other professional or labor-con-
nected fronts, the Soviet wedge again drove smoothly into the economic and
local government systems of the Chinese Nation. The objective, of course, was
the ultimate destruction of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Far-sighted,
insidious and viciously efficient, its success was evident in the Chinese debacle
of 1949. Another nation and 500. million people entered the Soviet orbit.
This is the information contained in collateral reports known as
the Shanghai municipal police file. For your information, Shanghai
was an extraterritorial enclave which maintained its own police and.
had French and British police in the French and British municipali-
ties. These were high official police officers, and I had made it a point
of having interviewed the past high-ranking officials of that police
where they were available, with the assistance of their governments,
as, for example, the former chief of the British political section who
is in Hongkong.
Mr. Tavexxer. Will you give the committee the benefit of your
compilation so far as we are prepared to make it public at this time?
General Willoughby. I am prepared to read selective points —
though the full text is available to the committee — or salient points
to show the international character of this apparatus or mechanism
90929— 51 7
1226 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
or machinery that was working toward the downfall of the Chinese-
Nationalist Government, as a sample or pattern of how they operate-
elsewhere.
Mr. Doyle. And when you say "elsewhere" do you include the
United States?
General Willotjghby. I include the United States, because we have
already developed the presence of operatives then in Shanghai still
in our midst — Earl Browder, Eugene Dennis, Gerhart Eisler, Jim
Dolsen — in this interplay between the counsel and myself, where I
furnished the oriental information and the committee had in its pos-
session, to my pleasant surprise, some very specific collateral data.
Mr. Wood. Proceed.
General Willoughby (reading) :
Miscellaneous records of the British and French Shanghai municipal police
in the early thirties, open up an astonishing vista on a fantastic array of Com-
munist fronts, ancillary agencies, and the vast interlocking operations of the
Third International in China. It is in this particular period that the ground-
work was laid for the Communist successes of today.
*******
The role of Shanghai, a veritable witch's caldron of international intrigue,
a focal point of Communist effort, is already apparent in the records of the
Sorge trial and collateral testimony. The Zeitgeist Bookshop, rendezvous of
Sorge and Ozaki, and its astute owner, Miss Wiedemeyer, appear again, viewed
from a different angle, recorded this time by a reputable international police
body.
*******
There is more to the Shanghai municipal police files than an inferential accusa-
tion against Smedley. We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the
history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here
were sown the dragon's teeth that ripened into the Red harvest of today, and
the farm labor was done by men and women of many nationalities who had no
personal stakes in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien
cause, the Communist "jehad" of pan-Slavism for the subjugation of the Western
World.
The greater design of the Soviet conquest of the east is already clear in the
confession of Sorge, Soviet master spy. It is again recognizable in the intricate
pattern of the Third International apparatus. Shanghai was the focal point
of sabotage and subversion, and to this mecca flocked the Communist operators
of the world for training, for experimentation, for career investments.
In 1927 a conference was held in Hankow under the auspices of the Third Inter-
national and attended by Tom Mann (Great Britain), Earl Browder (United
Slates of America) ; Jacques Doriot (France), Roy (India), and a number of
others. It was decided that Communist work in this part of the world would
be conducted by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, of which Earl
Browder was made secretary (or chief). He soon afterward became active in
this work in which he was assisted by Katherine Harrison alias Alice Reed, con-
sidered by the police as a convenient "menage-a-deux." Earl Browder and his
female assistant continued their work in the following year (1928) and spent
most of (heir time in Shanghai. They were joined in August that year by one
W. A. Haskell who also was assisted by a woman named Emerson, presumably
his wife.
Time in its issue of April 25, 1949, features Eugene Dennis, the boss of the
American Communists, now on trial.
The language, of course, is a year old. The trial is past.
There is no point in repeating this terse, well-written story of the growth and
world itinerary of a Soviet agent: important, however, are certain connecting
links with the Sorge espionage case.
Dennis who used to Francis X. Waldron, obtained a fraudulent passport as
Paul Walsh and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The world-wide
ramifications of the Third Comintern, with Shanghai as the far-eastern operat-
ing center, is reflected in the itinerary of this American disciple. Paul Eugene-
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1227
Walsh, alias Paul or Milton, suddenly appears in the records of the Shanghai
police ; his police card states :
••• * * From December 1, l93o, untilJune 1934, he resided at Flat 6, Grosh-
am Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue Joffre. ( >n .May SO, 1934, the lease of Flat 34D,
Foncim Apartments No. 643 Route Frelupt, was transferred to his name from
Harry Berger, with whom he was obviously on terms of good friendship. Walsh
resided at the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9. 1934, when he
secretly left Shanghai for Trieste on the steamship Contc Verde."
This is the important abbreviated statement by the police :
It has been established that Walsh was one of the master minds of the local
machine of the Comintern and as such was responsible for the collation of many
Important documents relating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far
East * * *.
I pause here to establish the link in this police investigation. Sorge
mentioned the Comintern group in Shanghai. This we pick up as
the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat since Noulens was arrested.
Obviously this man Walsh, or Eugene Dennis, and his subsequent con-
nection with Browder, establishes the strongest inference that he was
associated with him then.
Further relationship between what we have established in the Sorge
records is covered in paragraph 24. Incidentally, I took the title "The
Shadowy Men With Changeable Names," from the report of April
24, 1949, on Walsh, which is a very good report, indeed (reading) :
In 1930 a large host of agents of the Third International came to Shanghai
and became associated with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, and another
Important organ of the Third International, called the Far Eastern Bureau.
The new arrivals included Hilaire Noulens —
I invite your attention to that name, as it will appear later, N-o-u-
1-e-n-s [continuing reading] :
(or Paul Ruegg), and Mrs. Noulens, of unknown nationality, A. E. Stewart,
Margaret Undjus, and Judea Codkind, Americans, and Irene Wiedemeyer —
Wiedemeyer spells her name sometimes W-i-e-t —
who was German.
Smedley was an associate of Irene's. Weitmeyer (Wiedemeyer) operated the
Zeitgeist Bookshop in Shanghai, rendezvous of leftists and mail drop for espion-
age agents. Ozaki, Sorge's right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weit-
meyer's place.
I have already read Sorge's testimony and will not repeat it. [Con-
tinuing reading :]
The police card on Smedley states :
" * * * Agnes Smedley alias Bird and Mrs. Petroikos * * * Member of
the following societies : Friends of the U. S. S. R. ; Hindustan Association in
Berlin ; Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society ; Noulens Defense Committee ; All
China Labor Federation and 'the China League for Civil Rights * * * In
possession of two passports, German and American. Arrived in Shanghai in
May 1929 from Berlin as the correspondent of the German newspaper Frank-
furter Zeitung. She is in the service of the eastern branch of the central com-
mittee of the Communist International and is definitely known to have assisted
local Indian seditionists on several occasions * * * her chief duties comprise
the supervising of Communist organizations among workers, and that she receives
orders direct from the central committee of the Communist International in
Moscow. * * *"
The Shanghai police observed and recorded these furtive men and women, often
without direct accusations. Such things are a matter of cumulative surveillance,
but dossiers are never opened without some reason. Somehow, these names are
tainted.
1228 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
The case of Hilaire Noulens (known as) Paul Ruegg is both interesting and
typical : The clandestine fraternity, working under the aegis of the Comintern,
or the Soviet Army, could always count on a variety of front organizations to
rally to their defense, if they got into trouble. The principal agency for this
defense was The International Red Aid (hereafter referred to as MOPR, the
initials of its Russian name), created in 1922, known as International Labor De-
fense in America. Inferentially, whenever the defense swung into action it was
a foregone conclusion' that the chief protagonists were under orders of the
Comintern. To the gullible outsider, the defense action might look like a legiti-
mate civil liberty agitation even with some sentimental appeal ; however, to
the cognoscenti it was just another Red front mobilizing pink lawyers, agents,
and fellow travelers.
Noulens arrived in Shanghai in 1930 under cover of a stolen Belgian passport
as Fred Vandercruysen to head the far eastern bureau. Fifteen months later,
he was arrested for Communist activities linked with a French Communist,
Joseph Ducroux also known as Serge LeFranc, then operating in Singapore.
During the trial (and conviction) the authorities learned of his importance in
the Comintern apparatus. This group operated on a very considerable scale ;
they maintained 7 bank accounts, rented 15 houses or apartments, a veritable
political rabbit warren ; Ruegg-Noulens used at least 12 names in Shanghai and
carried 1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports, while his wife used 5 names and 2
Belgian passports.
Here again, the Time article furnishes an interesting clue to identities. In a
subparagraph headed "The Little Kremlin" it says —
I thought it was so good that I included it.
"* * * All but the most secret Communist operations in the United States
were and still are, directed from the ramshackle, nine-story loft building, on
35 East Twelfth Street, not far from Manhattan's Union Square. To its top-floor
offices came the Communists' international 'reps.' the shadowy men with the
changeable names like P. Green, G. Williams, A. Ewert, H. Berger * * *
which in a wink of the eye might become Drabkin, B. Mikhailov, Braun, or
Gerhart Eisler. These were Moscow's agents. From the ninth floor the word
which they brought from Moscow was passed along to the faithful, to the party
hacks on the Daily Worker and Yiddish-language Freiheit, to the cultivators of
organized labor's vineyards, to men like Christoffel in Milwaukee. * * *"
The interesting thing about Time's shadowy men with the changeable names
like A. Ewert, H. Berger, A. Steinburg, and Gerhart Eisler, is that these same
names and identities appear both in the Sorge records and the Shanghai police
files. Their crooked paths meander on into the forties and into the United
States —
As we shall shortly develop. [Continuing reading :]
Most of the old wheel horses of the Communist Party appear to have been
operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clande-
stine fraternity as well as the acolytes and dupes, who are flirting with the Red
menace. And somewhere in the bistros of the French concession, in the furtive
rendezvous of the Shanghai conspirators, you can hear the metallic tinkle of
30 pieces of silver.
I would like to pause here, Mr. Chairman, to make one point clear of
mutual interest. The reference to the Shanghai name cards, as far
as Tokyo was concerned, did not represent an arraignment, not even
an indictment. There are in the list of these names — and of course we
are not disclosing all of them — there are undoubtedly a number (if
people who were present by accidental association rather than by de-
sign, and, as stated in my introductory remarks at the beginning of
this hearing, a constant effort has been made to protect innocent peo-
ple and gullible people, and to distinguish between the joiners who
might not have realized the character of the organization to which they
belonged.
The quotations are not evaluations by G-2. They are the state-
ments by this reputable investigative body.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1229
Mr. Wood. I gather from your statement that you make a distinc-
tion between a fool and a knave ?
General Willougiiby. Yes, indeed. It is not a very flattering dis-
tinction, but a protective one. [Continuing reading :]
The Comintern apparatus and Shanghai affiliates —
"Apparatus" is their own word. They seem to take pride in that
pseudoscientific term. [Continuing reading:]
Other individuals, in variable degrees of implication with or commitment to
the Communist movement, are covered elsewhere. All of them are understand-
able only in terms of their subservience to a foreign master; this relationship
requires a background examination of the formidable world-wide machinery
of tiir Comintern apparatus. Machiavellian tool of the imperialist expansion of
the Soviets, who have made progress beyond the wildest dream of Czarist am-
bition. In fact, it may be factually stated that the Soviets have taken up where
the Czars left off and made further and more significant strides.
Comintern headquarters: The Moscow headquarters of the Third (Com-
munist! International I Comintern I during the 1930's paralleled the organiza-
tional structure of the Soviet Government. Led by a world congress of Soviet
and foreign Communists, who met at intervals between 1919 and 1935, actual
control of the Comintern fell to the U. S. S. R. through its leadership of the
world Communis! movement and a Comintern organizational ruling which gave
the largest representation to the nation playing host to the Congress — in every
case the Soviet Union. The executive functions of the Comintern were vested
in the executive committee of the Communist international (ECCI), which
advertised several foreign members but was actually controlled by its pre-
dominant Soviet representation. Like the world congress, the ECCI met pe-
riodically, primarily to determine general lines of policy, but final control of
the Comintern rested in the praesidium, which was made up, among others,
of a politburo, several standing Commissions, and a political secretariat —
Iii the interest of time I will become selective. The material is here.
[Continuing reading :]
"The Comintern was the nondiplomatic foreign arm of the U. S. S. R. Organ-
ized at Moscow in 1919, the Comintern was, until its alleged dissolution in
1943, a quasi-governmental body aimed largely at fostering Communist and
Communist-front groups in the capitalist world in order to carry out such
Communist strategy as the Government of the U. S. S. R. considered essential
to the promotion of world revolution or, as conditions required, the protection
of the Soviet Union.
There are also a number of auxiliary organizations I invite your
attention to :
Only a few of the Moscow auxiliary organizations are of immediate concern
here, although all of them, numbering about 13, had variable interests in
Shanghai, operating through an extraordinary variety of channels :
Profintern: The Red International of Labor (Profintern) was created in 1919
in order to counteract the influence of the International Federation of Labor
Unions of the Second (Socialist) International. The Profintern consisted of a
headquarters apparatus controlled by the praesidium and of affiliated sections
which in most countries outside the U. S. S. R. took the form of Red trade-union
oppositions. In the field, the Profintern organized international propaganda com-
mittees for work among specific trades. In addition, the Profintern sponsored
the creation of parallel labor union federations of which the Pan Pacific Trade
Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and the All China Labor Federation were important
examples.
Krestintern: The Red peasants International (Krestintern) was founded in
1923 to break the resistance to communism of the peasantry in various coun-
tries. Although it enjoyed far less success than organizations devoted to the
laborer and the intelligentsia, it directed local Communist groups which organ-
ized so-called peasants' unions including the Chinese Peasant League.
VOKS : The Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS)
was established in Moscow in 1923 to promote Soviet culture abroad as an
instrument of political propaganda. The cultural attache of each Soviet
1230 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Embassy abroad was in direct charge of VOKS and, as such, was charged with
liaison with the ECCI in Moscow and with the formation of the so-called
friendly societies. The activities of VOKS can be gaged from the sections of
its headquarters :
Foreign relations ; reception of foreigners ; international book exchange ;
press ; exhibitions, etc. —
I may say that personal observation of the embassy set-up in Tokyo
recently revealed this trend. [Continuing reading:]
MOPR: International Red Aid (MOPR), created in 1922, has been character-
ized as the Red Cross of the Communist International, designed primarily to
assist political prisoners, secret agents caught red-handed and other "victims
of bourgeois reaction." International Red Aid, which functioned legally and
illegally in 67 countries, was complemented by Workers International Relief,
both directed for many years by the German Communist Willi Muenzenberg.
Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front
groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading
role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities.
I pause here to establish the link. Gerhart Eisler was defended by
an offshoot of International Red Aid. Noulens was defended by an
offshoot of International Red Aid. And I previously called the
committee's attention to a brilliant article in the Saturday Evening
Post as of February 17, 1951, entitled "The Communist's Dearest
Friend," by Craig Thompson. The lead picture shows Carol King
escorting Gerhart Eisler, who later fled to Europe and became a
high-ranking officer in Red Germany. This article traces Interna-
tional Red Aid into American Labor Defense, into Civil Rights Con-
gress and other organizations in which Carol Weiss King has taken an
active part.
Mr. Wood. I might interpose that she actually led him up the
gangplank when he left the United States on the Batory.
General Willoughby (continuing reading) :
The International Union of Revolutionary Writers was organized in 1925,
probably under VOKS auspices, to enlist sympathetic literati abroad for the
promotion of pro-Soviet and anti-Fascist and antiwar themes. In Moscow
the IURW was responsible for the publication of the English-language Moscow
Daily News and International Literature, a periodical devoted to the promulga-
tion of Communist ideology abroad. At one time an American, Walt Carmon,
was an assistant editor of International Literature.
Mr. Tavenner. I would like the record to show that Walt Carmon
was subpenaed before the committee in recent weeks and refused to
testify relating to alleged Communist activities.
General Willoughby. I take it with the usual phraseology, on
advice of competent lawyer refused to testify on ground of fear
of self-incrimination?
Mr. Tavenner. That is right.
General Willoughby (continuing reading) :
Langston Hughes, the American Communist poet, and Agnes Smedley were
contributors. Anna Louise Strong for years was editor of the Moscow Daily
News, while another American, Fred Ellis, was employed as a cartoonist on
the staff of Trud, the official organ of the All Union Council of Soviet Trade
Unions. The printing of these foreign-language periodicals was done by the
State Publishing House in cooperation with the International Book Publishing
Association, both Soviet Government enterprises.
I pause here to invite the attention of the committee to an offshoot
of this International Union of Revolutionary Writers in the Ameri-
can scenery, the League of American Writers; and it was in this
connection that Mr. Lovett inquired from Mr. Ickes if he knew any-
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1231
tiling about this outfit, and lie described it as completely Communist-
dominated, as you recall, knowing, probably, that Smedley was on
the staff. I believe she was chairman. So was Whittaker Chambers
on the staff in that period.
In order to further bring you the picture of what these associations
really mean
Mr. Walter. General, before you go into that, I would like to ask
Mr. Tavenner, this Walt Cannon didn't testify before this com-
mittee, did he ?
Mr. Tavenner. He appeared before this committee, but declined
to answer questions other than those of the most casual character.
Mr. Walter. Is that the same Carmon ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir ; and the same one to whom Mr. Clubb took
a letter of introduction allegedly from Agues Smedley in July 1942.
Mr. Wood. It wasn't alleged, was it ?
Mr. Tavenner. Alleged as to the character of the letter. There is
no doubt that he took an envelope with a letter in it.
Mr. Doyle. That was where the question was, of whether it was
sealed or unsealed ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir.
General Willoughby. I would cite the Second Report, Un-
American Activities in California, 1945, Report of the Joint Fact-
Finding Committee to the Fifty-sixth California Legislature, pages
119-120.
I have had occasion to refer to the California State Un-American
Activities Committee, a brilliant example of what a State legisla-
ture can accomplish under the able direction of Senator Jack Tenney.
Their reports are a must in the research library of investigative bodies.
In the report just cited, Langston Hughes is reported. Indicative
of the character and membership of the International Union of Revo-
lutionary Writers and its American offshoot, the League of American
Writers, note the poem by Langston Hughes published in Literary
Service, the monthly organ of IURW I won't bore you with the
entire poem. Its title is "Good-by Christ" and it begins :
Listen, Christ,
You did alright in your day, I reckon —
But that day's gone now.
They ghosted you up a swell story too,
Called it Bible—
But it's dead now.
The popes and the preachers've
Made too much money from it.
It is hardly worth while to take the time of the committee to read the
rest of it.
Mr. Doyle. On page 5 of your statement, under paragraph (4) — I
think you read that paragraph ?
General Willoughby. MOPR or IURW?
Mr. Doyle. MOPR. In the last sentence you say :
Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front
groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading
role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities.
General Willoughby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Doyle. Because you were in the Far East so many years, I
would like to ask you, what kind of subversive activities would cause
1232 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
the arrest, say in China, of Communists ? What would they do which
would cause their arrest? What would be the evidence of their
activities ?
General Willoughby. That is an interesting question. To answer
it, I would have to practically read an endless array of the material
in the hands of your counsel. I will give you a brief of what they do :
Public disturbances; public disorders; strikes; tie-ups of maritime
and coastal traffic; aspersion of opposing or competing political
organizations; disorder; subversions, political, fraternal, collective;
the distribution of literature abhorrent to the existing government.
It is this cumulative picture which emerges from any study of their
operations abroad. This, roughly, is the definition.
Mr. Doyle. Then they would be arrested in China, in those days,
the same as they might be in this country ?
General Willoughby. Indeed.
Mr. Doyle. And for the same causes ?
General Willoughby. For the same causes. As an example, the
police files of Shanghai are those of a highly organized political entity
maintaining conservative business houses and an extraterritorial en-
clave. But their purpose was the same as any other, and it is this
police upon whom I relied for the identification of subversives much
more than the Chinese themselves.
We are not talking about the Chinese police, only incidentally. We
are talking about a reputable police of prewar vintage composed of a
French section and a British section, known as the international
municipal police body. So their reactions, to me, viewed at this dis-
tance, are those of a law-enforcing agency maintained for the protec-
tion of the county or city in which they operate.
Mr. Walter. Isn't it important to take into consideration also that
the Nationalist Government was very sensitive to the things that were
happening, and there were probably more arrests than was the case
before the Nationalist Government was aware of what was going on?
General Willoughby. Your point is well taken. I do not attempt
to disassociate the government at Shanghai and the Nationalist Gov-
ernment. They both worked against Soviet communism, not just
communism.
In paragraph 26 I touch upon the types of Chinese organizations
and Communist fronts. The indication is that the same thing hap-
pened in Czechoslovakia and Poland and Bulgaria. I describe them
thusly :
On a national and sectional level the organs of the Comintern often began to-
lose their distinctive coloring, becoming Communist-front groups in a host of
forms. However, each auxiliary organization of the Comintern was represented
abroad, often by apparently unconnected groups, which ranged from outright
Communist to pseudo-liberal movements, which were organized or infiltrated
by Comintern agents. In many cases, these national organizations could be
traced to more than one Moscow group as activities impinged on the different
fields of the Soviet Praesidium. Often they were temporary organizations or
local movements designed to gain popular or mass support for an immediate
aim; just as often, howver, they were serious long-term projects. As these
groups touched the Shanghai scene during the period of Smedley's residence
there, they form an interesting and often highly interconnected web which
requires relatively detailed treatment.
The first one, given this priority because of its intrinsic importance
is the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat and its parent organization,
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1233
the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau. [Continuing
reading:]
The Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and its parent organiza-
tion, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern I'.ureau, were the most Important
and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activities in the Far East
during the late 1920's and early 1930'S. The PPTUS, set up in i927 at a con-
ference in Hankow, was attendind by several prominent Comintern leaders,
including Lozovsky, a Comintern agent who rose from secretary of the Proiintern
in 1928 to a transient position as leader of the Soviet labor movement. Another
member of the Hankow conference who later became first head of the PPTUS
was the American Communist Earl Browder, who was assisited in his work in
Shanghai by an American woman, Katherine Harrison. Other Americans, in-
cluding a journalist, James H. Dolsen, one Albert Edward Stewart, and Margaret
Undjus, were prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS as was the German woman
Wiedemeyer.
Wiedemeyer is the same person whose house was a mail drop and
rendezvous for the Sorge ring. [Continuing reading:]
Richard Sorge himself was suspected by the Shanghai police of having come
on a mission for the PPTUS when he arrived in Shanghai in 1930.
Mr. Walter. General, may I interrupt you at this point?
General Willoughby. Yes.
Mr. Walter. Did you ever make an investigation, or was any made
that you know of, of the files of the Shanghai police force for the
purpose of determining whether or not they contained the names of
members of the PPTUS?
General Willoughby. We took what we found, belatedly. The
files were not complete but, roughly, GO to 80 percent in some cate-
gories. This is not an apology for not having it, but actually the Far
East Command is limited to Japan and the outlying islands. Where
we were able without unusual exertions, we would either call on a
sister intelligence agency to do something or grab it while grabbing
was good.
On the whole, if we are able to pick up some prominent persons like
Browder, Eugene Dennis, Dolsen, I think you have made substantial
progress in tracing a pattern so that it will be picked up again when it
makes its appearance. This is not a punitive enterprise for ultimate
arrests, but rather a historical enterprise for educational purposes.
While your mind is on the PPTUS and Earl Browder, I would like
\o call your attention to the remarks of one of your colleagues, the
Honorable Walter H. Judd, of Minnesota, made in the House of
Representatives on Tuesday, July 18, 1950:
* * * The Daily Worker, September 7, 1937, reproduced three letters ad-
dressed to Earl Browder, who was then the head of the Communist Party of
America: one was from MaoVTse Tung, who signed himself as president of the
Chinese Soviet Republic: one from Chu-Teh, leader of the Chinese Red army,
and one from Chou-En-Lai, now prime minister of the Communist regime in
China. Chou-En-Lai began his letter to Browder: " * * * Comrade, do you
still remember the Chinese who worked with you in China 10 years ago? We
feel that when we achieve victory in China, this will be of considerable help to
the struggle of the American people for liberation * * *."
Then Mr. Judd asks :
What had Earl Browder been doing in China in 1927? He was there with
other leaders of the Communist hierarchy from all over the world to help the
Reds seize complete control of China, as the Bolsheviks had done in Russia in
the October revolution, just 10 years before. Chiang Kai-shek in China was
scheduled to be what Kerensky had been in Russia — an interim leader to be
overthrown by the Reds as soon as he had defeated the war lords.
1234 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Here, Mr. Doyle, is your purpose, your plan, your fraternal rela-
tionship. The Shanghai police files fully confirm Mr. Judd's views.
American Commies, in fraternal correspondence with Chinese Com-
mies — who are now fighting the United States in North Korea. It
is these considerations that make these old files so alive today.
Mr. Doyle. I was directing my question to you because of the assign-
ment this committee has. I call your attention, if you haven't had
an opportunity to read it recently, to the assignment this committee
has. We are assigned to make investigations of —
(1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in
the United States; (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and
un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a do-
mestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of Government as guaranteed
by our Constitution.
That is why I directed the question to you. I, as a member of the
committee, am interested in getting into the record as much positive
evidence as there is of the actual existence of a world-wide conspiracy
to overthrow not only our constitutional form of Government, but
the constitutional governments of all free peoples. That is the point
of my question to you.
General Willoughby. The point is well taken, Mr. Doyle.
Mr. Doyle. I feel it very important that the world-wide knowl-
edge of men like yourself, who got first-hand the conditions in other
parts of the world, be given to us as proof, if you have it.
General Willoughby. Your point is weli taken, and I trust that
I have been able to contribute something to the committee by per-
haps not tracing the entire picture in its detailed ramifications, but
building a brief on the basis of which your research staff may pro-
ceed with its investigations.
Mr. Doyle. I am sure you are being very helpful. A few weeks
ago we had an undercover FBI agent who testified before us, who
was a member of a Communist cell in Massachusetts. He heard dis-
cussions in the cell of means by which arms might be obtained.
I wanted to ask you very briefly, do you believe and feel, from your
own personal knowledge, that that is the sort of revolution that is
aimed at our Nation if and when the time comes, and under what
conditions could that come in this country, a revolution with the use
of arms? What conditions could bring that about? Is it possible
the international conspiracy could ever bring about such a hellish
thing?
General Willoughby. Yes, Mr. Doyle, I firmly believe that there
is an international conspiracy; that there is a mechanism for its ac-
complishment; that these perhaps fragmentary disclosures here are
the early glimpses of the framework of the conspiracy. We have seen
nation after nation fall in the past 5 years. I call your attention to
Czechoslovakia, which fell through this type of intrigue. There is
no doubt that the economic conditions following a defeat in war —
unemployment and al] other social tensions — furnish the soil in which
this type of thing grows rapidly. Fortunately, the United States
is not in that condition. But they try. The perversion is in full
swing. We are fortunate that it has not taken hold here as it has else-
where.
Mr. Wood. Wouldn't we be very foolish to assume that the efforts
are going to be relaxed ?
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1235
General Willoughby. Yes, indeed. This committee is the watch-
dog duly appointed by Congress to recognize well in advance the
trends, and I believe yon have done a very good job. Here I come
from the Orient with certain information, and find the committee
lias collateral, dovetailing information in the United States. I was
very much impressed with this in the course of this presentation.
Mr. DoyIiE. That should be pretty clear evidence of a proficient
staff with an objective view of the whole thing.
General Willoughby. Indeed. You have heard me make compli-
mentary remarks toward the California State Legislature. Of course,
this committee is not only in a better position but its work has been
much more far reaching from the standpoint of public knowledge
than that of a State legislature.
Mr. Doyle. I would like to ask you this question right at this point:
Is there anything this committee should do, in your judgment, that
it is not doing? For instance, part of our assignment is we are charged
with recommending to Congress any necessary remedial legislation.
Will you bear that in mind and tell us what, in your judgment, this
committee should recommend in the way of remedial legislation. In
other words, I have frequently asked the question, Should the Com-
munist Party be outlawed?
General Willoughby. Your question is well taken; and, while it is
presumptuous of me to advise the committee, I shall take this oppor-
tunity of making the following recommendations against the following
back-ground:
Japan is a nation of 80 million people. My section was charged with
the organization in Japan of an organization something like the FBI.
So, I am aware of the problems from the standpoint of density of popu-
lation.
I had intended making those recommendations, by agreement with.
counsel, at the end of the session, but this is as good a place as any.
Mr. Doyle. Then I will withdraw my question at this time.
General Willoughby. "Withdraw" means it will be cheerfully com-
plied with at a later time.
Mr. Wood. You will not withdraw it, but withhold it.
Mr. Doyle. Yes.
General Whloughby. I have recommendations, and will present
them with apologies, feeling I see eye to eye with this committee.
Mr. Doyle. I was fearful, because I was not here yesterday, that
point was not raised. I am on the Armed Services Committee also,
and I was there all da}* yesterday ; so I couldn't be here.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, I am aware of the fact you
are anxious to complete your testimony today if possible.
General Willoughby. Not necessarily, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. There are several sections of this document which
I am very anxious for you to read into the record. We can then intro-
duce the rest without reading it, if that is agreeable to you.
General Willoughby. I am entirely in your hands, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. May I suggest you discuss the Xoulens Defense
Committee, appearing under paragraph b on page 7, and on the next
page the Friends of China section, entitled "d". If you will do that
first, we will then desire to ask you other questions.
General Willoughby. You have selected the Noulens case. I con-
sider it completely analogous to the legal assistance given Gerhart
1236 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Eisler. The defense was simply given in two different cases. Eisler
skipped Shanghai, or he would have been in the same fix as Noulens.
Sorge describes the Comintern group. He mentions two subdi-
visions. One was in charge of Eisler and one in charge of Noulens.
Noulens was caught ; and Eisler, as soon as the heat was put on, van-
ished.
We say, speaking of the Noulens Defense Committee :
International Red Aid (MOPR), as stated, has taken various forms abroad.
In Shanghai MOPR played its most spectacular role during the early 1930's in
the defense of the head of the FEB, Paul Ruegg, alias Hilaire Noulens, alias
Hilarie Noulens, alias Ferdinand Vandercruyssen, and a host of other names.
When Paul and Gertrude Ruegg were arrested June 13, 1931, the International
Red Aid took charge of their defense. Willi Muenzenberg, German Communist
wheel-horse and one of the Comintern's most efficient organizers of both Com-
munist and front groups, formed a defense unit first known as the Noulens
Defense Committee, the Shanghai branch being led by Harold Isaacs and boast-
ing among its members Agnes Smedley, Irene Wiedemeyer (or Weitemeyer) and
Mine. Sun Yet-sen ; the group continued efforts to free these Comintern agents
for several years after they were finally sentenced.
The Rueggs, when arrested, posed as Belgian citizens named Herssens, and
had used many aliases, such as Vandercruyssen, although the man had pre-
viously been known in Shanghai as Hilaire Noulens. Their claim to Belgian
protection was disapproved, and the couple was handed over to the Chinese au-
thorities for prosecution as Communist agents.
The League Against Imperialism and other Comintern groups protested that
Noulens, as he was then known, was merely the paid secretary of the PPTUS.
That is the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat in which Browder
took a leading part in its formation —
possibly a more easily defensible position than his actual post as leader of the
FEB. Later in 1931 a collateral English defense group, apparently inadvent-
ly, referred to him as "Ruegg." The ensuing investigation disclosed that Paul
Ruegg was an active Swiss Communist who had been prominent a decade earlier
in Switzerland and had come to police notice only sporadically after he had gone
to Moscow in 1924. After the disclosure of Ruegg's identity, the international
committee adopted his real name for their "Committee for the Defense of Paul
and Gertrude Ruegg." The committee attracted or solicited known Gommu-
ists, incidental sympathizers, and non-Communist humanitarians, listing Lion
Feuchtwanger and Albert Einstein as German members of the committee —
probably without their permission —
and several sentimental Americans then at the height of their fame, including
Floyd Dell, Sinclair Lewis, Theodore Dreiser, John Dos Passos, and Oswald
Garrison Villard.
Despite MOPR efforts, the Rueggs were found guilty of seditious activities and
imprisoned in Nanking. With the release of many political prisoners, when
Nanking fell to the Japanese, the pair were liberated in September 1937 and have
since disappeared. Ruegg is reported to have entered the United States in 1939
as Naum Katzenberg and another report claims that he again visited Shanghai in
1939, Chungking in 1940, and the Philippines in 1941.
You have a similar case in the movements of Guenther Stein, (Tiien-
ther Stein was associated with Sorge. He disappeared. Suddenly
he appears in France. He was arrested by the French police, who
advised me of that fact.
Mr. Tavenner. That is a very strong argument for continual watch-
fulness to follow up these people to see where they are and what they
are doing and what part they are taking in communism today.
General Willoughby. Your point is extremely well taken. Mr.
Counsel.
Mr. Tavenner. Now will you turn to section d.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1237
General Willoughby. Yes. You have Friends of Communist Russia
in the States. You have Friends of Communist China, also. Here is
Friends of China. [Reading :]
Outside the original range of the friendly societies, but similar to foreign
cultural groups for the support of countries presently within the Soviet orbit,
the International Friends of China was a front organization which capitalized on
western sympathy for China and its defense against Japanese aggression, in order
to promote the ends of the Chinese Communists. Like individual fellow-
travelers, the Friends of China, founded in 1934 with offices in New York,
London, and Paris, gave sole credit for Chinese resistance to the Chinese Com-
munists and attempted to divert normal sympathy to support of one party in
China.
Here you have a glimpse of the political purposes of some of these
movement s. The Chinese Communists claimed for a long time to have
fought Russian communism. They did nothing of the kind. Actually,
to my knowledge, the Chinese Communist commanders in western
China had a tacit agreement with the Japanese to allow free passage
into Hankow. [Continuing reading :]
Although its stated aims were lofty, the society tipped its hand when it claimed
to have "done much to expose the collaboration of Chiang Kai-shek with the
Japanese, British and American imperialists."
We are now getting into language similar to that of the New York
Spotlight. [Continuing reading:]
Although the London and Paris branches engaged in relatively little activity,
European members then included such respectable fronts as the Labour Party's
chief whip in the House of Lords, Lord Marley and Bertrand Russell, long
known for his interest in China, as well as Edmond Egon Kisch, classified as an
active Comintern agent, and other known Communists. The New York branch,
the American Friends of China, which included Earl Browder in its membership,
was the most active. Affiliated with the Communist-front American League
Against War and Fascism, the American Friends of China published its own
monthly magazine China Today which was pro-Communist. The American
group also sponsored a Shanghai publication of similar nature, Voice of China,
published by Max and Grace Granich. This paper published from March 1036
until the latter part of 1937, although not overtly a Communist publication,
portrayed the Chinese Communist as the only defenders of China's independence
and resistance to the Japanese. The magazine was suppressed after more than
18 months of existence and the Graniches returned to the United States
December 21, 1937.
One could go on and on with the description of similar fronts.
They all have their ancillaries in foreign countries, including the
United States.
Mr. Tavenner. The pattern as you have shown it in China is very
similar to that we have found in the United States with reference to
the use of book clubs. ^
General Willoughby. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Tavenner. You have a paragraph on that subject ?
General Willoughby. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Tavenner. I think it would be well for you to give us that at
this time.
General Willoughby. The Attorney General, I see from reading
the newspapers, has gone about a very laudable job, to classify certain
organizations as Communist fronts. I suppose the committee had a
hand in that. You have done a good job.
You find a number of book stores, Washington Book Shop, Cin-
cinnati, and so forth. They are scattered from the east coast to the
1238 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
west coast. You find these book shops 15 or 20 years ago. This is
paragraph g, entitled "Zeitgeist Bookstore" :
The Zeitgeist Bookstore, established by Irene E. I. Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer)
in November 1930, was part of a widespread and elaborate Comintern network
operating from the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow.
You have had the quotation by our pal Langston Hughes which I
threw into the arena. [Continuing reading :]
Prior to the advent of Hitler, the Zeitgeist Buchhandlung in Berlin, with a
branch office of its own in Moscow, was an important Comintern cultural outlet,
part of a syndicate headed by Willi Muenzenberg, who was also German head
of the League Against Imperialism, of the Comintern's own bank in Paris, the
Banque Commerciale Pour l'Europe du Nord, and a vast number of other Com-
intern organizations and enterprises until he was read out of the Comintern
in 1938, 2 years before his suicide. The Shanghai branch of the Zeitgeist Book-
store was set as a focal distribution point of the International Union of Revolu-
tionary Writers, stocking Communist publications in German and English as
well as more legitimate literature, mainly in German. The amount of business
transacted by the Zeitgeist Bookstore was small and the shop closed in 1933,
ostensibly due to its poor finances. A more likely reason was the destruction of
the legalized German Communist Party since, after a trip to Europe in the autumn
of 1933, Irene Weidemeyer returned to Shanghai on September 9, 1934, to set
herself up in the book business again, this time as the Shanghai representative
of International Publishers, of New York. The latter organization has long been
the publishers of American Communist Party writings and the American distribu-
tor of international literature.
Although Miss Wiedemeyer acted as the agent of International Publishers,
another Shanghai group was also known as the authorized agents for interna-
tional literature. Mrs. V. N. Sotoff (Sotov), the wife of the head of the Shang-
hai agency of Tass, operated the American Book & Supply Co., which sold inter-
national literature ; it is significant, however, that the American Book & Supply
Co. and Miss Wiedemeyer's agency occupied offices in the same building at 410
Szechuan Road.
Miss Wiedemeyer had had some background in the Third International
although there are gaps in information on her activities in Shanghai. She had
married Wu Shao-kuo, a Chinese Communist, in Germany in 1925 and had studied
the principles of revolutionary movements in Asia at the Sun Yat-sen University
in Moscow in 192G-27. In Shanghai she knew Agnes Smedley well and was a
member of the Noulens Defense Committee and the Society of Friends of the
U. S. S. R. She, as well as Smedley and Isaacs during 1932, were reported to
have been in close contact with John M. Murray, an American correspondent
for the Pacific News Agency, a Vancouver organization listed as an outlet of
the Comintern and possibly a front for the League Against Imperialism and
Colonial Oppression of Canada. In any event the particular role of the leftist
book shop was to operate as an outlet for revolutionary literature, rendezvous of
espionage partisans and fellow travelers. Wiedemeyer's (Weitemeyer) Zeit-
geist Bookstore is covered elsewhere in the Sorge trial records. Ozaki, Sorge's
right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weitemeyer's book shop, ren-
dezvous of Shanghai leftists, mail drop for espionage agents. Later on, during
his imprisonment in Sugamo, he (Ozaki) wrote a pathetic letter on June 8, 1943:
" * * * I might say that, in a more profound sense, my meeting with Agnes
Smedley and Richard Sorge had been predestined * * * my subsequent
decision to follow the narrow road was determined by my encounter with
them * * *."
The little bookshop had done its bit as a recruiting station for the Fourth
Bureau (Intelligence) of the Soviet Army — but the narrow road led to Ozaki's
gallows.
This is as good a description of the character, purposes and oper-
ational quality of the so-called bookstores as outlets for Communist
printed matter as I can give.
Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence the document prepared by Gen-
eral Willoughby from which he has been reading, and ask that it be
marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 41."
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1239
General Willoughby. May I amplify this, Mr. Counsel? There
are footnote references which are not shown in the mimeographed
copy. There is not a single statement in this mimeographed abbre-
viated summary that is not backed by documentation.
At random, paragraph 8 is supported by SMP (Shanghai munic-
ipal police) tile D-64S0, November 1-i, 1934, to February 13, 1935, page
5, and so on.
Mr. Tavennek. The copy which has been introduced in the record
contains the full documentation.
General Willolgiii-.v. It was really for the benefit of the corre-
spondents that I made that remark.
Mr. Wood. It will be admitted with the understanding it is adopted
by the witness in toto as part of his testimony?
General Willoughby. I do.
(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No.
41," is as follows:)
Wir.i.ouGHBY Exhibit No. 41
The Shanghai Conspiracy: 1929-49
22. Shanghai police dossiers support Sorge records
The element which intrigued MacArthur's intelligence research was the imme-
diate and dramatic recognition that the Sorge story did not begin nor end with
Tokyo, that it was no accident that Sorge served in Shanghai first, and that his
later operations, localized in Japan, were only a chip in the general mosaic of
Soviet and Comintern international design. An investigation was opened into
the Shanghai period and the Shanghai personages.
Miscellaneous records of the British and French Shanghai municipal police
in the early thirties, open up an astonishing vista on a fantastic array of Com-
munist fronts, ancillary agencies, and the vast interlocking operations of the
Third International in China. It is in this particular period that the groundwork
was laid for the Communist successes of today.
As in the Japanese court records, Smedley now appears in these independent
-documents, associated with well-known Comintern agents, leftists, and sympa-
thizers ; affiliated with or assisting in activities, most of which were Comtintern-
directed for the ultimate strategic benefit of Soviet Russia.
The role of Shanghai, a veritable witch's caldron of international intrigue,
a focal point of Communist effort, is already apparent in the records of the
Sorge trial and collateral testimony. The Zeitgeist Bookshop, rendezvous of
Sorge and Ozaki, and its astute owner, Miss Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), appear
again, viewed from a different angle, recorded this time by a reputable inter-
national police body. 1 Smedley has attacked the Japanese court materials as
"obtained under torture and duress" ; this claim is, of course, a typical "red
herring" and the customary smear-defense expected of a cornered individual.
On the other hand, the files of the Shanghai international police can hardly be
impugned as obtained under torture and duress, which Smedley slyly attributes
to the "Japanese Fascists who were enemies of the United States." Commu-
nist strategic defense is often brilliant. This innuendo is a clever but futile
defense maneuver. Smedley here manipulates both time and space. In Shang-
hai, in the early thirties, we are not dealing with the period of our uneasy alli-
ance with the Soviets (1941-45), but with the prewar years of 1930-39, in the
heyday of the Third International, prelude to the infamous Stalin-Hitler Pact,
sole factor that made World War II at all possible.
1 In parly recognition that Shanghai was the focal point of Communist espionage and
political subversion, F-2/Tokyo was lucky in acquiring substantial parts of these police
records. Files had already been tampered with, especially reference to American per-
sonalities, but someone had bungled (or G-2 worked too fast) ; enough material remained
to present an impressive continuity. Some of the Shanghai police officers were traced to
Hong Kong, like Mr. J. Crighton, former chief detective-inspector, political intelligence
group, Shanghai municipal police, who has a perfect recollection of Agnes Smedley, Identi-
fied her as a Communist, working with the Communist Party in Shanghai, states she worked
^'ith the Noulens, and recalls that her police file was voluminous. His confirmation of
the Shanghai files actually acquired by G-2 is collateral evidence from most authoritative
•quarters.
1240 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
23. Shanghai, focal point of Third International conspiracy
There is more to the Shanghai municipal police files than an inferential accu-
sation against Smedley. We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in
the history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here
were sown the dragon's teeth that ripened into the Red harvest of today, and
the farm lahor was done by men and women of many nationalities who had
no personal stakes in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien
cause, the Communist "jehad" of Pan-slavism for the subjugation of the western
world.
The greater design of the Soviet conquest of the East is already clear in the
confession of Sorge, Soviet master spy. It is again recognizable in the intricate
pattern of the Third International "apparatus." Shanghai was the focal point
of sabotage and subversion, and to this Mecca flocked the Communist operators
of the world for training, for experimentation, for career investments.
In 1927 a conference was held in Hankow under the auspices of the Third
International and attended by Tom Mann (Great Britain), Earl Browder (United
States of America), Jacques Doriot (France), Roy (India), and a number of
others. It was decided that Communist work in this part of the world would
be conducted by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, of which Earl Browder
was made secretary. He soon afterward became active in this work in which
he was assisted by Katherine Harrison alias Alice Reed, considered by the police
as a convenient "menage-a-deux." Earl Browder and his female assistant con-
tinued their work in the following year (1928) and spent most of their time
in Shanghai. They were joined in August that year by one W. A. Haskell who
also was assisted by a woman named Emerson, presumably his wife. 2
Time, in its issue of April 25, 1849, features Eugene Dennis, the boss of the
American Communists, now on trial. There is no point in repeating this terse,
well-written story of the growth and world itinerary of a Soviet agent ; impor-
tant, however, are certain connecting links with the Sorge espionage case. 3
Dennis who used to be Francis X. Waldron, obtained a fraudulent passport
as Paul Walsh and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The world-
wide ramifications of the Third Comintern, with Shanghai as the Far Eastern
operating center, is reflected in the itinerary of this American disciple. Paul
Eugene Walsh, alias Paul or Milton suddenly appears in the records of the
Shanghai police ; his police card states :
"* * * From December 1, 1933, until June 1934, he resided at Flat 6,
Gresham Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue J off re. On May 30, 1934, the lease of
Flat 34D, Foncim Apartments, No. 634 Route Frelupt was transferred to his
name from Harry Berger, with whom he was obviously on terms of good friend-
ship. Walsh resided at the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9,
1934, when he secretly left Shanghai for Trieste on the S. S. Conte Verde. It has
been established that Walsh was one of the masterminds of the local machine
of the Comintern and as such was responsible for the collation of many im-
portant documents relating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far
East. * * *"
The Shanghai police classification ties in neatly with related fragments in
the Sorge case; Sorge's assistants operated habitually under aliases or codes,
usually their Christian names, viz: Paul, Max, Alex. John, etc. Significantly,
a Comintern agent, under the code name of Paul took over the Shanghai station
after S'orge's transfer to Japan. 4
24- The shadow-]/ men with changeable names
In i !>.'!() a large host of agents of the Third International came to Shanghai
and became associated with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, and an-
other important organ of the Third International, called the Far Eastern Bureau.
-G-2 Doc. No. 5: SMP File D-4825, May 2-10, 1933, p. 20. The presence of this
prominent American Communist is significant.
Ibid., p. 22, "During l!»2!t. W. A. Haskell and Miss Emerson left Shanghai, but the ranks
of the foreign Communist agents were by no means reduced, for Gerhart Eisler who lived
in Wong Ka Shaw Gardens between March 20 and November 30 and George Hardy and
.1. II. Didsen also visited Shanghai one after another * * *."
8 There were plenty of other leads iii the original G-2 report, converging on American
Communists principally on the Pacific coast, the novitiate of Dennis, is names listing
Communist agitators, agents, and suspects were reported as connected with the Sorge ease
and covered in the trial records i Ltr. to Mil >, Oct. 17, 1H47 I.
4 Sorge : "Besides these two agents, Paul and John were dispatched from Moscow to
work directly under Sorge." See also : <; 2 Doc. No. 24 : SMP File l> 6227, June 15, 1933-
Angust 5, 1936, pp. 8, 9.
Klausen : "I worked with Weinuart. Then were also Paul. Smedley, and Dr. Woidt,
all of whom I met in Shanghai. I'aul succeeded Sorge as leader of the ring."
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1241
The new arrivals included Bilaire Noulens (or Paul Ruegg), and .Mrs. Noulens,
ef unknown nationality, A. E. Stewart, Blargarel Undjus, and Judea Codkind,
Americans, and Erene Wiedemeyer I Weitemeyer) who was German."
Smedley was an associate of Irene's. Weitmeyer (Wiedemeyer) operated
the Zeitgeist Bookshop in Shanghai, rendezvous of leftists and mail drop for
espionage agents. Ozaki, Sorge*s right-hand man was introduced by Smedley
in Weitmeyer's place." Sorge testified:
"* * * As previously slated I first met Smedley in Shanghai, acquired
her as a member, and through my recommendations, she was registered with
Comintern headquarters. 1 d<> net knew as to whether she was affiliated with
the American Communist Party. <>zaki was also acquired in China. I reestab-
lished contacl wiili him alter arriving in Japan, worked with bim and recom-
mended him to Comintern headquarters for registration. Tims I recommended
both of them and offered myself as one of the two sponsors required for each new
member. A member in .Moscow consented to he the other sponsor on the strength
of my recommendations and reports. * * *"
The police card on Smedley states:
•.* * * Agnes Smedley alias Alice Bird and Mrs. Petroikos * * * mem-
ber of the following societies: Friends of the U. S. S. R. ; Hindustan Association
in Berlin; Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society. Noulens Defense Committee;
All China Labor Federation and the China League for Civil Rights. * * *
In possession of two passports German and American. Arrived in Shanghai in
.May 1929 from Berlin as the correspondent of the German newspaper Frank-
furter Zeitung. She is in the service of the Eastern Branch of the Central
Committee of the Communist Internationa! and is definitely known to have
assisted local Indian seditionists on several occasions. * * * her chief duties
comprise the supervising of Communist organizations among workers, and that
she receives orders direct from the Central Committee of the Communist In-
ternational in Moscow. * * *"
The Shanghai police observed and reeorded these furtive men and women,
often without direct accusations. Such things are a matter of cumulative
surveillance, but dossiers are never opened without some reason. Somehow,
these names are tainted.
The case of Hilaire Noulens also know as Paul Ruegg is both interesting and
typical : The clandestine fraternity, working under the aegis of the Comintern,
or the Soviet Army, could always count on a variety of front organizations to
rally to their defense, if they got into trouble. The principal agency was The
International Red Aid (MOPR), created in 1922, known as International
Labor Defense in America. Inferentially, whenever the defense swung into
action it was a foregone conclusion that the chief protagonists were under
orders of the Comintern. To the gullible outsider, the defense action might
look like a legitimate civil liberty agitation even with some sentimental appeal;
however to the cognoscenti it was just another Red front mobilizing pink lawyers,
agents, and fellow travelers.
Noulens arrived in Shanghai in 1930 under cover of a stolen Belgian passport
as Fred Vandercruysen to head the Far Eastern Bureau. Fifteen months later,
lie was arrested for Communist activities Jinked with a French Communist,
Joseph Ducroux (also know as Serge LeFranc) then operating in Singapore.
During the trial (and conviction) the authorities learned of his importance in
the Comintern apparatus. This group operated on a considerable scale; they
maintained 7 bank accounts, rented 15 houses or apartments, a vertiable political
rabbit warren; Ruegg-Noulens used at least 12 names in Shanghai and carried
1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports, while his wife used 5 names and 2 Belgian
passports. 7
"G-2 Doc. No. 5 : SMF File D 4s-jr,. May s-10. 1!»::::. p. 22.
6 Foreign Affairs Yearbook 1942. Sec. XV. par. 2— i (Sorge).
7 G-2 Document No. Mo: SMP File 7.C< 827, March 7, 19.°,2. See also gorge's Own
Story (pt. T, eh. 4. sec. J. par. 4). He is quite specific. The Comintern group (FEB)
consisted <>f two branches, the political branch (headed by Gerhart Eisler) and the organi-
sation branch (headed by Noulens) : in the light of the current China debacle, the opera
tional missions were significant : liaison between the Comintern (Soviet) and the Chinese
Communist Party: political policy (decided upon by the Comintern) with respect to the
Chinese Communist Party: exchange of information between the Chinese Communist Party
and the Comintern; financial liaison between the Comintern and the Chinese Communist
Party; the movement of personnel between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party.
Smedley's and Isaacs' support of the Noulens Defense Committee or any other members
must be viewed against the background of these international subversive missions.
90929— si g
1242 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
Here, again, the Time article furnishes an interesting clue to identities ; in
a subparagraph heading : "The Little Kremlin," it says :
''* * * All but the most secret Communist operations in the United States
were and still are, directed from the ramshackle, nine-story loft building, on 35
East Twelfth Street, not far from Manhattan's Union Square. To its top-floor
offices came the Communists' international 'Reps,' the shadowy men with the
changeable names like P. Green, G. Williams, A. Ewert, H. Berger * * *
which in a wink of the eye might become Drabkin, B. Mikhailov, Braun, or
Gerhart Eisler. These were Moscow's agents. From the ninth floor the word
which they brought from Moscow was passed along to the faithful, to the party
hacks on the Daily Worker and Yiddish-language Freiheit, to the cultivators of
organized labor's vineyards, to men like Christoffel in Milwaukee. * * *"
The interesting thing about Time's shadowy men with the changeable names
like A. Ewert, H. Berger, 8 A. Steinburg, and Gerhart Eisler, 9 is that these same
names and identities appear both in the Sorge records and the Shanghai police
files. Their crooked paths meander on into the forties and into the United
States.
Most of the old wheel horses of the Communist Party appear to have been
operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clan-
destine fraternity as well as the accolytes and dupes, who are flirting with the
Red menace. And somewhere in the bistros of the French concession, in the
furtive rendezvous of the ^Shanghai conspirators, you can hear the metallic tinkle
of 30 pieces of silver
25. The Comintern apparatus and Shanghai affiliates
Other individuals, in variable degrees of implication with or commitment to
the Communist movement, are covered elsewhere. All of them are understand-
able only in terms of their subservience to a foreign master; this relationship
requires a background examination of the formidable world-wide machinery of
the Comintern apparatus, machiavellian tool of the imperialist expansion of the
Soviets, who have made progress beyond the wildest dream of Czari.-L ambition.
In fact, it may be factually stated that the Soviets have taken up where the Czars
left oft' and made further and more significant strides.
(a) Comintern headquarters. — The Moscow headquarters of the Third ( Com-
munist ) International (Comintern) during the 1930's paralleled the organiza-
tional structure of the Soviet Government. Led by a world congress of Soviet
and foreign Communists, who met at intervals between 1919 and 1935, actual con-
trol of the Comintern fell to the U. S. S. R. through its leadership of the world
Communist movement and a Comintern organizational ruling which gave the
8 G-2 Document No. 24. SMP File D-6227, June 15, 1933-August 5, 1936 : A man of
many aliases, when Paul Walsh appeared, it was Berger who rented his Shanghai apartment
to him. Flat 35D Foneim Apartments No. 643. Route Frelupt. Berger left Shanghai for
Vladivostoek July 19, 1934, on the steamship Yingchow due to police raids at No. 38 Race
Road, which netted incriminating Communist documents.
He appears in the Canadian espionage case as an "agent in the United States" ; Fred
Rose, Communist member of the Parliament in Canada used Freda Lipshitz as go-between
from himself (cover name Debouz) to Berger, and others in Washington.
9 Gerhart Eisler Sorge Material (Crimiual Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice, ch. IV,
sec. J-4) : "The Comintern group in Shanghai consisted of a political branch and an
organization branch. The political branch was in charge of "Gerhardt" (Eisler) whom I
had known in Germany and worked with in my Comintern days.
With the arrest of Noulens, Gerhardt's status in Shanghai became precarious and he
decided to return to Moscow in 1931 * * *."
The tendrils of Mr. Eisler weave into far places. He next appears as Communist
International representative in the United States in 1936. His first wife was Hede
Gumperz. Eisler was later transferred to Europe. His second wife, Hede's sister, Elli
whom he married in 1931 said she was still his wife in 1946. He returned to the United
States with another woman, whom he apparently married in 1942. The amorous exploits
of Comintern agents appear as complicated as their professional work. Hede Gumperz
was in charge of an underground Communist apparatus in Washington. She broke with
Stalin later on. She knew Alger Hiss and talked with him in an apartment of Noel Field,
State Department official who was a member of her apparatus. Incidentally, she was not
allowed to tell her story to the jury in the first trial of the Hiss case (Counterattack,
July 8, 1949). The character of her former husband makes this story more than plausible.
An arriere pensee of slight comfort to the mothers of America : A considerable number
of young American soldiers died in the war period 1941-45, so that "Gearhardt" Eisler
could pursue his business of treason and sabotage in the comparative safety of the United
States. It is noted that lie found Europe too hot in 1941. Needless to say, there is no
mention of a draft for service in the United States except perhaps to subvert some Govern-
ment employees. Eisler's spectacular arrest in New York and subsequent escape to
London recently, dovetail accurately into the general pattern of long ago. He left
Shanghai in 1931 in just as much of a hurry and for the same reasons.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1243
largest representation i<> the nation playing host to the Congress— in evei'y case
the Soviel Onion. The executive functions of the Comintern were vested in the
Executive Committee of the Communist international (ECCI)', which advertised
several foreign members l»ut was actually controlled by its predominant Soviet
represent a i ion. Like the "World'" Congress, the E< !< 'l met periodically, primarily
to determine general lines of policy, but final control of the Comintern rested in
the "praesidium," which was made up, among others, of a "politburo," several
standing Commissions, and a political Secretariat Under the praesidium there
were several training schools, sectional or regional secretariats and auxiliary
departments, which w< re concerned with generalized work in specific fields and,
finally, certain auxiliary organizations which worked directly and specifically
with foreign Communist or Communist-front groups.
The Comintern was the nondiplomatic foreign arm of the U. S. S. R. Organ-
ized at Moscow in 1919, the Comintern was, until its alleged dissolution in 1943,
a quasi-governmental body aimed largely at fostering Communist and Commu-
nist-front groups iu the capitalist world in order to carry out such Communist
strategy as the Government of the U. S. S. R. considered essential to the promo-
tion of world revolution or, as conditions required, the protection of the Soviet
Union.
(6) Auxiliary organizations. — Only a few of the Moscow auxiliary organiza-
tions are of immediate concern here, although all of them, numbering about 13,
had variable interests in Shanghai, operating through an extraordinary variety
of channels :
(1) Profintern : The Red International of Labor (Proiintern) was created in
1919 in older to counteract the influence of the International Federation of
Lahor Unions of the Second (Socialist) International. The profintern consisted
of a headquarters apparatus controlled by the praesidium and of affiliated sec-
tions which in most countries outside the U. S. S. R. took the form of Red trade-
union oppositions. In the field, the Profintern organized international propa-
ganda committees for work among specific trades. In addition, the Profintern
sponsored the creation of parallel labor-union federations of which the Pan
Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and the All China Labor Federation
were important examples.
(2) Krestintern : The Red Peasant International (Krestintern) was founded
in 1923 to break the resistance to communism of the peasantry in various coun-
tries. Although it enjoyed far less success than organizations devoted to the
laborer and the intelligentsia, it directed local Communist groups which or-
ganized so-called peasants' unions including the Chinese Peasant League.
(3) VOKS: The Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries
(VOKS) was established in Moscow in 1923 to promote Soviet culture abroad
as an instrument of political propaganda. The cultural attache of each Soviet
Embassy abroad was in direct charge of VOKS and, as such, was charged with
liaison witli the ECCI in Moscow and with the formation of the so-called friendly
societies. The activities of VOKS can be gaged from the sections of its head-
quarters: Foreign relations; reception of foreigners; international book
exchange ; press ; exhibitions, etc.
(4) MOPR: International Red Aid CMOPR), created in 1922, has been char-
acterized as the "Red Cross of the Communist International," designed primarly
to assist political prisoners, secret agents caught red-handed and other victims
of bourgeois reaction. 10 International Red Aid, which functioned legally and
illegally in 67 countries was complemented by Workers International Relief,
both directed for many years by the German Communist Willi Muenzenherg.
Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front
groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading
role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities.
(5) IURW: The International Union of Revolutionary Writers was organized
in 1925, probably under VOKS auspices, to enlist sympathetic literati abroad for
the promotion of pro-Soviet and anti-Fascist and antiwar themes. In Moscow
the IURW was responsible for the publication of the English-language Moscow
Daily News and International Literature, a periodical devoted to the promulga-
tion of Communist ideology abroad. At one time an American, Walt Cannon,
°With calculated skill international communism long ago subverted semantics to con-
tuse the slogans and cliches of capitalist society ; the universal sentimental appeal of the
historical Red Cross and its protection of the weak and oppressed was hound to be
•exploited. In the United States the agency was known as International Labor Defense.
1244 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
was an assistant editor of International Literature. 11 Langston Hughes, the
American Communist poet, and Agnes Smedley were contributors. Anna Louise
Strong for years was editor of the Moscow Daily News, while another American,
Fred Ellis, was employed as a cartoonist on the staff of Trud, the official organ
of the All Union Council of Soviet Trade-Unions. 12 The printing of these foreign
language periodicals was done by the State Publishing House (Goszdat) in
cooperation with the International Book Publishing Association (Mezhkniga),
both Soviet Government enterprises.
26. Chinese organizations and Communist fronts
On a national and sectional level the organs of the Comintern often began to
lose their distinctive coloring, becoming Communist-front groups in a host of
forms. However, each auxiliary organization of the Comintern was represented
abroad, often by apparently unconnected groups, which ranged from outright
Communist to pseudo-liberal movements, which were organized or infiltrated by
Comintern agents. In many cases, these national organizations could be traced
to more than one Moscow group as activities impinged on the different fields of
the praesidium. Often they were temporary organizations or local movements
designed to gain popular or mass support for an immediate aim; just as often,
however, they were serious long-term projects. As these groups touched the
Shanghai scene during the period of Smedley's residence there, they form
an interesting and often highly interconnected web which requires relatively
detailed treatment.
(a) PPTU8— The Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and its par-
ent organization, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau, were the most
important and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activities in the
Far East during the late 1920's and early 1930's. 13 The PPTUS, set up in 1927 at
a conference in Hankow, was attended by several prominent Comintern leaders,
including Lozovsky 14 a Comintern agent who rose from secretary of the Profin-
tern in 1928 to a transient position as leader of the Soviet labor movement.
Another member of the Hankow conference who later became first head of the
PPTUS was the American Communist Earl Browder, who was assisted in his
work in Shanghai by an American woman, Katherine Harrison. Other Ameri-
cans, including a journalist, James H. Dolsen, one Albert Edward Stewart, and
Margaret Undjus, were prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS as was the Ger-
man woman, Wiedemeyer. 16 Richard Sorge himself was suspected by the Shang-
hai police of having come on a mission for the PPTUS when he arrived in Shang-
hai in 1930. 16
Set up for Comintern work in China, Indochina, Malaya, Japan, Formosa,
Korea, and the Philippines, the PPTUS had no direct connection with the ECCI
or the Praesidium in Moscow although a chain of liaison existed to the Profintern
and some instances of direct connection between Moscow and Shanghai were
discovered. In that particular period and primarily for security, the PPTUS
derived its authority from a Comintern subsidiary in Berlin, the Western Euro-
pean Bureau (WEB) and from the WEB through the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB)
in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok."
* The Western European Bureau, largely an organ of the immensely powerful
and well organized (pre-Hitler) German Communist Party, went far beyond
its stated function of maintaining contact with the sections in Western Europe :
in fact, the WEB appears to have been, for a time, almost a peer of the ECCI,
operating often independently. From the WEB authority -went to the Far
Eastern Bureau in Shanghai. There was also an FEB (Dalburo) in Khabarovsk
(later transferred to Vladivostok) which maintained direct contact with both
the illegal FEB in Shanghai and the Praesidium of the Comintern in Moscow.
Instructions and cash subsidies for distribution by the FEB were transmitted
from the WEB in Berlin through courier channels to an import business in
"Editor: Walt Carmon is listed in the Fourth Report. Un-American Activities in Cali-
fornia, 1048, p. 273, as a meinlier of the League of American Writers and affiliated with
its congress.
'- G 2 Document No. 40 : SMP File D-5834. April 25, 1934, p. 4.
" G-2 Document No. 30 : SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1032. p. 13.
"G-2 Document No. 97: SMP File D-7884, May 10. 1027 to April 16, 102S. Editor,
Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, an old-time Bolshevik, was known as an expert on the Far
East and has held important posts in the Dalhnro (Far Eastern Bureau). His early con-
nection with Sorge is worthy of note. Norge's Own Story, eh. Ill, p. 35.
w G-2 Document No. 5 : SMP File 4S25, May 8 to 10, 1933, pp. 20 22.
"'0-2 Document No. 18 : SMP File I> 3509. January 10. 1032. to August 31, 1033, p. 5.
"G-2 Document No. 30. SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932. Memorandum 17, October
29, 1947.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1245
Shanghai dealing in wines, perfumes, and other luxury articles. Comintern
agents in the import company passed on these funds and instructions to the staff
of the FEB (Shanghai) which consisted of eight or nine Europeans and several
Chinese. Funds of the FEB were deposited in no less than seven Chinese banks
from which they then were withdrawn as needed. The FEB was a regional organ
of the Comintern, responsible for the dispatch of students for training in .Moscow
and for payments to Chinese organizations led by the PPTUS." The size of the
payments, at least $500,000 annually, gives some indication of the importance
attached to China alone by the Comintern strategists of the early 1930's. 18
The operational unit of the FEU although preceding the parent body in date
of formation in Shanghai, the PPTUS (also known as TOSS) was stalled largely
by the same personalities although direct PPTUS work was done by three
foreigners aided by Chinese translators. Two of the foreigners working for
PPTUS during the early 1930's are known to have been Albert Edward Stewart
and Margarel Undjus, while the third was reported to have been James Dolsen,
all Americans."
When Karl Browder left Shanghai in 1929 or 1930, Gerhart Eisler is reported
to have taken his place as secretary of the PPTUS. It is certain that Eisler was
in Shanghai in 1929 in connection with the PPTUS. 20 The interlocking evidence
of the Sorge records settle this point beyond a doubt: the FEI'» was divided into
an organizational section, under Noulens and a political branch under Gerhart
(Eisler). ^'hen Noulens was arrested, Eisler fled and other operators went
underground. Conversely, this fact puts the Noulens defense group in a proper
light : Soviet agents staging a defense rally for another agent.
The most famous of the Comintern agents connected with the FEB (and
PPTUS), were Paul and Gertrude Ruegg, more widely known as Mr. and .Airs.
Hilaire Noulens. Noulens, traveling on a stolen Melgian passport as Ferdinand
Vandercruysen, arrived in Shanghai March 19, 1930, to head the FEB. Fifteen
months later, on June 13, 1931, he was arrested for Communist activities as a
result of a cable address found on a French Communist Joseph Ducroux, alias
Serge LeFranc, when the latter was arrested in Singapore on June 1, 1930.
Following Ruegg's arrest, trial, and conviction, authorities learned that he and
other members of the FEB and PPTUS, in addition to seven bank accounts, had
rented 14 or 15 houses and apartments while in Shanghai, seven of which were
known to have been maintained concurrently. Ruegg himself used at least 12
names in Shanghai and carried 1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports and his wife
used 5 names and also carried 2 Belgian passports. 21
13 Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, p. 40ff. See also report by Deputy Commissioner of
Intelligence in the French Municipal Police. Shanghai : Simultanement avec l'etablisse-
ment du Bureau extreme-oriental de la Illeme Internationale, le Profintern (International
Syndicate Rouge) installa, egalement a Shanghai, une branche du Secretariat de l'Union
I'an-Pacifique Ouvriere (organization auxiliaire du Profintern, chargee de la direction du
inouvement syndicaliste militant dans les pays du Pacifique et dont le si&ge se trouve
depuis 1929 ji Vladivostock). G-2 Document No. 104. (English translation supplied by
the committee: Shanghai: Simultaneously with the establishment of the Far Eastern
Bureau of the Third International, the Profintern (Red International of Labor) Installed,
likewise at Shanghai, a branch of the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (auxiliary organ-
ization of the Profintern, charged with the direction of the militant trade-union move-
ment in the Pacific countries, and of which the headquarters have been since 1929 in
Vladivostock).)
19 G-2 Document No. 30: SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, pp. 15, 29, 30.
20 G-2 Document No. 5: SMP Pile No. 4825, May 8 to 10, 1933, p. 21. The records of
these men as Communists and Comintern operators is beyond question and has become
crystal-clear in recent years. Eisler is probably the more dangerous of the two. His
recent flight aboard a Polish ship, his seizure and release by the British are all of a
pattern. See also Sorge Story, pti I. ch. 4, sec. J, pars. 4 and 5.
21 G-2 Document No. 30 : SMP File No. ZCS-S27, March 7, 1932, p. 19ff. The French
report previously quoted bears out the Shanghai documents: Sur Lefranc on trouxa deux
feuilles de papier dont l'une portait l'indication, Post Office Box 208, Shanghai et l'autre :
Hilonoul. Shanghai * * * Des descentes furent aussitot operees dans les autres
maisons loupes par Noulens sous differents noms. Elles amenerent la saisie d'une quantity
importante de litterature communiste et de nombreux documents en differentes langueB,
relatifs au mouvement communiste en Extreme-Orient et l'arrestation de la femme de
Noulens connue sous les noms de Madame Vandercruysen, Motte. Ruck, etc. (G-2 Document
No. 104). (English translation supplied by the committee: On the person of Le Franc
were found two sheets of paper, of which one carried the notation, "Post Office Box 208,
Shanghai," and the other : Hilonoul, Shanghai . . . Raids were Immediately conducted
in tile other houses leased by Noulens under different names. They led to the seizure of a
sizable quantity of Communist literature and of numerous documents in different languages
relative to the Communist movement in the Far East and the arrest of the wife of Noulens
known under the names of Madame Vandercruysen. Motte, Ruck, etc.)
1246 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
The All-China Labor Federation, of which Smedley was a member 22 was one-
of the recipients of the FEB subsidies, receiving $1,800 monthly from the
PPTUS. 23
(b) Noulens Defense Committee. — International Red Aid (MOPR),as stated,,
has taken various forms abroad. 24 In Shanghai MOPIt played its most spectacu-
lar role during the early 1930's in the defense of the head of the FEB, Paul Ruegg,.
alias Hilaire Noulens, alias Hilarie Noulens, alias Ferdinand Vandercruysen and
a host of other names. When Paul and Gertrude Ruegg were arrested June 13,
1931, the International Red Aid took charge of their defense. Willi Muenzenberg,.
German Communist wheel horse and one of the Comintern's most efficient organ-
izers of both Communist and front groups, formed a defense unit first known as
the Noulens Defense Committee, the Shanghai branch being led by Harold Isaacs, 25
and boasting among its members Agnes Smedley, Irene Wiedemeyer (Weite-
meyer) and Madam Sun Yat-sen ; the group continued efforts to free these Comin-
tern agents for several years after they were finally sentenced. 2 *
The Rueggs, when arrested, posed as Belgian citizens named Herssens, and
had used many aliases, such as Vandercruyssen, although the man had pre-
viously been known in Shanghai as Hilaire Noulens. Their claim to Belgian
protection was disapproved and the couple was handed over to the Chinese-
authorities for prosecution as Communist agents. The League Against Im-
perialism and other Comintern groups protested that Noulens, as he was then
known, was merely the paid secretary of the PPTUS, possibly a more easily
defensible position than his actual post as leader of the FEB. Later in 1931 a
collateral English defense group, apparently inadvertently, referred to him as
"Ruegg." The ensuing investigation disclosed that Paul Ruegg was an active
22 G-2 Document No. 10: SMP File D-471S, January 4 to May 20, 1933, p. 22.
23 G-2 Document No. 30 : SMP ZCS-S27, March 7, 1932, p. 14. Editor : Like so many
front organizations, this Profintern agency is difficult to trace In all its ramifications..
As a Chinese labor organization it attempted to channelize laborers' grievance toward
Communist ends. As a foreigner, Smedley's position is not quite clear, though as an out-
side adviser Smedley gave the All-China Labor Federation a direct connection with the
Profintern in addition to its indirect liaison through the PPTUS, the FEB, and finally
the WEB.
24 Editor : In the United States MOPR has been known as International Labor Defense,
headed for several years by Representative Vito Marcantonio. A more recent offshoot is-
the Civil Rights Congress, a postwar development, which drew heavy non-Communist sup-
port to make it a genuine front group. An important part of the technique of this and'
similar MOPR groups is to form in democratic countries so-called civil rights groups tc
defend individual cases. Characteristically, the Civil Rights Congress has formed an
Eisler Defense Committee, or committees to protest the denial of public meeting privileges
to known Communists, and others which can enlist the support of many Americans genuinely
interested in the protection of civil rights (Union Calendar 575, H. Rept. No. 1115, SOth
Cong., 1st sess., Report on Civil Rights Congress as a Communist-Front Organization,
September 2, 1947. Fifth report. Un-American Activities in California, 1949, pp. 439, 446)..
25 G-2 Document No. 16 : SMP File D-6628, April 1935, p. 4 ; G-2 Document No. 6 :
SMP File D-3956, August 18, 1932-Mav 23, 1935, pp. 10, 11.
26 G-2 Document No. 12: SMP (French) Dossier No. III-A-3C, March 10, 1930-Novem-
ber 10, 1941, 2-C-16. J. M. Jobez, the former deputy commissioner of intelligence in the
French municipal police, Shanghai, again provides collateral information on this notorious
case: "Les 19 et 20 aout 1931. Madame Sun Yat-sen qui venait de rentrer de Berlin ft
Shanghai, recevait de differents organizations et groupes radicaux d'Europe, une serie de
telegrammes lui demandant d'intervenir dans l'affaire Noulens et reclamant la liberation-
des inculpes. Parmi ces telegrammes, a noter ceux des ecrivains et des artists allemands,
des avocats allemands, de Clara Zetkine, membre de la faction communistre du Reichstag
(decedee fin juin 1933, en URSS), d'un groupe de membres travaillistes du Parlement
Anglais, d'ecrivains, d'artistes et de savants Espagnols, du Comity Central de la Ligue Contre
l'lmperialisme, du Comite Central du Secours Ouvrier International, de Romain Rolland,
d'Henri Barbusse, etc. * * * Au debut du mois de September 1931 les milieux
radicaux etrangers ft Shanghai avaient form£, de leur cot£, un comity de 'secours* air
Secretairs de l'Union Pan-pacifique Ouvriers.' Parmi les membres de ce comity se trou-
vaient Madame Agnes Smedley, anarchiste syndicaliste Amerieaine, hien connue dans les;
milieux radicaux de la Place, J. B. Powell, redacteur du journal China Weekly Review,
Edgar Snow, H. Isaacs, iournalistes radicaux Americains (G-2 Document No. 104).
(English translation supplied by the committee: August 19 and 20, 1931. Madame Sun
Yat-sen. who had just returned from Berlin to Shanghai, received from various radical
European organizations and groups, a series of telegrams demanding of her to intervene-
in the Noulens case and demanding the liberation of the defendants. Among these tele-
grams were noted those from writers. German artists, and lawyers: from Clara Zetkin,
member of the Communist faction of the Reichstag (deceased the last of June 1933, in the-
U. S. S. R.) : and from a group of members of the Workers Party of the English Parliament ;
from Spanish writers, artists, and intellectuals : from the Central Committee or the League'
Against Imperialism : from the Central Committee of the International Labor Defense ;
from, Romain Rolland, Henry Barbusse, etc. ... At the beginning of the month of Sep-
temper 1931, the intellectual radical foreigners in Shanghai formed, for their part, a
committee for aid to the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat. Among the members of
this committee was discovered to have been Agnes Smedley, American anarchist trade-
unionist, well known in the radical circles of Shanghai; J. B. Powell, editor of the paper,
China Weekly Review ; Edgar Snow and H. Isaacs, radical American journalists (G-2
Document No. 104).)
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1247
Swiss Communist who had been prominent a decade earlier in Switzerland and
had come to police notice only sporadically after he had gone to Moscow in
1924. 27 After the disclosure of Ruegg's identity, the international committees
adopted his real name for their Committee for the Defense of Paul and Gertrude
Ruegg. The committee attracted or solicited known Communists, incidental
sympathizers, and non-Communist humanitarians, listing Lion Feuchtwanger
and Albeit Einstein as German members of the committee, and several senti-
mental Americans then at the height of their fame, including Floyd Dell, Sinclair
Lewis, Theodore Dreiser, John Dos Passos, and Oswald Garrison Villard. 28
Despite MOPR efforts, the Rueggs were found guilty of seditious activities and
imprisoned in Nanking. With the release of many political prisoners, when
Nanking fell to the Japanese, the pair were liberated in September 1937 and have
since disappeared. Ruegg is reported t<» have entered the United States in 1939
as Naum Katzenberg 20 and another report claims that he again visited Shanghai
in 1939, Chungking in 1940, and the Philippines in 1941. 80
(c) Friends of the U. S. S. R— The Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R.,.
Shanghai branch was founded in 1932 by Edmond Egon Kisch, a Czechoslovakian
journalist long known as a Comintern agent. 31 The Shanghai branch of this pro-
Soviet Communist front was one of a series of typical overseas societies for
cultural relations between the U. S. S. R. and a given country, the autonomous
and ostensibly independent branch in the United States being known as the
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, the successor to the (American)
Friends of the Soviet Union and the American Council on Soviet Relations. 82
The purpose behind the formation of these groups is to gain support for Soviet
foreign policy objectives through highly publicized participation in these front
organizations of "liberal" elements who were presumed to believe sincerely in the
altruistic nature of Soviet policy. 33
The names of some of the more important members of the Shanghai branch
are known, listing among others in the early 1930's Agnes Smedley, Irene-
Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), and Harold Isaacs. 34 Communism unmasks boldly
when successful. The character of this society is made plain by its sudden re-
vival in our days in the wake of the Communist conquest of China. A new
label appeared, "China-Soviet Friendship Association," and opening meetings
were attended by Communist bigwigs like Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-chi. Madame
Snn Yat-sen was listed as one of the sponsors of an organization which pro-
claimed its mission as "the establishment and consolidation of the cultural, ec-
onomic, and other relations of China and the Soviet Union.
(d) Friends of China. — Outside the original range of the friendly societies,
but similar to foreign cultural groups for the support of countries presently
within the Soviet orbit, the International Friends of China was a front organ-
ization which capitalized on western sympathy for China and its defense against
Japanese aggression, in order to promote the ends of the Chinese Communists.
Like individual fellow travelers, the Friends of China, founded in 1934 with
offices in New York, London, and Paris, gave sole credit for Chinese resis-
tance to the Chinese Communists and attempted to divert normal sympathy to
support of one party in China. Although its stated aims were lofty, the society
tipped its hand when it claimed to have "done much to expose the collaboration,
of Chiang Kai-shek with the Japanese, British, and American imperialists."
Although the London and Paris branches engaged in relatively little activity,
European members then included such respectable fronts as the Labor Party's
chief whip in the House of Lords, Lord Marley and Bertrand Russell, long
known for his interest in China, as well as Edmund Egon Kisch, classified as
17 G-2 Document No. 30 : SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, pp. 21-22.
28 G-2 Document No. 6: SMP File D-3956, August 18, 1932-May 23, 1935, p. 10.
29 Memorandum 19, December 1, 1947, Third (Communist) International, Personnel,
p. 43.
30 G-2 Document No. 33 : SMP File ZCS-638, October 9. 1947. p. 9.
31 G-2 Document No. 10: SMP File D-4718, January 4, 1933-Mav 20, 1933, p. 31.
82 DA Cir. 192. DA Washington 25, D. C, June 29, 1948.
^WDGS, The Soviet Union, p. 56. (Editor:) Membership In a Soviet friendship
society is neither charge nor proof of Communist Party membership. Affiliation could be
Classified as misplaced sympathy. However, when association is combined with more
obviously Communist groups, membership in a "friendly" society becomes a practical'
indication of strong support of Communist world objectives. Thus the imperceptible
evolution of the fellow traveler.
M G-2 Document No. 31 : SMP file cards, various : G-2 Document No. 10, SMP File
D— 1718, various.
1248 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
an active Comintern agent, and other known Communists. The New York
branch, the American Friends of China, which included Earl Browder in its
membership, was the most active. Affiliated with the Communist-front Amer-
ican League Against War and Fascism, 35 the American Friends of China pub-
lished its own monthly magazine China Today which was pro-Communist. 36
The American group also sponsored a Shanghai publication of similar nature,
Voice of China, published by Max and Grace Granich. This paper, published
from March 1936 until the latter part of 1937, although not overtly a Communist
publication, portrayed the Chinese Communists as the only defenders of China's
independence and resistance to the Japanese. The magazine was suppressed
after more than IS months of existence and the Graniches returned to the
United States December 21, 1937. 3 '
(e) League for Civil Rights. — The China League for Civil Rights remained in
a twilight zone of respectability en route to becoming a Communist-front organi-
zation. The group was initially organized by such liberal Kuomintang members
as Madame Sun Yat-sen, who, despite her sojourn in Moscow and her acceptance
by the CCP, was not then regarded as a Communist, Hu Shih, Lin Yu-tang, and
Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei at the height of the Kuomintang persecution of dissident
opinion. 38 As a Communist front during its comparatively short existence, it
was a perfect example of such an organization. Obviously objected to by Kuo-
mintang authorities, who closed its Peiping branch, the high position of the
Chinese leaders of the parent organization in Shanghai precluded any direct
action against the league by the Nanking authorities until the organization
finally liquidated itself after complete lack of success in its objectives. 39
(/) League Against Imperialism. — The League Against Imperialism was a
relatively early Comintern body, founded by German Communists and various
colonial nationals as the League for Struggle Against Colonial Oppression. While
it existed outside any of the auxiliary groups of the ECCI, its direct connection
with Moscow was obvious and its basis was article 8 of the conditions of adminis-
sion to the Comintern, obliging Comintern sections in countries with colonies to
advocate and support the "liberation" of colonial populations. At a 1927
Congress in Brussels, the notorious Willi Muenzenberg formed the League
Against Imperialism as a front or so-called innocents group which would
serve as a rallying point for anti-imperialist national revolutionary movements
and promote the U. S. S. R. as the champion of the liberty of colonial people. 40
Agnes Smedley, during her Berlin days, admits having been present when her
Indian friends participated with the Communists in founding the league 41 and
took an active part, shortly after her arrival in Shanghai in May 1929, in organ-
izing the China League Against Imperialism. 42 The Chinese branch, along with
its western counterpart, took an active part in attempting to agitate mass pres-
sure in the Noulens case 43 and participated in several antiforeign movements,
later becoming involved with the Antiwar Congress.
Typical of the Communist-front organization in seeking respectable stooges, the
Antiwar Congress boasted Ellen Wilkinson, the Labor MP, and Lord Marley as
leading names. 44 Following a congress in Amsterdam in August 1932, Lord
Marley and a party of foreigners sailed for Shanghai to attend an Asiatic Con-
gress Against Imperialist War. The Chinese Communists had no illusions about
this group, despite its "liberal" front, often referring to it as the Barbusse Mis-
sion after one of its members, Henri Barbusse, a prominent member of the Comin-
tern and publisher of the French Communist organs L'Humanit^ and Le Monde. 45
35 (Editor.) The World Committee Against War and Fascism, organized in 1932, was
■designed to direct public opinion against any aggressor against the Soviet Union and to
promote noninterventional pacifism. Although many members of the World Committee
were non-Communists, its control was in the hands of such Communists as Willi Muenzen-
T)erg and Henri Barbusse. Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Third (Communist) Inter-
national, Structure and Functions, p. 56.
39 G-2 Document No. 91 : SMP File D-7356, April 16, 1936, p. 3.
37 G-2 Document No. 4 : SMP File D-7298, March 3, 1936-December 30, 1937.
^Editor: The presence of at least two foreigners, Smedley and Isaacs, is worthy of
note. G-2 Document No. 31. SMP file cords, various.
39 G-2 Document No. 96 : SMP File D-4455, February 2, 1933-May 14, 1935, p. 32.
«° Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Third (Communist) International Structure and
Functions, pp. 7, 56 et al.
41 Battle Hvmn of China, op. cit., p. 24.
42 G-2 Document No. 4 : SMP File D-7298. March 3, 1936-December 30, 1937, p. 55.
43 G-2 Document No. 19: SMP File No. D-3527, April 18, 1932-AugUSt 18, 1932, p. 4.
G-2 Document No. 68 : SMP File D-2554, October 12, 1933, pp. 10, 11, 15.
44 G-2 Document No. 59: SMP File D-4380, July 6, 1933-Februarv 10, 1936.
40 G-2 Document No. 45: SMP File D-517, September 19-Octoher 28, 1929, p. 12;
G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-43S0/5, August 25, 1933, pp. 90, 113, etc.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE ] 249
The Antiwar Congress presumably was to gather data on Japanese aggression,
the Comintern having denounced the 1931 Lytton Mission as a "whitewash" by
the "imperialist organ," the League of Nations. Madame Sun Yat-sen, China
representative of the World Committee Against Imperialist War. headed Un-
welcoming committee and a host of organizations in China promoted the mission,
organizing mass welcome demonstrations but tying in the visit with the necessity
for the "extension of the revolutionary struggle." Joined with these ostensibly
Chinese problems were demands "to oppose the imperialist attack on the U. S.
S. R." as well as to "celebrate the recent victories of the (Chinese) Red armies"
and "to oppose Christianity and fascism." 46 On hand to welcome the mission
were Agnes Smedley and delegates from America, Canada, and Australia. It
appears, however, that the Antiwar Congress accomplished nothing : Lord Marley
spoke at a few meetings, was shocked when taken through a colony of laborers'
hovels, and departed Shanghai less than 2 months after his arrival."
((f) Zeitgeist Bookstore. — The Zeitgeist Bookstore, established by Irene
E. I. Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer) in November 1930, was part of a widespread
and elaborate Comintern network operating from the International Union of
Revolutionary Writers in Moscow. Prior to the advent of Hitler, the Zeitgeist
Buehhandlung in Berlin, with a branch office of its own in Moscow, was an im-
portant Comintern cultural outlet, part of a syndicate headed by Willi Muenzen-
berg, who was also German head of the League Against Imperialism, of the
Comintern's own bank in Paris, the Banque Commerciale Pour L'Europe du
Nord. and a vast number of other Comintern organizations and enterprises until
he was read out of the Comintern in 1938, 2 years before his suicide. 48 The
Shanghai branch of the Zeitgeist Bookstore was set up as a focal distribution
point (if the international Union of Revolutionary Writers, stocking Communist
publications in German and English as well as more legitimate literature, mainly
in German. The amount of business transacted by the Zeitgeist Bookstore
was small and the shop closed in 1933, ostensibly due to its poor finances. A
more likely reason was the destruction of the legalized German Communist Party
since, after a trip to Europe in the autumn of 1933, Irene Weidemeyer returned
to Shanghai on September 9, 1934 to set herself up in the book business again,
this time as the Shanghai representative of International Publishers of New
York. 49 The latter organization has long been the publishers of American Com-
munist Party writings and the American distributor of International Literature. 60
Although Miss Wiedemeyer acted as the agent of International Publishers,
another Shanghai group was also known as the authorized agents for Inter-
national Literature. Mrs. V, N. Sotoff (Sotov), the wife of the head of the
Shanghai agency of TASS, operated the American Book & Supply Co., which
sold International Literature ; it is significant, however, that the American
Book & Supply Co. and Miss Wiedemeyer's agency occupied offices in the same
building at 410 Szechuan Road. 51
Miss Wiedemeyer had had some background in the Third International al-
though there are gaps in information on her activities in Shanghai. She had
married Wu Shao-kuo, a Chinese Communist, in Germany in 192.1 and had
studied the principles of revolutionary movements in Asia at the Sun Yat-sen
University in Moscow in 1926-27. In Shanghai she knew Agnes Smedley well
and was a member of the Noulens Defense Committee and the Society of Friends
of the U. S. S. R. She, as well as Smedley and Isaacs during 1932 were reported
to have been in close contact with John M. Murray, an American correspondent
for the Pacific News Agency, a Vancouver organization listed as an outlet of
the Comintern and possibly a front for the League Against Imperialism and
Colonial Oppression of Canada. 62 In any event the particular role of the leftist
bookshop was to operate as an outlet for revolutionary literature, rendezvous
of espionage partisans and fellow travelers. Wiedemeyer's (Weitemeyer) Zeit-
geist Bookstore is covered elsewhere in the Sorge Trial Records. Ozaki, Sorge's
48 G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-4380, Julv 15-August 18. 1933, pp. 161, 186.
47 G-2 Document No. 68 : SMP File D-43S0/5, September 28, 1933, p. 93. G-2 Docu-
ment No. 59 ; SMP File D-4380, July 6. 1933-February 10. 1936.
48 Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Third (Communist) International, Structure and
Functions, pp. 37. 41, 42, et al. (Editor:) This report presents an interesting picture of
some of the activities of a remarkable Comintern agent.
49 G-2 Document No. 23 : SMP File D-6480, November 14, 1934-February 13, 1935, p. 5.
SMP file card ( Weitmever).
60 G-2 Document No. 23 : SMP File D-6480, November 14, 1934-February 13, 1935, p. 5.
61 G-2 Document No. 31 : SMP file card (Weitmever).
82 G-2 Document No. 10: SMP File D-4718. January 4, 1933-Mav 20, 1933. pp. 29-32.
1250 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weitemeyer's bookshop, rendez-
vous of Shanghai leftists, mail drop for espionage agents. 53 Later on, during
his imprisonment in Sugamo, he wrote a pathetic letter on June 8, 1943 :
" * * * I may say that, in a more profound sense, my meeting with Agnes
Smedley and Richard Sorge had been predestined * * * my subsequent de-
cision to follow the narrow road was determined by my encounter with
them * * *"
The little bookshop had done its bit as a recruiting station for the Fourth
Bureau (Intelligence) of the Soviet Army — but the narrow road led to the
gallows !
(h) Ancillary American contributory factors. — The interlocking court records
of the Sorge case and the files of the Shanghai municipal police show a very
considerable traffic of shady international characters, over a long period of years.
Their clandestine operations in the thirties have paved the way for the collapse
of Nationalist China in recent years, under the cumulative impact of the Japanese
occupation.
The recent State Department white paper throws some flickering light on
this complex, general problem :
"* * * i^ combined force of overpopulation and new ideas set in motion
the Chinese revolution, first under the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen and later
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It should be remembered that Soviet doctrine
and practice had a measurable effect upon the thinking and principles of Dr.
Sun Yat-Sen particularly in terms of economics and party organization and that
the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists cooperated until 1927, when the
Third International demanded a predominant position in the Government and
in the Army. It was this demand which precipitated the break between the two
groups. * * *"
This is an oblique admission that the infant republic was weaned on Soviet
doctrine and practice; it easily explains the widow Sun Yat-Sen as a front for
many Communist efforts and it concedes naively, that the Chinese Communist
Party came under the orders of the Third International, the recognized Soviet
tool of internal sabotage and subversion, in its demands on the government and
army in 1927 — and thereafter.
The Shanghai police records contain many items in which American diplo-
matic and consular officers have attempted to stem the Red tide, by denying the
protection of the International Settlement or American pseudo-citizenship to
these operators ; a classical case is the intervention of the American consul to stop
the publication of The Voice of China. 54
While the white paper apparently skirts the conspiratorial underground, it
-confirms the impact of the Comintern apparatus, amply evident in the Sorge and
Shanghai documents ; it can at once be stated that individual propagandists and
operators like Smedley and Stein, and the horde of saboteurs, agents, fellow
travelers and dupes, unleashed by the Comintern, represent the major element
in this Oriental disaster and their nefarious work must be considered a contribu-
tory and even decisive factor.
Mr. Tavenner. I desire also to introduce in evidence a map tracing
the connection of the various organizations concerning which you
liave testified with various Soviet Government agencies and divisions
of the Comintern. I will hand it to you and ask you to identify it.
General Willoughby. It is so identified, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. I offer it in evidence and ask that it be marked
"Willoughby Exhibit No. 42."
Mr. Wood. It will be admitted.
(The map above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 42,"
is filed herewith.)
Mr. Tavenner. Will you explain briefly to the committee what it
purports to show?
M Vol. II of five volumes of procurator's examination of Ozaki, Hozumi ; Interrogation
No. 20, March 5, 1042, Question 14 ct al.
M See footnote 30; pt. Ill; G-2 Doc. 4, SMP File D-7298, March 3, 1936-December
.30, 1!K>,7.
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1251
General Willoughby. Intensive examination of the Shanghai
records, plus other supporting evidence available to the G-2 section
in Tokyo, made it comparatively easy to reconst nut the organizational
family tree of the Third (Communist) International.
The upper part of this family tree is the Communist mother unit.
The next part shows the foreign ancillaries, in this instance leading
into China. The third part is devoted to Shanghai. The box Inter-
national lied Aid leads to International Labor Defense (United
States) and Civil Rights Congress. I again refer to the article by
Craig Thompson in the Saturday Evening Post of February 17, 1951,
•which covers this specifically with reference to the United States. I
covered it specifically with reference to Shanghai. That is the purpose
•of this chart.
Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, in the course of your tenure
in Tokyo, were you acquainted with a person by the name of Philip
Keeney, or did you have occasion to look into the case of Philip
Keeney '.
General Willoughby. As a citizen, Mr. Counsel, I am very anxious
to be of service to this committee, but as a Federal employee and func-
tionary, I am expected to carry out to the letter the regulations of the
Army and the Presidential directive of March 1948, under the terms
of which I must respectfully decline to dwell on this individual,
since he was a Federal employee and no reference to his files is per-
mitted, derogatory or otherwise.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Keeney has appeared before this committee, but
he did not cooperate.
I believe you were asked questions before another committee relat-
ing to several other Government employees ?
General Willoughby. I was.
Mr. Tavenner. Is your answer the same as to those as to Philip
Keeney ?
General Willoughby. My technical objection is the same, on ac-
count of the clear-cut regulatory orders.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I believe that is all.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Doyle, do you have further questions ?
Mr. Doyle. I want to renew my question, then, if it is proper at
this place to ask the general to give us the benefit of his recommenda-
tions as to remedial legislation to meet the problem facing this coun-
try with regard to subversive activities. If you have any suggestions
or advice as to what further we can do in meeting the situation which
originates domestically or is instigated from foreign countries, give us
that.
General Willoughby. I have strong feelings on this entire field, and
am delighted at this opportunity of submitting certain thoughts that
might be termed recommendations.
First, the Federal Government should give full and unqualified sup-
port to this committee. Possibly a joint House-Senate committee is
indicated, as they are operating in the same sphere of investigation.
Such committee should be supported financially in order that their
research staffs may be increased. I have the impression that while
these staffs are doing a first-class job, they obviously are limited both
in time and personnel.
1252 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
With reference to such expanded allocation of funds to support
the research staffs of such committees as this, there should be establish-
ed a central file or record system in which information of this kind
ultimately finds its place, for future reference, or so that these inter-
locking relationships could be traced.
Second, the FBI should be vigorously supported. In my associa-
tion over many years with the FBI, I hold the highest regard for the
efficiency of that body. The authority should be extended from its
present field to include the international relationships in the areas
of subversion.
Third, their work should be made easier by the elimination 'of legal-
istic juridical objections. For example, to determine whether wire-
tapping under certain conditions is illegal. Wiretapping is in the
same category as furnishing a pistol to a law enforcing agency com-
bating crime. All law-enforcing agencies, with particular regard to
the FBI, should be given free play in their fight against these sub-
terranean forces of evil which have no such fine distinction as to
whether or not wiretapping is or is not illegal. The law-enforcing
agency combating them should be given complete liberty of action.
Fourth, having remarked once on the excellent work of the Cali-
fornia State Committee on Un-American Activities, I would recom-
mend that each State legislature form and maintain such a committee
and that this network of proposed State un-American activities com-
mittees cooperate, on a correspondence or secretarial basis, with this
congressional committee, so that the investigative process Statewide
blankets the Nation.
I also would recommend that at least one State university, or uni-
versities, should at once institute special research courses leading to
academic degrees, or acceptable under that classification, to study
the mechanism of communism and to disseminate combative literature
to that effect.
That, roughly, is my thought on the subject.
Mr. Doyle. You didn't mention any legislation other than what we
now have.
General Willoughby. I am glad you reminded me of it.
I think that any legislation that in your experience you have found
to be deficient in your line of inquiry should be strengthened or new
legislation provided, in order to satisfy the experience, for example,
by this committee in its past dealings; in fact, legislation to make this
committee permanent and not subject to, shall we say, an allocation
of funds, so that if the funds are not forthcoming the personnel col-
lapses. There is room for a permanent watchdog on a congressional
and State level for the laudable purposes of this inquiry.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde, any further questions?
Mr. Velde. General, I want to thank you for the very fine contribu-
tion you have made to this committee as a result of your very extensive
and distinguished service as Intelligence Chief to General MacArthur.
It occurred to me while you were testifying that your hands were
tied a little bit by this Presidential directive issued in April of 1948,
and subsequent Presidential directives. I realize full well that it
would be unwise for this committee to have available to it all of the
files of the FBI, or all of the G-2 files, but it does seem to me that
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1253
certain files, especially the older files, personnel files, loyalty files,
should be available to congressional committees for their examination
and perusal.
I wonder i 1' you agree with me on that ?
General Willoughiiy. May I say that I am reluctant to criticize
Presidential directives, but that the legislative liberty which is ac-
corded to Congress would, of course, enable them to pursue their
channels of inquiry according to the dictates of their conscience.
Mr. Velde. With reference to your recommendation relative to the
FBI and other investigative agencies, I happen to be familiar with
the operations of the FBI, being a former FBI agent myself. I
realize their hands are tied in certain investigations, especially those
involving subversives, by the fact it is difficult to obtain the permission
of the Attorney General in many cases to install wire taps or secret
means of obtaining information. However, it may be done, with the
authority of the Attorney General, and he only grants that authority,
as I understand it, when there is other corroborative evidence of sub-
versive activity in violation of the Federal laws. Do you think that
procedure should be changed in any way?
General Willoughbt. While I am anxious to be of assistance to you,
Mr. Velde, of course my specialty has been in a slightly different
category. I believe the Congress is in a position to effect such regu-
lations as they see fit, and my opinion is practically worthless.
Mr. Velde. When did you say that the Japanese intelligence were
first aware of the fact that the Sorge spy ring was operating in Japan?
General Willoughby. They must have been aware of it for some
time, because they intercepted Klauseivs radio messages to the Siber-
ian radio station. They knew by that token they were in contact with
some foreign agent. But Klausen had domicile furnished by the
British subject Guenther Stein, and shifted his station continually so
that they were not able to catch up with him.
Mr. Velde. Japan was on peaceful terms with Russia during the
thirties?
General Willoughbt. Yes. That was a contributing factor.
Mr. Velde. Would you say the Japanese had intelligence of the
Sorge spy ring as far back as 1935 ?
General Wiluutghby. That is not my impression; that is too far
back; that is too far back. As a matter of fact, Sorge, as I recall,
was in and out twice. I would have to look this up.
Mr. Velde. Of course, it isn't too important. I just wanted to bring
out the fact you have so ably brought out so many times, that we have
a counterpart to the Sorge spy ring, or did have, and I suppose it is
still functioning in the United States of America, and the first con-
clusive evidence that there was a Soviet spy ring operating in this
country was adduced in March 1943, that late, although it was deter-
mined the spy ring had been operating sometime prior to that time,
and probably back as far as 1934 or 1935. And I might say that the
evidence that was produced was substantiated by highly confidential
means such as you have been discussing.
The only difficulty that we have, as I see it, is the fact that after
evidence is obtained by highly confidential means, it is not permitted
as evidence in courts of law. I think our distinguished colleague. Mr.
Walter, is considering a bill before the Judiciary Committee at this
]254 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE
time to make evidence secured by wire tapping and other confidential'
means admissible in courts of law.
Do you concur that that would be a good recommendation for
legislation ?
General Willoughby. I concur. I have already gone on record
that all legalistic juridical objections in the way of law-enforcing and
investigative agencies should be removed, without touching the in-
dividual liberty in its broad concept, in order to make their work:
both easier and more effective. I selected wire tapping. Perhaps there
are other references possible. To be morally sensitive when you are
dealing with a criminal strikes me as silly.
Mr. Velde. Of course we all hate to have our rights of privacy
violated. I know I do, and I am sure you do too. But in cases where
we are liable to lose all our rights if we don't use such method, I
think the method is justified.
General Willotjghby. I assume it would only be applied against
subversive and criminal groups. The average citizen of probity would
hardly be exposed to it, and if he were, he could easily make his posi-
tion defensible, I have a feeling.
Mr. Velde. Thank you again.
Mr. Wood. General, I join with other members of the committee
in conveying to you the very deep appreciation that this committee
feels for the effort you have expended, and the considerable sacrifice
of your strength in the present condition of your health, as well as
your time, to come here and give the committee and the American
people the valuable information you have given.
After all, we only operate as the agents and representatives of the
people. We have no power other than to make known to the American
people, as best we can, what is going on that strikes at our liberty and
way of life. I am particularly impressed with what you had to say,,
and appreciative.
I wouldn't be entirely human if I didn't also take this opportunity
to express very great gratification for your feeling about this com-
mittee. This committee has been in existence a relatively short time..
We operate under a limited budget. It is significant that this com-
mittee has in its employ only eight investigators, who have to cover a
a wide area. Every member of this committee, elected Member of"
the Congress itself, has other committee assignments besides this, in
addition to the general work as Members of Congress in undertaking
to study and pass intelligently on legislation that comes before the-
Congress, which makes it obviously imperative that we lean rather
heavily upon our counsel and staff, and we are very fortunate to have
a staff and counsel of which no one needs to be ashamed, and of
which we are very proud.
It has occurred to me — not now but sometime at your leisure, today
or tomorrow or some future time — you might find an opportunity to
confer with the investigative staff and counsel of this committee
and, out of the abundance of your wide knowledge and experience,
you might make some suggestions, perhaps, to the staff that would be
beneficial to them in the performance of the various and many duties
piling in both day and night.
I happen to know that members of this staff work long hours.. There
is no clock- watching on this committee. Frequently they go for 24
AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1255
hours at a time without sleep. I felt that perhaps you might be in a
position to be of some assistance to them by making such suggestions
as you might think would be helpful to them, out of the abundance
of your experience.
Mr. Counsel, do you have any further questions you desire to ask
the general \
Mr. Tavenner. It is my thought that there is other testimony which
is vital to the committee.
Mr. Woon. I understood we wanted to have an executive session
with the general, and if he can join us for an executive session we
would be very grateful to him.
(Thereupon, at 4:50 p. in., the public testimony of General Wil-
loughby was concluded, and a subcommittee of the Committee on
Un-American Activities proceeded to go into executive session.)
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